Narrative:

I approached the bay area on an instrument clearance, expecting to use the hwd localizer-DME runway 28L as a means of descent through a possible broken layer as reported by hwd ATIS. Bay approach was busy, and kept me on a 240 degree heading after crossing sunol from the east on V195. When I could see that clouds would not be a factor, I told approach that I was prepared to cancel but would stick with them until I could descend more. I canceled at the shoreline at 3000 ft MSL and told the controller I would go direct sql. It was at this point that I made my first mistake. I thought that the san mateo bridge was the dumbarton bridge. I made a brief leg along the coast toward the bridge and called sql tower, incorrectly reporting position. My instructions were the standard, a right base entry to runway 30 sql, reporting cement plant. I headed for the last visual match to seaport blvd and the cement plant as I crossed the bay. My precision might have also been affected by a passenger that was trying to spot the airport, and asking questions about the runway layout and beacon. Neither of us spotted the beacon. As I approached the west shore of the bay, I realized that I was looking at a small hill, it was not the cement plant. Scanning for the airport, I looked to my right and saw the sfo approach lights. At that point I understood exactly what had happened. I called sql tower after making a turn directly away from sfo. I estimate that I could have been 3.5 to 4 NM from sfo at the closest. My altitude was 800 ft MSL at that time. Sql tower said that they did not see me on radar and asked me to identify. When I did, the controller told me to make an immediate right turn, and that I was in the class B. At that point I was abeam bay meadows. I made a standard entry from bay meadows. On the ground, sql told me to call sfo tower. I did so shortly after landing. The sfo tower supervisor was very reasonable, and made some comments that the reader might find relevant. First, my incursion had occurred during an unusually quiet time, so I did not see any traffic landing at sfo to alert me to my incorrect position. Also, tower personnel were watching me approach, and got close to calling off the first approach to sfo during that time. (If they had done so, they would have escalated the matter, but did not because there had not been any consequences.) apparently, they were satisfied with the situation and safety of the pending approach when they saw me turn away from sfo. I feel that I would not have made this mistake if I had continued the approach to hwd and canceled only after turning onto the localizer and going past a few step-downs. The 'made-up' entrance over the bay, coupled with lack of daytime visuals, was a first for me. Without a passenger, I might have caught the error a little sooner.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE36 PVT PLT ENTERS THE CLASS B OF SFO WITHOUT CLRNC WHEN HE BELIEVES THE SAN MATEO BRIDGE IS THE DUMBARTON BRIDGE, 4 MI E OF SFO, CA.

Narrative: I APCHED THE BAY AREA ON AN INST CLRNC, EXPECTING TO USE THE HWD LOC-DME RWY 28L AS A MEANS OF DSCNT THROUGH A POSSIBLE BROKEN LAYER AS RPTED BY HWD ATIS. BAY APCH WAS BUSY, AND KEPT ME ON A 240 DEG HDG AFTER XING SUNOL FROM THE E ON V195. WHEN I COULD SEE THAT CLOUDS WOULD NOT BE A FACTOR, I TOLD APCH THAT I WAS PREPARED TO CANCEL BUT WOULD STICK WITH THEM UNTIL I COULD DSND MORE. I CANCELED AT THE SHORELINE AT 3000 FT MSL AND TOLD THE CTLR I WOULD GO DIRECT SQL. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT I MADE MY FIRST MISTAKE. I THOUGHT THAT THE SAN MATEO BRIDGE WAS THE DUMBARTON BRIDGE. I MADE A BRIEF LEG ALONG THE COAST TOWARD THE BRIDGE AND CALLED SQL TWR, INCORRECTLY RPTING POS. MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE THE STANDARD, A R BASE ENTRY TO RWY 30 SQL, RPTING CEMENT PLANT. I HEADED FOR THE LAST VISUAL MATCH TO SEAPORT BLVD AND THE CEMENT PLANT AS I CROSSED THE BAY. MY PRECISION MIGHT HAVE ALSO BEEN AFFECTED BY A PAX THAT WAS TRYING TO SPOT THE ARPT, AND ASKING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RWY LAYOUT AND BEACON. NEITHER OF US SPOTTED THE BEACON. AS I APCHED THE W SHORE OF THE BAY, I REALIZED THAT I WAS LOOKING AT A SMALL HILL, IT WAS NOT THE CEMENT PLANT. SCANNING FOR THE ARPT, I LOOKED TO MY R AND SAW THE SFO APCH LIGHTS. AT THAT POINT I UNDERSTOOD EXACTLY WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I CALLED SQL TWR AFTER MAKING A TURN DIRECTLY AWAY FROM SFO. I ESTIMATE THAT I COULD HAVE BEEN 3.5 TO 4 NM FROM SFO AT THE CLOSEST. MY ALT WAS 800 FT MSL AT THAT TIME. SQL TWR SAID THAT THEY DID NOT SEE ME ON RADAR AND ASKED ME TO IDENT. WHEN I DID, THE CTLR TOLD ME TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE R TURN, AND THAT I WAS IN THE CLASS B. AT THAT POINT I WAS ABEAM BAY MEADOWS. I MADE A STANDARD ENTRY FROM BAY MEADOWS. ON THE GND, SQL TOLD ME TO CALL SFO TWR. I DID SO SHORTLY AFTER LNDG. THE SFO TWR SUPVR WAS VERY REASONABLE, AND MADE SOME COMMENTS THAT THE READER MIGHT FIND RELEVANT. FIRST, MY INCURSION HAD OCCURRED DURING AN UNUSUALLY QUIET TIME, SO I DID NOT SEE ANY TFC LNDG AT SFO TO ALERT ME TO MY INCORRECT POS. ALSO, TWR PERSONNEL WERE WATCHING ME APCH, AND GOT CLOSE TO CALLING OFF THE FIRST APCH TO SFO DURING THAT TIME. (IF THEY HAD DONE SO, THEY WOULD HAVE ESCALATED THE MATTER, BUT DID NOT BECAUSE THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY CONSEQUENCES.) APPARENTLY, THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THE SIT AND SAFETY OF THE PENDING APCH WHEN THEY SAW ME TURN AWAY FROM SFO. I FEEL THAT I WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THIS MISTAKE IF I HAD CONTINUED THE APCH TO HWD AND CANCELED ONLY AFTER TURNING ONTO THE LOC AND GOING PAST A FEW STEP-DOWNS. THE 'MADE-UP' ENTRANCE OVER THE BAY, COUPLED WITH LACK OF DAYTIME VISUALS, WAS A FIRST FOR ME. WITHOUT A PAX, I MIGHT HAVE CAUGHT THE ERROR A LITTLE SOONER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.