Narrative:

I was the first officer, still on IOE, on a regularly scheduled flight from dallas to dulles to dallas with an XA00 am departure. The captain was a check airman as necessitated by my IOE status. The captain suggested I take the first leg to dulles and I did. He did not seem sharp and alert. He missed calls from ATC and seemed slow to respond to his PNF duties. At one point the captain fell asleep, and I engaged him in conversation to keep him awake. The flight was otherwise uneventful. On the return leg from dulles to dallas, the captain flew. We were IMC on climb out and were given a clearance to 23000 ft. The captain was climbing with the autoplt on. I called 1000 ft to go in accordance with company procedure. As we approached 23000 ft I noticed the captain still had an 1800 FPM climb rate and I said, 'there's 23000 ft.' the captain leveled off at 23300 ft and went back to FL230. Throughout the climb we were given short, rapid climbs to various altitudes prior to being given a clearance to our cruise altitude of 35000 ft. During the climbs to the intermediate altitudes the captain climbed at an airspeed slower than the recommended climb profile. I assumed that since he was a captain and check airman with much more experience in the DC9 that he knew what he was doing and that he was within acceptable parameters for the aircraft. Being so new to the aircraft I was unsure as to what was acceptable, although I knew clearly what the recommended climb profile was, and that he was much slower than that. After being given clearance to cruise altitude of FL350, we continued to climb. I became involved in PNF duties, such as checking our cleared route of flight, setting up our navigation equipment to the next radio fixes and communicating with ATC. We were passing FL330 and at that point the yoke began to oscillate left and right. We were still climbing and still on autoplt. I said, 'what's that?' the captain responded, 'it does that sometimes.' as he responded I checked our airspeed. The airspeed indicated approximately 183 KTS. I said, 'we're too slow. Add power.' the captain was slow to respond. Again I said 'we're too slow, add power, lower the nose.' at that moment the stick shaker and srss came on and we began to descend. As I called for power the captain added some power. The takeoff and landing data cards (told cards) which were behind the power levers interfered. The left wing dipped lower. I helped level the wings by aileron and rudder input. The captain finally moved the takeoff and landing data cards and added more power. We were descending rapidly. I said, 'lower the nose -- get some airspeed.' he then clicked off the autoplt and lowered the nose. I called ATC and requested a descent. I was cut out. I called again and said that we were experiencing an autoplt problem and needed an immediate descent. ATC said 'you're cleared to descend, level off when able and report that altitude.' the captain said, 'it feels like something is dragging.' I verified that the slats, flaps, and gear selectors were all in the up position and that all indicators confirmed they were up. He continued to say something is dragging. I responded that we had no indication of anything dragging and that we needed airspeed. We picked up airspeed and were able to stop the descent just under FL310. He climbed again and leveled at FL310. We picked up more airspeed to cruise mach of .78. I called ATC and reported level at FL310 and requested to remain there. I am not certain but suspect that the captain may have experienced subtle incapacitation of some kind. As a check airman I was expecting his knowledge of the climb speed parameters to be much more extensive than mine and hence I did not question his deviation from the recommended climb profile. Once the airspeed was obviously too slow, I did not hesitate to speak up. I felt I coached him through the recovery and that he was unaware that the situation was dire. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter is a new probationary first officer for a new start up air carrier. They do not have a pilot's union, or any professional standards group. The first officer reported the problems to the air carrier chief pilot. She reports that the chief pilot and the captain are close friends. As far as she knows, nothing hasbeen done. The chief pilot requested her to place nothing on paper, and keep everything verbal. Since her incident other first officer's have had similar problems with the same captain.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC9 CAPT HAD SUBTLE INCAPACITATION ON 2 FLT LEGS.