Narrative:

We were holding short of taxiway F, nearing the end of the pre takeoff briefing. Just prior to the final comments, we received, and first officer read back, clearance to 'turn the corner, taxi up to and hold short of runway 25L.' I heard left, but thought right. I cleared final as I approached runway 25L. In VMC, the airplane I saw on final looked like he was going to runway 25R. How it was discovered: as we neared the runway, I could see it was indeed going to land on the left runway. The #2 jump seat first officer also saw the conflict and called out 'there's an airplane out there.' after stopping, I realized our nosewheel was slightly ahead of the hold line. We did not appear to be in conflict with airplane Y on short final. He may have made the same determination. He chose to land. The next airplane Z (a B767) continued his approach. On short final, tower directed him to go around due to possible conflict with an aircraft holding short of the runway. He did so, and then we were cleared to cross both runways to taxi for runway 25R full length takeoff. Whenever possible, at our company, we prefer completing the predep briefing before pushback. The reason I did not accomplish it at the preferred time was due to my desire to assist station ground personnel. At about 35 mins before scheduled block-out, I was told that if we could depart early it would be helpful to the station in turning the other aircraft we had waiting to go. I think this may have been a contributing factor, as I decided to accomplish the brief after pushback while taxiing. Although I have briefed during taxi and been interrupted before, I have not had failures of clearance comprehension associated with that method. I believe the real failure on my part came from an isolated lapse in judgement. My preferred location to hold short of runway 25L is before turning onto taxiway F. The space after fully completing the turn seems quite short -- the line of sight is below the nose of a B747. I know ground control cleared me to hold short of taxiway F, but that was my normal runway hold short point. When I was cleared to 'taxi up...' I was going to taxi through and hold between the runways. It's really difficult to try to explain why you do something stupid. The explanation itself is stupid. I never have been a perfect pilot, so I am an avid advocate of CRM. I am told I support it quite well, so I have difficulty explaining why the 3 first officer's let me get that far -- especially because I was taxiing very slowly while watching airplane Y. Corrective actions: 1) minimize distrs while taxiing by briefing in the blocks. 2) brief the crew on the importance of clearance back-up by all crew members. 3) pilot controling the airplane should read back all clrncs to the crew as a statement of intentions. 4) fight the temptation to be complacent about operating from very familiar stations. Supplemental information from acn 477318: during taxi, and while the captain was giving his departure briefing, I switched to tower, south complex (120.95). Without a prompt from me, tower immediately gave us instructions to turn the corner on taxiway F and hold short of runway 25L. I read back the instructions verbatim and the captain continued with his briefing. While holding for runway 25R, tower sent us to a discrete frequency to discuss the incident. As the captain was rounding the corner onto taxiway F, I should have had my feet on or near the brake pedals to ensure he did not cross the hold line. Supplemental information from acn 478730: we were later instructed to contact the ATC supervisor on a discrete frequency and the captain gave him requested information: name, address, license number, phone number.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CARGO B747-400 PIC TAXIES PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 25L. TWR CTLR SENDS THE SECOND ACFT ON FINAL AROUND AFTER THE FIRST ONE HAD ALREADY LANDED ON RWY 25L AT LAX, CA.

