Narrative:

I volunteered to take kids flying at xyz airport. The first flight I was able to get flight following and flew in the local area for about 30 mins. On the second flight I called numerous times and was unable to get flight following. During one of the call attempts I looked up and saw a C172 heading on a direct collision course at less than 200 ft away. I avoided the collision and needless to say was quite rattled. I was about 3500 ft when this happened. I became extra concerned and took my head out of the cockpit and headed back to xyz. On arrival into xyz I was too high and entered the bottom of the outer ring of the class C airspace. When I landed I was asked to call approach. The supervisor was very cordial and wanted to make sure I understood the airspace. I told him I am very familiar, however, in my rattled state I blew it. On departing xyz on the way home, ground was complaining about my radios having a loud squeal in them. I switched radios a couple of times and the squeal persisted. I determined the cause. After landing my landing light was left on and had a high drain on the battery and the alternator had a very high load after startup. When I departed, I called tower on ground since I was still tuned to #2. When I called the tower [on second attempt] I abbreviated my call-up (since I had in my mind already given the proper call-up, except [that was] to ground) the controller lectured me on giving the right information on call-up. Then on departure I requested a straight-out. The runway heading is 250 degrees. I was flying between 220-240 degrees, which put me in the controller's airspace for the left runway. I did not realize that straight out meant runway heading, and by now the controller was very upset with me. What I learned: my normal mode of flight is going somewhere and talking to ATC all the way. Milling around with a plane full of kids in busy airspace without flight following and having the closest call in 2500 hours of flying really shook me up. I was now in a mentally dangerous state. Even after cooling down some on the ground, this unsettled state still existed and the problems from the first flight (leaving the landing light on) carried on a bad chain of events into the next flight. Taking more time getting back in the air would have broken the chain. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter commented on the progression of an incident and how one disturbing incident may lead to others if focus is lost. As reporter said, 'one part of the mind goes 'brain dead'....' reporter also commented on the lack of TCASII or transponder equipment for GA aircraft in general and the overall cost of same in particular and how technology can solve the issue of data link transmission through inexpensive transmission, reception and display units for all aircraft within the ATC system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C182 PVT PLT EXPERIENCES AN NMAC WITH PAX ON BOARD. HE IS SO DISTURBED BY THIS FACT (THAT OF MISSING THE C172 BY 200 FT) THAT HE EXPERIENCES OTHER MISADVENTURES DUE TO THE LOSS OF FOCUS NEAR XYZ ARPT, CA.

Narrative: I VOLUNTEERED TO TAKE KIDS FLYING AT XYZ ARPT. THE FIRST FLT I WAS ABLE TO GET FLT FOLLOWING AND FLEW IN THE LCL AREA FOR ABOUT 30 MINS. ON THE SECOND FLT I CALLED NUMEROUS TIMES AND WAS UNABLE TO GET FLT FOLLOWING. DURING ONE OF THE CALL ATTEMPTS I LOOKED UP AND SAW A C172 HDG ON A DIRECT COLLISION COURSE AT LESS THAN 200 FT AWAY. I AVOIDED THE COLLISION AND NEEDLESS TO SAY WAS QUITE RATTLED. I WAS ABOUT 3500 FT WHEN THIS HAPPENED. I BECAME EXTRA CONCERNED AND TOOK MY HEAD OUT OF THE COCKPIT AND HEADED BACK TO XYZ. ON ARR INTO XYZ I WAS TOO HIGH AND ENTERED THE BOTTOM OF THE OUTER RING OF THE CLASS C AIRSPACE. WHEN I LANDED I WAS ASKED TO CALL APCH. THE SUPVR WAS VERY CORDIAL AND WANTED TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTOOD THE AIRSPACE. I TOLD HIM I AM VERY FAMILIAR, HOWEVER, IN MY RATTLED STATE I BLEW IT. ON DEPARTING XYZ ON THE WAY HOME, GND WAS COMPLAINING ABOUT MY RADIOS HAVING A LOUD SQUEAL IN THEM. I SWITCHED RADIOS A COUPLE OF TIMES AND THE SQUEAL PERSISTED. I DETERMINED THE CAUSE. AFTER LNDG MY LNDG LIGHT WAS LEFT ON AND HAD A HIGH DRAIN ON THE BATTERY AND THE ALTERNATOR HAD A VERY HIGH LOAD AFTER STARTUP. WHEN I DEPARTED, I CALLED TWR ON GND SINCE I WAS STILL TUNED TO #2. WHEN I CALLED THE TWR [ON SECOND ATTEMPT] I ABBREVIATED MY CALL-UP (SINCE I HAD IN MY MIND ALREADY GIVEN THE PROPER CALL-UP, EXCEPT [THAT WAS] TO GND) THE CTLR LECTURED ME ON GIVING THE RIGHT INFO ON CALL-UP. THEN ON DEP I REQUESTED A STRAIGHT-OUT. THE RWY HDG IS 250 DEGS. I WAS FLYING BTWN 220-240 DEGS, WHICH PUT ME IN THE CTLR'S AIRSPACE FOR THE L RWY. I DID NOT REALIZE THAT STRAIGHT OUT MEANT RWY HDG, AND BY NOW THE CTLR WAS VERY UPSET WITH ME. WHAT I LEARNED: MY NORMAL MODE OF FLT IS GOING SOMEWHERE AND TALKING TO ATC ALL THE WAY. MILLING AROUND WITH A PLANE FULL OF KIDS IN BUSY AIRSPACE WITHOUT FLT FOLLOWING AND HAVING THE CLOSEST CALL IN 2500 HRS OF FLYING REALLY SHOOK ME UP. I WAS NOW IN A MENTALLY DANGEROUS STATE. EVEN AFTER COOLING DOWN SOME ON THE GND, THIS UNSETTLED STATE STILL EXISTED AND THE PROBS FROM THE FIRST FLT (LEAVING THE LNDG LIGHT ON) CARRIED ON A BAD CHAIN OF EVENTS INTO THE NEXT FLT. TAKING MORE TIME GETTING BACK IN THE AIR WOULD HAVE BROKEN THE CHAIN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR COMMENTED ON THE PROGRESSION OF AN INCIDENT AND HOW ONE DISTURBING INCIDENT MAY LEAD TO OTHERS IF FOCUS IS LOST. AS RPTR SAID, 'ONE PART OF THE MIND GOES 'BRAIN DEAD'....' RPTR ALSO COMMENTED ON THE LACK OF TCASII OR XPONDER EQUIP FOR GA ACFT IN GENERAL AND THE OVERALL COST OF SAME IN PARTICULAR AND HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN SOLVE THE ISSUE OF DATA LINK XMISSION THROUGH INEXPENSIVE XMISSION, RECEPTION AND DISPLAY UNITS FOR ALL ACFT WITHIN THE ATC SYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.