Narrative:

While proceeding nwbound from stt to iad, at FL390, on R763 between leton and nance, the captain and first officer of air carrier X observed what appeared to be a solid line of thunderstorms approximately 80 mi ahead across their track. At the same time the captain was attempting to check in with ny commercial radio on HF frequencys 6586 and 5550 with a position report for leton. For at least 10 mins the captain attempted to contact ny commercial radio, to no avail. ZMA had assigned the 2 HF frequencys. After 10 mins the captain switched to HF frequency 11330, which had previously been used on the leg from iad to stt. Frequency 11330 was scratchy, but at least appeared to be in use by ny commercial radio and many aircraft attempting to contact them. All the while air carrier X was proceeding toward the line of thunderstorms and it was becoming obvious that a turn to the right of course had to be made in order to avoid penetrating one or more of several large developing cells. At approximately XA45Z, aircraft X, unable to get new york commercial radio to acknowledge their position report or their request to deviate for WX, used captain's emergency authority/authorized and turned right 20 degrees to miss the line of thunderstorms. Soon thereafter (less than 5 mins) they were finally able to contact ny commercial radio, at which time the captain requested to deviate 80 NM east of course. By the time ny commercial radio acknowledged the position report and the request to deviate, the copilot had found a hole between the thunderstorms and turned back to the left direct to nance. The deviation was 20 degrees to the right for less than 10 mins and was actually no more than 20 NM east of track. As a matter of fact, the time we arrived at nance was only 1 min later than our previous projected on track time was to be. At some point therein ny commercial radio communicated that ny oceanic was concerned about a possible loss of separation with another aircraft on a parallel track at FL390. It should be noted that air carrier X maintained VFR conditions with unlimited visibility and a working TCASII the entire time. A constant VFR scan was maintained and no other aircraft were seen either visually or on air carrier X's screen out to a range of 80 NM. Later in the flight a request was made by ZNY for the crew of air carrier X to contact them after landing. After landing the captain called the supervisor at ZNY and explained the above incident. They informed the captain that a pilot deviation report had been filed and they explained that a pilot deviation report had to be filed because a loss of separation had occurred. The captain explained that was not necessarily the case. What was true was that the ny commercial radio person had passed on to ZNY that air carrier X was deviating 80 NM east of course, which, as explained above, was not the case. The captain had used captain's emergency authority/authorized and ordered the deviation to avoid a possibly devastating thunderstorm and the deviation was not more than 20 NM to the right of track. The supervisor assured captain and first officer that, because the captain was exercising his emergency authority/authorized to deviate around WX, this would be downgraded to an incident and that no further action would take place. I believe that this whole situation was a non event that was perceived to be a possible conflict by ZNY based completely upon a report given to them by the commercial radio person on frequency 11330. The commercial radio person seemed to be in over her head because too many aircraft were checking in with her and the HF radio reception was very poor. In fact, during the time we were up on 11330, she twice SELCAL'd us by mistake looking for other aircraft. The captain of air carrier X initially mentioned a possible 80 NM deviation, but that was because it appeared that the line of thunderstorms extended that far to our right (and even further to our left). In fact we were confident that we would be able to find a hole in the line to cut through long before we deviated 80 NM (which we did). It looks to me like ZNY assumed we deviated 80 NM to the right of course without authority/authorized and assumed that a loss of separation occurred based upon that perception. This was my first flight to the 'islands' in a long time. I am amazed by the poor HF radio reception. I fly the north atlantic a lot and our communications with gander radio and shanwick radio from the middle of the atlantic ocean are far superior to what I experienced on apr/sat/00. I think action should be taken to improve communications in this area. I am sure that similar sits where aircraft are forced to deviate around WX occur quite frequently in that area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COM DIFFICULTIES ON HF FREQS DURING WX DEV ALONG R-763. POSSIBLE LOSS OF SEPARATION.