Narrative: WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OF TXWY F, NEARING THE END OF THE PRE TKOF BRIEFING. JUST PRIOR TO THE FINAL COMMENTS, WE RECEIVED, AND FO READ BACK, CLRNC TO 'TURN THE CORNER, TAXI UP TO AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25L.' I HEARD L, BUT THOUGHT R. I CLRED FINAL AS I APCHED RWY 25L. IN VMC, THE AIRPLANE I SAW ON FINAL LOOKED LIKE HE WAS GOING TO RWY 25R. HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED: AS WE NEARED THE RWY, I COULD SEE IT WAS INDEED GOING TO LAND ON THE L RWY. THE #2 JUMP SEAT FO ALSO SAW THE CONFLICT AND CALLED OUT 'THERE'S AN AIRPLANE OUT THERE.' AFTER STOPPING, I REALIZED OUR NOSEWHEEL WAS SLIGHTLY AHEAD OF THE HOLD LINE. WE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH AIRPLANE Y ON SHORT FINAL. HE MAY HAVE MADE THE SAME DETERMINATION. HE CHOSE TO LAND. THE NEXT AIRPLANE Z (A B767) CONTINUED HIS APCH. ON SHORT FINAL, TWR DIRECTED HIM TO GO AROUND DUE TO POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH AN ACFT HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY. HE DID SO, AND THEN WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS BOTH RWYS TO TAXI FOR RWY 25R FULL LENGTH TKOF. WHENEVER POSSIBLE, AT OUR COMPANY, WE PREFER COMPLETING THE PREDEP BRIEFING BEFORE PUSHBACK. THE REASON I DID NOT ACCOMPLISH IT AT THE PREFERRED TIME WAS DUE TO MY DESIRE TO ASSIST STATION GND PERSONNEL. AT ABOUT 35 MINS BEFORE SCHEDULED BLOCK-OUT, I WAS TOLD THAT IF WE COULD DEPART EARLY IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE STATION IN TURNING THE OTHER ACFT WE HAD WAITING TO GO. I THINK THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR, AS I DECIDED TO ACCOMPLISH THE BRIEF AFTER PUSHBACK WHILE TAXIING. ALTHOUGH I HAVE BRIEFED DURING TAXI AND BEEN INTERRUPTED BEFORE, I HAVE NOT HAD FAILURES OF CLRNC COMPREHENSION ASSOCIATED WITH THAT METHOD. I BELIEVE THE REAL FAILURE ON MY PART CAME FROM AN ISOLATED LAPSE IN JUDGEMENT. MY PREFERRED LOCATION TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25L IS BEFORE TURNING ONTO TXWY F. THE SPACE AFTER FULLY COMPLETING THE TURN SEEMS QUITE SHORT -- THE LINE OF SIGHT IS BELOW THE NOSE OF A B747. I KNOW GND CTL CLRED ME TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY F, BUT THAT WAS MY NORMAL RWY HOLD SHORT POINT. WHEN I WAS CLRED TO 'TAXI UP...' I WAS GOING TO TAXI THROUGH AND HOLD BTWN THE RWYS. IT'S REALLY DIFFICULT TO TRY TO EXPLAIN WHY YOU DO SOMETHING STUPID. THE EXPLANATION ITSELF IS STUPID. I NEVER HAVE BEEN A PERFECT PLT, SO I AM AN AVID ADVOCATE OF CRM. I AM TOLD I SUPPORT IT QUITE WELL, SO I HAVE DIFFICULTY EXPLAINING WHY THE 3 FO'S LET ME GET THAT FAR -- ESPECIALLY BECAUSE I WAS TAXIING VERY SLOWLY WHILE WATCHING AIRPLANE Y. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) MINIMIZE DISTRS WHILE TAXIING BY BRIEFING IN THE BLOCKS. 2) BRIEF THE CREW ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CLRNC BACK-UP BY ALL CREW MEMBERS. 3) PLT CTLING THE AIRPLANE SHOULD READ BACK ALL CLRNCS TO THE CREW AS A STATEMENT OF INTENTIONS. 4) FIGHT THE TEMPTATION TO BE COMPLACENT ABOUT OPERATING FROM VERY FAMILIAR STATIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 477318: DURING TAXI, AND WHILE THE CAPT WAS GIVING HIS DEP BRIEFING, I SWITCHED TO TWR, S COMPLEX (120.95). WITHOUT A PROMPT FROM ME, TWR IMMEDIATELY GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN THE CORNER ON TXWY F AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25L. I READ BACK THE INSTRUCTIONS VERBATIM AND THE CAPT CONTINUED WITH HIS BRIEFING. WHILE HOLDING FOR RWY 25R, TWR SENT US TO A DISCRETE FREQ TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT. AS THE CAPT WAS ROUNDING THE CORNER ONTO TXWY F, I SHOULD HAVE HAD MY FEET ON OR NEAR THE BRAKE PEDALS TO ENSURE HE DID NOT CROSS THE HOLD LINE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 478730: WE WERE LATER INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT THE ATC SUPVR ON A DISCRETE FREQ AND THE CAPT GAVE HIM REQUESTED INFO: NAME, ADDRESS, LICENSE NUMBER, PHONE NUMBER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.