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FAA FSDO inspector had approved a temporary jump zone in the missed approach fix area for the ILS approach without coordination with approach controller or requiring the jump aircraft pilot to contact approach control when airborne.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 474374 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200005 |
| Day | Wed |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | navaid : bdr.vor |
| State Reference | CT |
| Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 6000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tracon : n90.tracon tower : pdx.tower |
| Operator | Other |
| Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
| Navigation In Use | other vortac |
| Flight Phase | cruise : holding |
| Flight Plan | None |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | controller : approach |
| Qualification | controller : radar pilot : private |
| Experience | controller radar : 10 flight time total : 450 |
| ASRS Report | 474374 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | Other |
| Function | flight crew : single pilot |
| Qualification | pilot : commercial |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | other controllera |
| Resolutory Action | other |
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Airspace Structure ATC Human Performance |
| Primary Problem | Airspace Structure |
| Air Traffic Incident | Inter Facility Coordination Failure |
Narrative:
Parachute jumping NOTAM was issued for a temporary jump zone may/wed/00, XA30-XC30, bdr 050 degree radial, 7 DME, 2 NM radius down to 6000 ft. The problem is that this temporary jump zone is located right in the middle of the bdr ILS runway 6 missed approach holding area (published holding at milum intersection). Apparently no provisions were made when the jump authority/authorized was issued to have the jump aircraft establish and maintain 2-WAY communications with the appropriate ny TRACON ATC sector ('loves', 126.95), so that jump activities could be coordinated with IFR arrs executing the ILS runway 6 into bdr. Without knowing when jump aircraft would be airborne, nor when jumpers would be airborne, ny TRACON would have no alternative but to protect the missed approach area by denying the ILS runway 6 to any inbound aircraft. Since the ceiling and winds were 012 overcast approximately 090 degrees at 10 KTS, this would have effectively closed bdr to all IFR arrs for the 3 hour period the jump zone was active. I had to take the initiative to contact sikorsky helicopter's tower (CT41) (the jump zone was inside of CT41's class D) and ask them to ensure that jump aircraft would contact us on 126.95 when airborne. Again, the point is that the FAA's office which has the authority/authorized to approve such activities should have procedures which require 2-WAY communication with the affected approach control in order to maintain adequate safety while accommodating user requests.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FAA FSDO INSPECTOR HAD APPROVED A TEMPORARY JUMP ZONE IN THE MISSED APCH FIX AREA FOR THE ILS APCH WITHOUT COORD WITH APCH CTLR OR REQUIRING THE JUMP ACFT PLT TO CONTACT APCH CTL WHEN AIRBORNE.
Narrative: PARACHUTE JUMPING NOTAM WAS ISSUED FOR A TEMPORARY JUMP ZONE MAY/WED/00, XA30-XC30, BDR 050 DEG RADIAL, 7 DME, 2 NM RADIUS DOWN TO 6000 FT. THE PROB IS THAT THIS TEMPORARY JUMP ZONE IS LOCATED RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE BDR ILS RWY 6 MISSED APCH HOLDING AREA (PUBLISHED HOLDING AT MILUM INTXN). APPARENTLY NO PROVISIONS WERE MADE WHEN THE JUMP AUTH WAS ISSUED TO HAVE THE JUMP ACFT ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN 2-WAY COMS WITH THE APPROPRIATE NY TRACON ATC SECTOR ('LOVES', 126.95), SO THAT JUMP ACTIVITIES COULD BE COORDINATED WITH IFR ARRS EXECUTING THE ILS RWY 6 INTO BDR. WITHOUT KNOWING WHEN JUMP ACFT WOULD BE AIRBORNE, NOR WHEN JUMPERS WOULD BE AIRBORNE, NY TRACON WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PROTECT THE MISSED APCH AREA BY DENYING THE ILS RWY 6 TO ANY INBOUND ACFT. SINCE THE CEILING AND WINDS WERE 012 OVCST APPROX 090 DEGS AT 10 KTS, THIS WOULD HAVE EFFECTIVELY CLOSED BDR TO ALL IFR ARRS FOR THE 3 HR PERIOD THE JUMP ZONE WAS ACTIVE. I HAD TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO CONTACT SIKORSKY HELI'S TWR (CT41) (THE JUMP ZONE WAS INSIDE OF CT41'S CLASS D) AND ASK THEM TO ENSURE THAT JUMP ACFT WOULD CONTACT US ON 126.95 WHEN AIRBORNE. AGAIN, THE POINT IS THAT THE FAA'S OFFICE WHICH HAS THE AUTH TO APPROVE SUCH ACTIVITIES SHOULD HAVE PROCS WHICH REQUIRE 2-WAY COM WITH THE AFFECTED APCH CTL IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SAFETY WHILE ACCOMMODATING USER REQUESTS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.