Narrative:

On departure we were cleared to pdx via the eagle one departure. The acceleration ht for this runway is 2529 ft MSL (1194 ft AGL). The first officer briefed the engine-out turn procedure and acceleration ht as well as our route clearance as it was her leg. We were cleared for takeoff and departed mfr on runway 32. As per our understanding of company procedure, we were climbing to the acceleration of 2529 ft where we were then going to turn to 015 degrees on the eagle one departure. The tower handed us off to cascade approach as we climbed straight ahead to 2529 ft. At 2529 ft the first officer called for flaps up, climb power, after takeoff checklist while turning to a 015 degree heading. At this point we became aware of 2 things: one was that approach was talking to traffic inbound on the localizer to mfr and the other was that he wanted us to make an immediate right turn to a 090 degree heading to avoid this traffic. We of course complied immediately and in the turn I gained visual contact on the traffic. We did not get a TA or RA on the TCASII. The controller advised us to contact cascade approach upon landing in pdx and gave us the number. The remainder of the flight proceeded normally to pdx. Factors contributing to the above situation are as follows: departing traffic from mfr on runway 32 while arrs inbound on the runway 14 localizer has the potential for conflict even under the best of circumstances. A concern of mine would be an engine failure after departure before reaching acceleration ht. Procedure dictates flying the published turn procedure back to the imfr localizer or mfr VOR, taking you directly into the path of the inbound traffic. My understanding of company procedures regarding acceleration ht and tuns after departure. A common perception among dash 8 pilots is that a turn may not begin until reaching acceleration ht. I think this has come about because many of us are taught that we may not begin to turn after departure until we are at least 400 ft AGL. Most of the airports we depart have acceleration hts that are at or near 400 ft AGL. I think over time these 2 separate issues become blended into one, causing one to believe that a turn may not begin until reaching acceleration ht. At most airports these 2 events occur almost simultaneously, but at places like mfr the extra high acceleration ht caused the delay to the 015 degree heading. Communication. Mfr tower and cascade approach observed this climb to acceleration ht before turning to the 015 degree heading occurring on a fairly regular basis and in some instances called the company to report it. Individual crews were counseled to correct their misconceptions. A communication to the entire pilot group or even just the dash 8 pilots could have corrected this at once. A call by approach to alert us of the inbound traffic before it got critical may also have helped. Fatigue. This was the 6TH and last leg of a day beginning at very early morning wake-up. No breaks in the schedule for meals makes a 10 hour duty day seem even longer and more tiring. Supplemental information from acn 475964: crew believed they were following company policy. Crew believes situation could have been avoided by having the tower/departure communicate the GA impending approach/arrival. Also if the eagle one had said immediate right turn after departure. Company procedures clarified -- acceleration ht and turns prior reaching altitude.