Narrative:

I was the PIC sitting in the right seat conducting (operational experience) with a transition captain on his fourth leg in the left seat. We pushed back behind schedule and, upon calling ground control for taxi clearance, were told to contact clearance for a rerte. Taxi was commenced with operational experience captain monitoring ground while I copies the rerte. Rerte was verified and read back to clearance delivery. As I began to program the FMC, I entered the first fix, followed by the remainder of the clearance, and subsequently received an 'insufficient fuel' FMC message. The first fix had been spelled incorrectly and the mistake was obvious. The FMC was reprogrammed with the correct fix, a quick ACARS message to dispatch with the new route sent, and a clearance to cross an active runway was received. Operational experience captain called for taxi check as I inputted the takeoff performance into ACARS. I had a takeoff card displayed and then ACARS indicated full thrust, requiring the takeoff card to be changed and the taxi check to be interrupted. We thought we were #3 for takeoff, but tower put us into position and hold. Taxi check was completed, flight attendants were PA'ed for takeoff, and before takeoff check completed, after takeoff warning was received. Flaps had not been extended. A low speed abort was conducted, the runway cleared, and a PA made to our passenger. The flaps were extended, all checklists completed, and we departed lga uneventfully. We landed uneventfully at our destination. As an operational experience captain for over 2 yrs now, this one got by me. There was no fatigue involved. The transition captain, who was senior to me, had some minor idiosyncrasies that I was trying to correct diplomatically. When the flaps should have been extended I was preoccupied, mentally trying to figure out how to solve these habits, and missed the requirement for flap extension. I believe we completed the proper checklists but the verification of the physical position of the flap handle along with the flap gauge indication was not completed. I recommended to the transition captain that in the future, he should physically 'tap' the flap handle and point to the flap gauge for flap extension verification. I, too, shall incorporate this procedure in an effort to prevent another occurrence in the future.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: REJECTED TKOF AT LGA, NY, WHEN FLAPS WERE NOT EXTENDED FOR TKOF. TRAINING WAS IN PROGRESS.

Narrative: I WAS THE PIC SITTING IN THE R SEAT CONDUCTING (OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE) WITH A TRANSITION CAPT ON HIS FOURTH LEG IN THE L SEAT. WE PUSHED BACK BEHIND SCHEDULE AND, UPON CALLING GND CTL FOR TAXI CLRNC, WERE TOLD TO CONTACT CLRNC FOR A RERTE. TAXI WAS COMMENCED WITH OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE CAPT MONITORING GND WHILE I COPIES THE RERTE. RERTE WAS VERIFIED AND READ BACK TO CLRNC DELIVERY. AS I BEGAN TO PROGRAM THE FMC, I ENTERED THE FIRST FIX, FOLLOWED BY THE REMAINDER OF THE CLRNC, AND SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED AN 'INSUFFICIENT FUEL' FMC MESSAGE. THE FIRST FIX HAD BEEN SPELLED INCORRECTLY AND THE MISTAKE WAS OBVIOUS. THE FMC WAS REPROGRAMMED WITH THE CORRECT FIX, A QUICK ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH WITH THE NEW RTE SENT, AND A CLRNC TO CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY WAS RECEIVED. OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE CAPT CALLED FOR TAXI CHK AS I INPUTTED THE TKOF PERFORMANCE INTO ACARS. I HAD A TKOF CARD DISPLAYED AND THEN ACARS INDICATED FULL THRUST, REQUIRING THE TKOF CARD TO BE CHANGED AND THE TAXI CHK TO BE INTERRUPTED. WE THOUGHT WE WERE #3 FOR TKOF, BUT TWR PUT US INTO POS AND HOLD. TAXI CHK WAS COMPLETED, FLT ATTENDANTS WERE PA'ED FOR TKOF, AND BEFORE TKOF CHK COMPLETED, AFTER TKOF WARNING WAS RECEIVED. FLAPS HAD NOT BEEN EXTENDED. A LOW SPD ABORT WAS CONDUCTED, THE RWY CLRED, AND A PA MADE TO OUR PAX. THE FLAPS WERE EXTENDED, ALL CHKLISTS COMPLETED, AND WE DEPARTED LGA UNEVENTFULLY. WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY AT OUR DEST. AS AN OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE CAPT FOR OVER 2 YRS NOW, THIS ONE GOT BY ME. THERE WAS NO FATIGUE INVOLVED. THE TRANSITION CAPT, WHO WAS SENIOR TO ME, HAD SOME MINOR IDIOSYNCRASIES THAT I WAS TRYING TO CORRECT DIPLOMATICALLY. WHEN THE FLAPS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXTENDED I WAS PREOCCUPIED, MENTALLY TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO SOLVE THESE HABITS, AND MISSED THE REQUIREMENT FOR FLAP EXTENSION. I BELIEVE WE COMPLETED THE PROPER CHKLISTS BUT THE VERIFICATION OF THE PHYSICAL POS OF THE FLAP HANDLE ALONG WITH THE FLAP GAUGE INDICATION WAS NOT COMPLETED. I RECOMMENDED TO THE TRANSITION CAPT THAT IN THE FUTURE, HE SHOULD PHYSICALLY 'TAP' THE FLAP HANDLE AND POINT TO THE FLAP GAUGE FOR FLAP EXTENSION VERIFICATION. I, TOO, SHALL INCORPORATE THIS PROC IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT ANOTHER OCCURRENCE IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.