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO, STILL ON IOE, ON A REGULARLY SCHEDULED FLT FROM DALLAS TO DULLES TO DALLAS WITH AN XA00 AM DEP. THE CAPT WAS A CHK AIRMAN AS NECESSITATED BY MY IOE STATUS. THE CAPT SUGGESTED I TAKE THE FIRST LEG TO DULLES AND I DID. HE DID NOT SEEM SHARP AND ALERT. HE MISSED CALLS FROM ATC AND SEEMED SLOW TO RESPOND TO HIS PNF DUTIES. AT ONE POINT THE CAPT FELL ASLEEP, AND I ENGAGED HIM IN CONVERSATION TO KEEP HIM AWAKE. THE FLT WAS OTHERWISE UNEVENTFUL. ON THE RETURN LEG FROM DULLES TO DALLAS, THE CAPT FLEW. WE WERE IMC ON CLBOUT AND WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO 23000 FT. THE CAPT WAS CLBING WITH THE AUTOPLT ON. I CALLED 1000 FT TO GO IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY PROC. AS WE APCHED 23000 FT I NOTICED THE CAPT STILL HAD AN 1800 FPM CLB RATE AND I SAID, 'THERE'S 23000 FT.' THE CAPT LEVELED OFF AT 23300 FT AND WENT BACK TO FL230. THROUGHOUT THE CLB WE WERE GIVEN SHORT, RAPID CLBS TO VARIOUS ALTS PRIOR TO BEING GIVEN A CLRNC TO OUR CRUISE ALT OF 35000 FT. DURING THE CLBS TO THE INTERMEDIATE ALTS THE CAPT CLBED AT AN AIRSPD SLOWER THAN THE RECOMMENDED CLB PROFILE. I ASSUMED THAT SINCE HE WAS A CAPT AND CHK AIRMAN WITH MUCH MORE EXPERIENCE IN THE DC9 THAT HE KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING AND THAT HE WAS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE PARAMETERS FOR THE ACFT. BEING SO NEW TO THE ACFT I WAS UNSURE AS TO WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH I KNEW CLRLY WHAT THE RECOMMENDED CLB PROFILE WAS, AND THAT HE WAS MUCH SLOWER THAN THAT. AFTER BEING GIVEN CLRNC TO CRUISE ALT OF FL350, WE CONTINUED TO CLB. I BECAME INVOLVED IN PNF DUTIES, SUCH AS CHKING OUR CLRED RTE OF FLT, SETTING UP OUR NAV EQUIP TO THE NEXT RADIO FIXES AND COMMUNICATING WITH ATC. WE WERE PASSING FL330 AND AT THAT POINT THE YOKE BEGAN TO OSCILLATE L AND R. WE WERE STILL CLBING AND STILL ON AUTOPLT. I SAID, 'WHAT'S THAT?' THE CAPT RESPONDED, 'IT DOES THAT SOMETIMES.' AS HE RESPONDED I CHKED OUR AIRSPD. THE AIRSPD INDICATED APPROX 183 KTS. I SAID, 'WE'RE TOO SLOW. ADD PWR.' THE CAPT WAS SLOW TO RESPOND. AGAIN I SAID 'WE'RE TOO SLOW, ADD PWR, LOWER THE NOSE.' AT THAT MOMENT THE STICK SHAKER AND SRSS CAME ON AND WE BEGAN TO DSND. AS I CALLED FOR PWR THE CAPT ADDED SOME PWR. THE TKOF AND LNDG DATA CARDS (TOLD CARDS) WHICH WERE BEHIND THE PWR LEVERS INTERFERED. THE L WING DIPPED LOWER. I HELPED LEVEL THE WINGS BY AILERON AND RUDDER INPUT. THE CAPT FINALLY MOVED THE TKOF AND LNDG DATA CARDS AND ADDED MORE PWR. WE WERE DSNDING RAPIDLY. I SAID, 'LOWER THE NOSE -- GET SOME AIRSPD.' HE THEN CLICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND LOWERED THE NOSE. I CALLED ATC AND REQUESTED A DSCNT. I WAS CUT OUT. I CALLED AGAIN AND SAID THAT WE WERE EXPERIENCING AN AUTOPLT PROB AND NEEDED AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT. ATC SAID 'YOU'RE CLRED TO DSND, LEVEL OFF WHEN ABLE AND RPT THAT ALT.' THE CAPT SAID, 'IT FEELS LIKE SOMETHING IS DRAGGING.' I VERIFIED THAT THE SLATS, FLAPS, AND GEAR SELECTORS WERE ALL IN THE UP POS AND THAT ALL INDICATORS CONFIRMED THEY WERE UP. HE CONTINUED TO SAY SOMETHING IS DRAGGING. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD NO INDICATION OF ANYTHING DRAGGING AND THAT WE NEEDED AIRSPD. WE PICKED UP AIRSPD AND WERE ABLE TO STOP THE DSCNT JUST UNDER FL310. HE CLBED AGAIN AND LEVELED AT FL310. WE PICKED UP MORE AIRSPD TO CRUISE MACH OF .78. I CALLED ATC AND RPTED LEVEL AT FL310 AND REQUESTED TO REMAIN THERE. I AM NOT CERTAIN BUT SUSPECT THAT THE CAPT MAY HAVE EXPERIENCED SUBTLE INCAPACITATION OF SOME KIND. AS A CHK AIRMAN I WAS EXPECTING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLB SPD PARAMETERS TO BE MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE THAN MINE AND HENCE I DID NOT QUESTION HIS DEV FROM THE RECOMMENDED CLB PROFILE. ONCE THE AIRSPD WAS OBVIOUSLY TOO SLOW, I DID NOT HESITATE TO SPEAK UP. I FELT I COACHED HIM THROUGH THE RECOVERY AND THAT HE WAS UNAWARE THAT THE SIT WAS DIRE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS A NEW PROBATIONARY FO FOR A NEW START UP ACR. THEY DO NOT HAVE A PLT'S UNION, OR ANY PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS GROUP. THE FO RPTED THE PROBS TO THE ACR CHIEF PLT. SHE RPTS THAT THE CHIEF PLT AND THE CAPT ARE CLOSE FRIENDS. AS FAR AS SHE KNOWS, NOTHING HASBEEN DONE. THE CHIEF PLT REQUESTED HER TO PLACE NOTHING ON PAPER, AND KEEP EVERYTHING VERBAL. SINCE HER INCIDENT OTHER FO'S HAVE HAD SIMILAR PROBS WITH THE SAME CAPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.