Narrative: WHILE PROCEEDING NWBOUND FROM STT TO IAD, AT FL390, ON R763 BTWN LETON AND NANCE, THE CAPT AND FO OF ACR X OBSERVED WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SOLID LINE OF TSTMS APPROX 80 MI AHEAD ACROSS THEIR TRACK. AT THE SAME TIME THE CAPT WAS ATTEMPTING TO CHK IN WITH NY COMMERCIAL RADIO ON HF FREQS 6586 AND 5550 WITH A POS RPT FOR LETON. FOR AT LEAST 10 MINS THE CAPT ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT NY COMMERCIAL RADIO, TO NO AVAIL. ZMA HAD ASSIGNED THE 2 HF FREQS. AFTER 10 MINS THE CAPT SWITCHED TO HF FREQ 11330, WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN USED ON THE LEG FROM IAD TO STT. FREQ 11330 WAS SCRATCHY, BUT AT LEAST APPEARED TO BE IN USE BY NY COMMERCIAL RADIO AND MANY ACFT ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT THEM. ALL THE WHILE ACR X WAS PROCEEDING TOWARD THE LINE OF TSTMS AND IT WAS BECOMING OBVIOUS THAT A TURN TO THE R OF COURSE HAD TO BE MADE IN ORDER TO AVOID PENETRATING ONE OR MORE OF SEVERAL LARGE DEVELOPING CELLS. AT APPROX XA45Z, ACFT X, UNABLE TO GET NEW YORK COMMERCIAL RADIO TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR POS RPT OR THEIR REQUEST TO DEVIATE FOR WX, USED CAPT'S EMER AUTH AND TURNED R 20 DEGS TO MISS THE LINE OF TSTMS. SOON THEREAFTER (LESS THAN 5 MINS) THEY WERE FINALLY ABLE TO CONTACT NY COMMERCIAL RADIO, AT WHICH TIME THE CAPT REQUESTED TO DEVIATE 80 NM E OF COURSE. BY THE TIME NY COMMERCIAL RADIO ACKNOWLEDGED THE POS RPT AND THE REQUEST TO DEVIATE, THE COPLT HAD FOUND A HOLE BTWN THE TSTMS AND TURNED BACK TO THE L DIRECT TO NANCE. THE DEV WAS 20 DEGS TO THE R FOR LESS THAN 10 MINS AND WAS ACTUALLY NO MORE THAN 20 NM E OF TRACK. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE TIME WE ARRIVED AT NANCE WAS ONLY 1 MIN LATER THAN OUR PREVIOUS PROJECTED ON TRACK TIME WAS TO BE. AT SOME POINT THEREIN NY COMMERCIAL RADIO COMMUNICATED THAT NY OCEANIC WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE LOSS OF SEPARATION WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON A PARALLEL TRACK AT FL390. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ACR X MAINTAINED VFR CONDITIONS WITH UNLIMITED VISIBILITY AND A WORKING TCASII THE ENTIRE TIME. A CONSTANT VFR SCAN WAS MAINTAINED AND NO OTHER ACFT WERE SEEN EITHER VISUALLY OR ON ACR X'S SCREEN OUT TO A RANGE OF 80 NM. LATER IN THE FLT A REQUEST WAS MADE BY ZNY FOR THE CREW OF ACR X TO CONTACT THEM AFTER LNDG. AFTER LNDG THE CAPT CALLED THE SUPVR AT ZNY AND EXPLAINED THE ABOVE INCIDENT. THEY INFORMED THE CAPT THAT A PLTDEV RPT HAD BEEN FILED AND THEY EXPLAINED THAT A PLTDEV RPT HAD TO BE FILED BECAUSE A LOSS OF SEPARATION HAD OCCURRED. THE CAPT EXPLAINED THAT WAS NOT NECESSARILY THE CASE. WHAT WAS TRUE WAS THAT THE NY COMMERCIAL RADIO PERSON HAD PASSED ON TO ZNY THAT ACR X WAS DEVIATING 80 NM E OF COURSE, WHICH, AS EXPLAINED ABOVE, WAS NOT THE CASE. THE CAPT HAD USED CAPT'S EMER AUTH AND ORDERED THE DEV TO AVOID A POSSIBLY DEVASTATING TSTM AND THE DEV WAS NOT MORE THAN 20 NM TO THE R OF TRACK. THE SUPVR ASSURED CAPT AND FO THAT, BECAUSE THE CAPT WAS EXERCISING HIS EMER AUTH TO DEVIATE AROUND WX, THIS WOULD BE DOWNGRADED TO AN INCIDENT AND THAT NO FURTHER ACTION WOULD TAKE PLACE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WHOLE SIT WAS A NON EVENT THAT WAS PERCEIVED TO BE A POSSIBLE CONFLICT BY ZNY BASED COMPLETELY UPON A RPT GIVEN TO THEM BY THE COMMERCIAL RADIO PERSON ON FREQ 11330. THE COMMERCIAL RADIO PERSON SEEMED TO BE IN OVER HER HEAD BECAUSE TOO MANY ACFT WERE CHKING IN WITH HER AND THE HF RADIO RECEPTION WAS VERY POOR. IN FACT, DURING THE TIME WE WERE UP ON 11330, SHE TWICE SELCAL'D US BY MISTAKE LOOKING FOR OTHER ACFT. THE CAPT OF ACR X INITIALLY MENTIONED A POSSIBLE 80 NM DEV, BUT THAT WAS BECAUSE IT APPEARED THAT THE LINE OF TSTMS EXTENDED THAT FAR TO OUR R (AND EVEN FURTHER TO OUR L). IN FACT WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO FIND A HOLE IN THE LINE TO CUT THROUGH LONG BEFORE WE DEVIATED 80 NM (WHICH WE DID). IT LOOKS TO ME LIKE ZNY ASSUMED WE DEVIATED 80 NM TO THE R OF COURSE WITHOUT AUTH AND ASSUMED THAT A LOSS OF SEPARATION OCCURRED BASED UPON THAT PERCEPTION. THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT TO THE 'ISLANDS' IN A LONG TIME. I AM AMAZED BY THE POOR HF RADIO RECEPTION. I FLY THE NORTH ATLANTIC A LOT AND OUR COMS WITH GANDER RADIO AND SHANWICK RADIO FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE ATLANTIC OCEAN ARE FAR SUPERIOR TO WHAT I EXPERIENCED ON APR/SAT/00. I THINK ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE COMS IN THIS AREA. I AM SURE THAT SIMILAR SITS WHERE ACFT ARE FORCED TO DEVIATE AROUND WX OCCUR QUITE FREQUENTLY IN THAT AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.