Narrative:

We were cleared to taxi to runway 21C behind a B737. After his departure, we were told to hold short and expect a 5-7 min center delay. First officer started to make a PA to advise passenger and then we were told to 'turn left to 200 degrees, cleared for takeoff.' after passing 2500 ft we were told to stop our climb at 3000 ft. There was a DC9 that departed runway 21R that we were watching. They gave him a left turn in front of us then continued our climb. When on center frequency they asked us to call dtw tower when we were on the ground. The tower operations supervisor told me he replayed the tapes and heard us acknowledge the clearance to turn left to 200 degrees and cleared for takeoff with our call sign. He said the controller failed to respond to our acknowledgement but the takeoff clearance was for an aircraft with a similar call sign on runway 21R. The controller was working more than 1 frequency. He said there was no conflict with traffic. Supplemental information from acn 466598: I selected the PA system on my communication panel to inform the passenger of our situation. Over the captain's speaker, I heard a takeoff clearance given. The captain responded, repeated that we were cleared for takeoff, with a turn to a 200 degree heading. After we were airborne, tower directed traffic off runway 21R that departed ahead of us to turn and maintain 5000 ft. We were directed to maintain 3000 ft. This situation re-emphasizes the need for clear communication between pilots and ATC. At least 3 actions could have prevented the occurrence. 1) the captain, who answered tower's takeoff clearance call, must be absolutely certain of the call sign the clearance was given to. 2) the first officer must question any action or clearance that is questionable, ie, one min we were notified of a 5 min delay, and the next min we were cleared for takeoff. 3) ATC must listen to the response(south) of his clrncs and be ready to correct any mistakes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PIC OF A B757 ANSWERS FOR THE WRONG CALL SIGN WHILE THE FO IS ON THE PA AND PERFORMS AN UNAUTH TKOF FROM DTW, MI.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 21C BEHIND A B737. AFTER HIS DEP, WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT AND EXPECT A 5-7 MIN CTR DELAY. FO STARTED TO MAKE A PA TO ADVISE PAX AND THEN WE WERE TOLD TO 'TURN L TO 200 DEGS, CLRED FOR TKOF.' AFTER PASSING 2500 FT WE WERE TOLD TO STOP OUR CLB AT 3000 FT. THERE WAS A DC9 THAT DEPARTED RWY 21R THAT WE WERE WATCHING. THEY GAVE HIM A L TURN IN FRONT OF US THEN CONTINUED OUR CLB. WHEN ON CTR FREQ THEY ASKED US TO CALL DTW TWR WHEN WE WERE ON THE GND. THE TWR OPS SUPVR TOLD ME HE REPLAYED THE TAPES AND HEARD US ACKNOWLEDGE THE CLRNC TO TURN L TO 200 DEGS AND CLRED FOR TKOF WITH OUR CALL SIGN. HE SAID THE CTLR FAILED TO RESPOND TO OUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BUT THE TKOF CLRNC WAS FOR AN ACFT WITH A SIMILAR CALL SIGN ON RWY 21R. THE CTLR WAS WORKING MORE THAN 1 FREQ. HE SAID THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH TFC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 466598: I SELECTED THE PA SYS ON MY COM PANEL TO INFORM THE PAX OF OUR SIT. OVER THE CAPT'S SPEAKER, I HEARD A TKOF CLRNC GIVEN. THE CAPT RESPONDED, REPEATED THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, WITH A TURN TO A 200 DEG HDG. AFTER WE WERE AIRBORNE, TWR DIRECTED TFC OFF RWY 21R THAT DEPARTED AHEAD OF US TO TURN AND MAINTAIN 5000 FT. WE WERE DIRECTED TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT. THIS SIT RE-EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR CLR COM BTWN PLTS AND ATC. AT LEAST 3 ACTIONS COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE OCCURRENCE. 1) THE CAPT, WHO ANSWERED TWR'S TKOF CLRNC CALL, MUST BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN OF THE CALL SIGN THE CLRNC WAS GIVEN TO. 2) THE FO MUST QUESTION ANY ACTION OR CLRNC THAT IS QUESTIONABLE, IE, ONE MIN WE WERE NOTIFIED OF A 5 MIN DELAY, AND THE NEXT MIN WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. 3) ATC MUST LISTEN TO THE RESPONSE(S) OF HIS CLRNCS AND BE READY TO CORRECT ANY MISTAKES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.