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TFC CONFLICT AT MEDFORD, OR, WHEN ILS RWY 14 CIRCLE TO LAND IS IN USE WITH DEPS ON RWY 32. CONFUSION ABOUT ALT FOR FIRST TURN AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: ON DEP WE WERE CLRED TO PDX VIA THE EAGLE ONE DEP. THE ACCELERATION HT FOR THIS RWY IS 2529 FT MSL (1194 FT AGL). THE FO BRIEFED THE ENG-OUT TURN PROC AND ACCELERATION HT AS WELL AS OUR RTE CLRNC AS IT WAS HER LEG. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND DEPARTED MFR ON RWY 32. AS PER OUR UNDERSTANDING OF COMPANY PROC, WE WERE CLBING TO THE ACCELERATION OF 2529 FT WHERE WE WERE THEN GOING TO TURN TO 015 DEGS ON THE EAGLE ONE DEP. THE TWR HANDED US OFF TO CASCADE APCH AS WE CLBED STRAIGHT AHEAD TO 2529 FT. AT 2529 FT THE FO CALLED FOR FLAPS UP, CLB PWR, AFTER TKOF CHKLIST WHILE TURNING TO A 015 DEG HDG. AT THIS POINT WE BECAME AWARE OF 2 THINGS: ONE WAS THAT APCH WAS TALKING TO TFC INBOUND ON THE LOC TO MFR AND THE OTHER WAS THAT HE WANTED US TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE R TURN TO A 090 DEG HDG TO AVOID THIS TFC. WE OF COURSE COMPLIED IMMEDIATELY AND IN THE TURN I GAINED VISUAL CONTACT ON THE TFC. WE DID NOT GET A TA OR RA ON THE TCASII. THE CTLR ADVISED US TO CONTACT CASCADE APCH UPON LNDG IN PDX AND GAVE US THE NUMBER. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY TO PDX. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ABOVE SIT ARE AS FOLLOWS: DEPARTING TFC FROM MFR ON RWY 32 WHILE ARRS INBOUND ON THE RWY 14 LOC HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT EVEN UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES. A CONCERN OF MINE WOULD BE AN ENG FAILURE AFTER DEP BEFORE REACHING ACCELERATION HT. PROC DICTATES FLYING THE PUBLISHED TURN PROC BACK TO THE IMFR LOC OR MFR VOR, TAKING YOU DIRECTLY INTO THE PATH OF THE INBOUND TFC. MY UNDERSTANDING OF COMPANY PROCS REGARDING ACCELERATION HT AND TUNS AFTER DEP. A COMMON PERCEPTION AMONG DASH 8 PLTS IS THAT A TURN MAY NOT BEGIN UNTIL REACHING ACCELERATION HT. I THINK THIS HAS COME ABOUT BECAUSE MANY OF US ARE TAUGHT THAT WE MAY NOT BEGIN TO TURN AFTER DEP UNTIL WE ARE AT LEAST 400 FT AGL. MOST OF THE ARPTS WE DEPART HAVE ACCELERATION HTS THAT ARE AT OR NEAR 400 FT AGL. I THINK OVER TIME THESE 2 SEPARATE ISSUES BECOME BLENDED INTO ONE, CAUSING ONE TO BELIEVE THAT A TURN MAY NOT BEGIN UNTIL REACHING ACCELERATION HT. AT MOST ARPTS THESE 2 EVENTS OCCUR ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY, BUT AT PLACES LIKE MFR THE EXTRA HIGH ACCELERATION HT CAUSED THE DELAY TO THE 015 DEG HDG. COM. MFR TWR AND CASCADE APCH OBSERVED THIS CLB TO ACCELERATION HT BEFORE TURNING TO THE 015 DEG HDG OCCURRING ON A FAIRLY REGULAR BASIS AND IN SOME INSTANCES CALLED THE COMPANY TO RPT IT. INDIVIDUAL CREWS WERE COUNSELED TO CORRECT THEIR MISCONCEPTIONS. A COM TO THE ENTIRE PLT GROUP OR EVEN JUST THE DASH 8 PLTS COULD HAVE CORRECTED THIS AT ONCE. A CALL BY APCH TO ALERT US OF THE INBOUND TFC BEFORE IT GOT CRITICAL MAY ALSO HAVE HELPED. FATIGUE. THIS WAS THE 6TH AND LAST LEG OF A DAY BEGINNING AT VERY EARLY MORNING WAKE-UP. NO BREAKS IN THE SCHEDULE FOR MEALS MAKES A 10 HR DUTY DAY SEEM EVEN LONGER AND MORE TIRING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 475964: CREW BELIEVED THEY WERE FOLLOWING COMPANY POLICY. CREW BELIEVES SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY HAVING THE TWR/DEP COMMUNICATE THE GA IMPENDING APCH/ARR. ALSO IF THE EAGLE ONE HAD SAID IMMEDIATE R TURN AFTER DEP. COMPANY PROCS CLARIFIED -- ACCELERATION HT AND TURNS PRIOR REACHING ALT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.