Narrative:

The first officer of air carrier flight X, an ATR42-320, called ground control for a taxi clearance from gate at pvd. Ground issued clearance: 'air carrier X taxi to runway 34 via txwys T, C, K, hold short runway 5L.' I jotted down the routing and read the clearance back along with the hold short runway 5L instruction. As the captain initiated the taxi, he appeared to be trying to orient himself and locate the appropriate txwys so I gestured towards taxiway T. With the aircraft on its way toward taxiway T, I started my usual taxi flows inside the cockpit in preparation for the taxi checklist. With my attention inside, setting the flaps and takeoff confign, ground said, 'air carrier X confirm hold short runway 5L.' I responded, 'short runway 5L' and immediately looked outside in search of runway 5L while the airplane continued to roll. I was unable to quickly identify the runway until seeing the faded white centerline markings as the aircraft began to cross. I instantly alerted the captain who said, 'this is a taxiway isn't it?' as he brought the plane to a stop in confusion. That same moment, ground said, 'disregard, cross runway 5L taxi txwys T, C, K to runway 34.' as we continued across I looked up runway 5L and saw a twin (Y) in position for takeoff. The remainder of the flight was accomplished as normal, no damage or injury resulted. Several factors acted synergistically to contribute to this incursion. Most notable was our difficulty to quickly distinguish runway 5L. The yellow chevrons along the edge of the crowned pavement surface with the blue reflective edge markers along the apex of the crown obscures the view of the faded white centerline markings. The blue edge markers, narrow usable runway surface, green centerline lights and orientation of the departure end terminating visually at a cluster of hangars all contribute to its appearance as a taxiway. Having actually used this strip of pavement as a taxiway on pervious flts into pvd, it was difficult for me to positively identify it as a runway in the few seconds between the 'hold short' confirmation from ground and the point the airplane rolled across the hold lines. Another factor involved CRM. I was tending to tasks that diverted my attention momentarily inside the cockpit while the plane was rolling, leaving the ground navigation largely in the hands of the captain assuming he was clear on where he was going. Had he interpreted the instruction from ground as 'hold short runway 5R' which is the clearance given the majority of the time, his misconception could not have been corrected by the ground controller who received the readback correctly from me. Although the markings along runway 5L and associated txwys at pvd are initially confusing, there are runway signs and hold lines on the west side of runway 5L intersection tango apparently on careful analysis. Prevention of further incursion of this type at pvd or any other airport could perhaps be best addressed through a different use of crew resource: tasks such as cockpit flows and checklists happen while the aircraft is not moving on the ground, allowing both crew to fully direct their attention outside while taxiing. Taxi instructions are read back by the crew member actually taxiing the aircraft so erroneous assumptions can be corrected by ATC. (Had the captain read back 'hold short runway 5R' as is most often issued, ground could have corrected him directly.) in this case there was no way for either the ground controller or me to know that the captain did not correctly understand the clearance. When instructed, 'confirm hold short...' the aircraft is immediately brought to a full stop by either crew member until the hold point has been positively idented by both crew. Other factors of note: late off the gate due to delayed refueling. Fifth leg of the day. Inadequate time to eat or take a break between any of the 6 flts that day. End of a good month of flying together fostered mutual trust and complacency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION AT PVD, RI. ARPT SIGNAGE AND SURFACE MARKING ARE AT ISSUE.

