Narrative:

After takeoff, the landing gear was unable to be retracted. The crew returned the aircraft to the airport of departure. Upon arrival, it was discovered by maintenance personnel that the 'landing gear alternate release' door had been left open by a mechanic who had svced the aircraft's hydraulic system immediately prior to departure. My airline's checklists did not call for this item to be checked prior to every departure, only the first flight of the day (of which this was not). Of greater concern to me is that there was no checklist in the aircraft or company pubs that addressed a 'landing gear cannot be retracted' scenario. Had there been one, the problem may have been easily rectified. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter said that there was no checklist for this problem and that it is being addressed by the company and training committee since it has occurred several times at this airline. She reports that the panel and door in question is above and behind the first officer's head, out of the usual line of scan of the cockpit. Opening of the door deactivates the hydraulic power to the gear and this is done to open the gear doors by maintenance for servicing. The company has put out a bulletin to run the acceptance of the aircraft checklist any time maintenance has worked on the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DHC8-200 LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT AFTER TKOF WHEN MAINT LEFT 'LNDG GEAR ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR' OPEN AFTER SVCING HYD FLUID. THIS DOOR IS A ONCE A DAY CHKLIST ITEM FOR THE FLC.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF, THE LNDG GEAR WAS UNABLE TO BE RETRACTED. THE CREW RETURNED THE ACFT TO THE ARPT OF DEP. UPON ARR, IT WAS DISCOVERED BY MAINT PERSONNEL THAT THE 'LNDG GEAR ALTERNATE RELEASE' DOOR HAD BEEN LEFT OPEN BY A MECH WHO HAD SVCED THE ACFT'S HYD SYS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO DEP. MY AIRLINE'S CHKLISTS DID NOT CALL FOR THIS ITEM TO BE CHKED PRIOR TO EVERY DEP, ONLY THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY (OF WHICH THIS WAS NOT). OF GREATER CONCERN TO ME IS THAT THERE WAS NO CHKLIST IN THE ACFT OR COMPANY PUBS THAT ADDRESSED A 'LNDG GEAR CANNOT BE RETRACTED' SCENARIO. HAD THERE BEEN ONE, THE PROB MAY HAVE BEEN EASILY RECTIFIED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAID THAT THERE WAS NO CHKLIST FOR THIS PROB AND THAT IT IS BEING ADDRESSED BY THE COMPANY AND TRAINING COMMITTEE SINCE IT HAS OCCURRED SEVERAL TIMES AT THIS AIRLINE. SHE RPTS THAT THE PANEL AND DOOR IN QUESTION IS ABOVE AND BEHIND THE FO'S HEAD, OUT OF THE USUAL LINE OF SCAN OF THE COCKPIT. OPENING OF THE DOOR DEACTIVATES THE HYD PWR TO THE GEAR AND THIS IS DONE TO OPEN THE GEAR DOORS BY MAINT FOR SVCING. THE COMPANY HAS PUT OUT A BULLETIN TO RUN THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE ACFT CHKLIST ANY TIME MAINT HAS WORKED ON THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.