Narrative:

Poor communication between the pilots and controllers. The controller needs to be aware of his airspace and NOTAMS much like pilots do. Also, pressure on pilots to obey instructions was given priority over safety and preparedness. A flight plan was filed for a departure from gjt to sbd with NOTAM and WX forecast information by the captain. A normal clearance was received by the first officer. On the arrival, we were told to expect a visual approach to sbd. We were handed off to a controller (socal approach) who told us that sbd was closed. He asked our intentions. I asked for time to discuss with my passenger our options. We were assigned a heading. After evaluating our options (other airports) the controller advised us that sbd was open. We had a short discussion that, per ATIS and NOTAM information, only runway 6 was closed. We were vectored and cleared for the ILS 6 approach. I asked to go around because we were expecting a visual approach and were not prepared for the ILS 6 (which was inoperative in earlier received NOTAMS). The controller then told us that the ILS was inoperative and asked if we could accept the NDB runway 6. We said we could but needed time to prepare. We asked for holding. We were given a heading and a climb instruction. The controller was relieved. The new controller gave us immediate vectors for the NDB 6. We still were not ready. As the instruction was received to 'turn to 090 degrees, maintain 3200 ft until established, cleared for the NDB 6 approach,' we flew through the final approach course. The controller asked our intentions and we asked for another vector to the NDB 6. More vectors were received for the NDB 6. This time we became established and were cleared for the NDB runway 6 circle to runway 24. I asked for a wind check (light and variable) and continued (on unicom). I asked the first officer what altitude we could descend to and he gave me the MDA (we're still outside of petis, the NDB). The altitude I was looking for was 3200 ft, not the MDA. The controller gave us the phone number to call, and we continued with a visual approach to land on runway 24. During this arrival, approachs, and landing, a passenger was about the cabin (with the passenger advisory light on) trying to stay abreast of the situation. I tried to explain as best I could and would explain everything on the ground. After parking, I tried to explain the situation to the passenger and her company. She seemed to understand. I made the call to socal and we seemed to reach a mutual understanding. I called the chief pilot and advised him of the situation. The WX received for sbd on ATIS was visibility greater than 6 mi, no clouds below 12000 ft (VFR conditions).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE560 CREW HAD ALT AND TRACK DEV AT SBD IN SCT CLASS E AIRSPACE.

Narrative: POOR COM BTWN THE PLTS AND CTLRS. THE CTLR NEEDS TO BE AWARE OF HIS AIRSPACE AND NOTAMS MUCH LIKE PLTS DO. ALSO, PRESSURE ON PLTS TO OBEY INSTRUCTIONS WAS GIVEN PRIORITY OVER SAFETY AND PREPAREDNESS. A FLT PLAN WAS FILED FOR A DEP FROM GJT TO SBD WITH NOTAM AND WX FORECAST INFO BY THE CAPT. A NORMAL CLRNC WAS RECEIVED BY THE FO. ON THE ARR, WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT A VISUAL APCH TO SBD. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO A CTLR (SOCAL APCH) WHO TOLD US THAT SBD WAS CLOSED. HE ASKED OUR INTENTIONS. I ASKED FOR TIME TO DISCUSS WITH MY PAX OUR OPTIONS. WE WERE ASSIGNED A HDG. AFTER EVALUATING OUR OPTIONS (OTHER ARPTS) THE CTLR ADVISED US THAT SBD WAS OPEN. WE HAD A SHORT DISCUSSION THAT, PER ATIS AND NOTAM INFO, ONLY RWY 6 WAS CLOSED. WE WERE VECTORED AND CLRED FOR THE ILS 6 APCH. I ASKED TO GO AROUND BECAUSE WE WERE EXPECTING A VISUAL APCH AND WERE NOT PREPARED FOR THE ILS 6 (WHICH WAS INOP IN EARLIER RECEIVED NOTAMS). THE CTLR THEN TOLD US THAT THE ILS WAS INOP AND ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT THE NDB RWY 6. WE SAID WE COULD BUT NEEDED TIME TO PREPARE. WE ASKED FOR HOLDING. WE WERE GIVEN A HDG AND A CLB INSTRUCTION. THE CTLR WAS RELIEVED. THE NEW CTLR GAVE US IMMEDIATE VECTORS FOR THE NDB 6. WE STILL WERE NOT READY. AS THE INSTRUCTION WAS RECEIVED TO 'TURN TO 090 DEGS, MAINTAIN 3200 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED, CLRED FOR THE NDB 6 APCH,' WE FLEW THROUGH THE FINAL APCH COURSE. THE CTLR ASKED OUR INTENTIONS AND WE ASKED FOR ANOTHER VECTOR TO THE NDB 6. MORE VECTORS WERE RECEIVED FOR THE NDB 6. THIS TIME WE BECAME ESTABLISHED AND WERE CLRED FOR THE NDB RWY 6 CIRCLE TO RWY 24. I ASKED FOR A WIND CHK (LIGHT AND VARIABLE) AND CONTINUED (ON UNICOM). I ASKED THE FO WHAT ALT WE COULD DSND TO AND HE GAVE ME THE MDA (WE'RE STILL OUTSIDE OF PETIS, THE NDB). THE ALT I WAS LOOKING FOR WAS 3200 FT, NOT THE MDA. THE CTLR GAVE US THE PHONE NUMBER TO CALL, AND WE CONTINUED WITH A VISUAL APCH TO LAND ON RWY 24. DURING THIS ARR, APCHS, AND LNDG, A PAX WAS ABOUT THE CABIN (WITH THE PAX ADVISORY LIGHT ON) TRYING TO STAY ABREAST OF THE SIT. I TRIED TO EXPLAIN AS BEST I COULD AND WOULD EXPLAIN EVERYTHING ON THE GND. AFTER PARKING, I TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE SIT TO THE PAX AND HER COMPANY. SHE SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND. I MADE THE CALL TO SOCAL AND WE SEEMED TO REACH A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. I CALLED THE CHIEF PLT AND ADVISED HIM OF THE SIT. THE WX RECEIVED FOR SBD ON ATIS WAS VISIBILITY GREATER THAN 6 MI, NO CLOUDS BELOW 12000 FT (VFR CONDITIONS).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.