Narrative: THE FO OF ACR FLT X, AN ATR42-320, CALLED GND CTL FOR A TAXI CLRNC FROM GATE AT PVD. GND ISSUED CLRNC: 'ACR X TAXI TO RWY 34 VIA TXWYS T, C, K, HOLD SHORT RWY 5L.' I JOTTED DOWN THE ROUTING AND READ THE CLRNC BACK ALONG WITH THE HOLD SHORT RWY 5L INSTRUCTION. AS THE CAPT INITIATED THE TAXI, HE APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO ORIENT HIMSELF AND LOCATE THE APPROPRIATE TXWYS SO I GESTURED TOWARDS TXWY T. WITH THE ACFT ON ITS WAY TOWARD TXWY T, I STARTED MY USUAL TAXI FLOWS INSIDE THE COCKPIT IN PREPARATION FOR THE TAXI CHKLIST. WITH MY ATTN INSIDE, SETTING THE FLAPS AND TKOF CONFIGN, GND SAID, 'ACR X CONFIRM HOLD SHORT RWY 5L.' I RESPONDED, 'SHORT RWY 5L' AND IMMEDIATELY LOOKED OUTSIDE IN SEARCH OF RWY 5L WHILE THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED TO ROLL. I WAS UNABLE TO QUICKLY IDENT THE RWY UNTIL SEEING THE FADED WHITE CTRLINE MARKINGS AS THE ACFT BEGAN TO CROSS. I INSTANTLY ALERTED THE CAPT WHO SAID, 'THIS IS A TXWY ISN'T IT?' AS HE BROUGHT THE PLANE TO A STOP IN CONFUSION. THAT SAME MOMENT, GND SAID, 'DISREGARD, CROSS RWY 5L TAXI TXWYS T, C, K TO RWY 34.' AS WE CONTINUED ACROSS I LOOKED UP RWY 5L AND SAW A TWIN (Y) IN POS FOR TKOF. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS ACCOMPLISHED AS NORMAL, NO DAMAGE OR INJURY RESULTED. SEVERAL FACTORS ACTED SYNERGISTICALLY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS INCURSION. MOST NOTABLE WAS OUR DIFFICULTY TO QUICKLY DISTINGUISH RWY 5L. THE YELLOW CHEVRONS ALONG THE EDGE OF THE CROWNED PAVEMENT SURFACE WITH THE BLUE REFLECTIVE EDGE MARKERS ALONG THE APEX OF THE CROWN OBSCURES THE VIEW OF THE FADED WHITE CTRLINE MARKINGS. THE BLUE EDGE MARKERS, NARROW USABLE RWY SURFACE, GREEN CTRLINE LIGHTS AND ORIENTATION OF THE DEP END TERMINATING VISUALLY AT A CLUSTER OF HANGARS ALL CONTRIBUTE TO ITS APPEARANCE AS A TXWY. HAVING ACTUALLY USED THIS STRIP OF PAVEMENT AS A TXWY ON PERVIOUS FLTS INTO PVD, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO POSITIVELY IDENT IT AS A RWY IN THE FEW SECONDS BTWN THE 'HOLD SHORT' CONFIRMATION FROM GND AND THE POINT THE AIRPLANE ROLLED ACROSS THE HOLD LINES. ANOTHER FACTOR INVOLVED CRM. I WAS TENDING TO TASKS THAT DIVERTED MY ATTN MOMENTARILY INSIDE THE COCKPIT WHILE THE PLANE WAS ROLLING, LEAVING THE GND NAV LARGELY IN THE HANDS OF THE CAPT ASSUMING HE WAS CLR ON WHERE HE WAS GOING. HAD HE INTERPRETED THE INSTRUCTION FROM GND AS 'HOLD SHORT RWY 5R' WHICH IS THE CLRNC GIVEN THE MAJORITY OF THE TIME, HIS MISCONCEPTION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CORRECTED BY THE GND CTLR WHO RECEIVED THE READBACK CORRECTLY FROM ME. ALTHOUGH THE MARKINGS ALONG RWY 5L AND ASSOCIATED TXWYS AT PVD ARE INITIALLY CONFUSING, THERE ARE RWY SIGNS AND HOLD LINES ON THE W SIDE OF RWY 5L INTXN TANGO APPARENTLY ON CAREFUL ANALYSIS. PREVENTION OF FURTHER INCURSION OF THIS TYPE AT PVD OR ANY OTHER ARPT COULD PERHAPS BE BEST ADDRESSED THROUGH A DIFFERENT USE OF CREW RESOURCE: TASKS SUCH AS COCKPIT FLOWS AND CHKLISTS HAPPEN WHILE THE ACFT IS NOT MOVING ON THE GND, ALLOWING BOTH CREW TO FULLY DIRECT THEIR ATTN OUTSIDE WHILE TAXIING. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS ARE READ BACK BY THE CREW MEMBER ACTUALLY TAXIING THE ACFT SO ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS CAN BE CORRECTED BY ATC. (HAD THE CAPT READ BACK 'HOLD SHORT RWY 5R' AS IS MOST OFTEN ISSUED, GND COULD HAVE CORRECTED HIM DIRECTLY.) IN THIS CASE THERE WAS NO WAY FOR EITHER THE GND CTLR OR ME TO KNOW THAT THE CAPT DID NOT CORRECTLY UNDERSTAND THE CLRNC. WHEN INSTRUCTED, 'CONFIRM HOLD SHORT...' THE ACFT IS IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT TO A FULL STOP BY EITHER CREW MEMBER UNTIL THE HOLD POINT HAS BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTED BY BOTH CREW. OTHER FACTORS OF NOTE: LATE OFF THE GATE DUE TO DELAYED REFUELING. FIFTH LEG OF THE DAY. INADEQUATE TIME TO EAT OR TAKE A BREAK BTWN ANY OF THE 6 FLTS THAT DAY. END OF A GOOD MONTH OF FLYING TOGETHER FOSTERED MUTUAL TRUST AND COMPLACENCY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.