Narrative:

Departing shenandoah regional airport (shd) for a planned IFR flight to washington dulles (iad). The crew flew the published IFR departure procedure off of runway 5. The crew contacted richmond TRACON via airborne relay with another air carrier for an IFR release and departed the field. In the left turn to the LOM at 3300 ft MSL the crew contacted richmond and was advised of radar contact and given a climb clearance to 5000 ft. Departure control then asked if the crew could maintain their own obstacle clearance to which the crew replied 'negative, IMC.' richmond then asked if the crew could proceed direct luray intersection. The captain advised only above 4500 ft or if ATC would be responsible for obstacle clearance -- no response from richmond TRACON. As the aircraft continued its climb to 5000 ft direct to the LOM, the crew heard richmond clear an aircraft (believed to be a learjet) for the ILS 5 approach to shd. The captain reset the TCASII display to the 5 NM scale and observed a target at 12 O'clock, 4-5 NM, 300 ft above our altitude and descending. The TCASII TA alert sounded, the crew began an immediate (evasive) climbing right turn to avoid the potential conflict. As the crew began the turn, richmond asked the inbound aircraft to break off the ILS approach and turn right to an unspecified heading. Richmond then queried the crew if their reason for climbing was the result of a TCASII alert, to which the captain responded 'affirmative.' the crew was then asked by richmond to maintain 5000 ft and fly a northwest heading (nothing specific). The captain advised ATC of a 030 degree heading and asked if this heading was ok. Richmond responded 'affirmative.' shortly thereafter, the flight was cleared to climb to 6000 ft and radar control was xferred ZDC and the flight continued uneventfully to iad. The captain believes that the crew's decision to fly the IFR departure procedure in absence of any other ATC directions or SID was correct. Further, the captain believes that IFR approachs and departures at non tower controled airports allows for only 1 aircraft in the terminal area at a time. A departing aircraft must clear the terminal area or an arriving aircraft must cancel IFR on the ground prior to any other IFR aircraft beginning an approach or departing the airport. Contributing to the situation: 1) ATC radio communications with aircraft on the ground shd are often difficult because of its location in a valley. This may have prompted a lack of understanding and clarity between ATC and the crew of the departing aircraft. 2) the ATC controller may have been unfamiliar with the IFR departure procedure for that airport. Solution; the installation of an rco within the valley region would improve communication and might prevent a repeat of the situation.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BA31 INITIATES TCASII MANEUVER RESPONDING TO CONFLICTING LEARJET ON OPPOSITE, INBOUND COURSE TO SHD.

Narrative: DEPARTING SHENANDOAH REGIONAL ARPT (SHD) FOR A PLANNED IFR FLT TO WASHINGTON DULLES (IAD). THE CREW FLEW THE PUBLISHED IFR DEP PROC OFF OF RWY 5. THE CREW CONTACTED RICHMOND TRACON VIA AIRBORNE RELAY WITH ANOTHER ACR FOR AN IFR RELEASE AND DEPARTED THE FIELD. IN THE L TURN TO THE LOM AT 3300 FT MSL THE CREW CONTACTED RICHMOND AND WAS ADVISED OF RADAR CONTACT AND GIVEN A CLB CLRNC TO 5000 FT. DEP CTL THEN ASKED IF THE CREW COULD MAINTAIN THEIR OWN OBSTACLE CLRNC TO WHICH THE CREW REPLIED 'NEGATIVE, IMC.' RICHMOND THEN ASKED IF THE CREW COULD PROCEED DIRECT LURAY INTXN. THE CAPT ADVISED ONLY ABOVE 4500 FT OR IF ATC WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR OBSTACLE CLRNC -- NO RESPONSE FROM RICHMOND TRACON. AS THE ACFT CONTINUED ITS CLB TO 5000 FT DIRECT TO THE LOM, THE CREW HEARD RICHMOND CLR AN ACFT (BELIEVED TO BE A LEARJET) FOR THE ILS 5 APCH TO SHD. THE CAPT RESET THE TCASII DISPLAY TO THE 5 NM SCALE AND OBSERVED A TARGET AT 12 O'CLOCK, 4-5 NM, 300 FT ABOVE OUR ALT AND DSNDING. THE TCASII TA ALERT SOUNDED, THE CREW BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE (EVASIVE) CLBING R TURN TO AVOID THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT. AS THE CREW BEGAN THE TURN, RICHMOND ASKED THE INBOUND ACFT TO BREAK OFF THE ILS APCH AND TURN R TO AN UNSPECIFIED HDG. RICHMOND THEN QUERIED THE CREW IF THEIR REASON FOR CLBING WAS THE RESULT OF A TCASII ALERT, TO WHICH THE CAPT RESPONDED 'AFFIRMATIVE.' THE CREW WAS THEN ASKED BY RICHMOND TO MAINTAIN 5000 FT AND FLY A NW HDG (NOTHING SPECIFIC). THE CAPT ADVISED ATC OF A 030 DEG HDG AND ASKED IF THIS HDG WAS OK. RICHMOND RESPONDED 'AFFIRMATIVE.' SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE FLT WAS CLRED TO CLB TO 6000 FT AND RADAR CTL WAS XFERRED ZDC AND THE FLT CONTINUED UNEVENTFULLY TO IAD. THE CAPT BELIEVES THAT THE CREW'S DECISION TO FLY THE IFR DEP PROC IN ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER ATC DIRECTIONS OR SID WAS CORRECT. FURTHER, THE CAPT BELIEVES THAT IFR APCHS AND DEPS AT NON TWR CTLED ARPTS ALLOWS FOR ONLY 1 ACFT IN THE TERMINAL AREA AT A TIME. A DEPARTING ACFT MUST CLR THE TERMINAL AREA OR AN ARRIVING ACFT MUST CANCEL IFR ON THE GND PRIOR TO ANY OTHER IFR ACFT BEGINNING AN APCH OR DEPARTING THE ARPT. CONTRIBUTING TO THE SIT: 1) ATC RADIO COMS WITH ACFT ON THE GND SHD ARE OFTEN DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF ITS LOCATION IN A VALLEY. THIS MAY HAVE PROMPTED A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AND CLARITY BTWN ATC AND THE CREW OF THE DEPARTING ACFT. 2) THE ATC CTLR MAY HAVE BEEN UNFAMILIAR WITH THE IFR DEP PROC FOR THAT ARPT. SOLUTION; THE INSTALLATION OF AN RCO WITHIN THE VALLEY REGION WOULD IMPROVE COM AND MIGHT PREVENT A REPEAT OF THE SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.