Narrative:

Our clearance was to cross quail intersection at 17000 ft and 250 KTS. I entered this restr into the FMC incorrectly. I entered '170/250' and it should have been '250/170.' this error was not noticed by the captain or myself until the FMC computed top of descent was reached and the aircraft started down with VNAV selected. At this point it became painfully clear that we would be unable to make the crossing restr. The autoplt was disconnected, power to idle, and speed brakes deployed. As we were approaching 'quail' we were given a frequency change, this short delay kept us from providing a timely warning to the controller of our inability to make the restr. We did tell the controller (ie, state the obvious) at about the same time we reached 'quail' intersection. In conclusion, I will request a verbal concurrence or xchk of any inputs to the FMC. Additionally, I will mentally compute a top of descent point to xchk the FMC. Contributing factors include a perceived lack of adequate training in FMC usage, particularly vertical navigation functions. Lack of a dedicated FMC training device in the B737-300 fleet at our airlines. 2 relatively low (glass or FMC) time pilots.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DSNDING B737-500 FAILS TO MAKE THE 17000 FT ALT XING RESTR WHEN THE FO PLACES THE WRONG INFO INTO THE FMC AT QUAIL INTXN, CO.

Narrative: OUR CLRNC WAS TO CROSS QUAIL INTXN AT 17000 FT AND 250 KTS. I ENTERED THIS RESTR INTO THE FMC INCORRECTLY. I ENTERED '170/250' AND IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN '250/170.' THIS ERROR WAS NOT NOTICED BY THE CAPT OR MYSELF UNTIL THE FMC COMPUTED TOP OF DSCNT WAS REACHED AND THE ACFT STARTED DOWN WITH VNAV SELECTED. AT THIS POINT IT BECAME PAINFULLY CLR THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTR. THE AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED, PWR TO IDLE, AND SPD BRAKES DEPLOYED. AS WE WERE APCHING 'QUAIL' WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE, THIS SHORT DELAY KEPT US FROM PROVIDING A TIMELY WARNING TO THE CTLR OF OUR INABILITY TO MAKE THE RESTR. WE DID TELL THE CTLR (IE, STATE THE OBVIOUS) AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME WE REACHED 'QUAIL' INTXN. IN CONCLUSION, I WILL REQUEST A VERBAL CONCURRENCE OR XCHK OF ANY INPUTS TO THE FMC. ADDITIONALLY, I WILL MENTALLY COMPUTE A TOP OF DSCNT POINT TO XCHK THE FMC. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE A PERCEIVED LACK OF ADEQUATE TRAINING IN FMC USAGE, PARTICULARLY VERT NAV FUNCTIONS. LACK OF A DEDICATED FMC TRAINING DEVICE IN THE B737-300 FLEET AT OUR AIRLINES. 2 RELATIVELY LOW (GLASS OR FMC) TIME PLTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.