Narrative:

The right fire warning light and master warning light illuminated in-flight at a cruise altitude of 10000 ft MSL. I visually inspected the engine and engine instruments for any indications of an engine fire. I did not observe any smoke or fire and all the engine instruments appeared normal. After considering the WX and the aircraft's conditions (aircraft weight, density altitude, cloud layers, visibility, ice, etc), I elected to do a precautionary engine shutdown, including discharging the fire extinguisher bottle. To shut down the engine, I performed all of the required memory items and then followed up with the engine failure/engine fire checklist. I then requested, and was given, radar vectors to the nearest airport from ATC. I informed them that the right engine had been shut down. ATC asked for fuel remaining and number of souls on board. I was told that the fire crews were standing by. I understood that I was being given emergency handling and it did not seem necessary to declare an emergency. After landing, I visually inspected the engine and there was no evidence of fire or fire damage. Had there been an actual engine fire, the fear of being punished by my employer for causing a customer delay may have raised safety concerns because of my reluctance to perform the required engine shutdown. What I would do differently next time: after this incident, it was explained to me that since there was no indication of a fire, a better course of action may have been to leave the 'apparently normal' engine running, instead of shutting it down. By doing it this way, I could have avoided putting myself in a potentially more dangerous situation by taking away the second engine and the great amount of excess power that goes with it. Had icing conditions been encountered or a go around been necessary, this situation would have been an even bigger emergency.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A TWIN ACR FREIGHTER SINGLE PLT SPEAKS OF HIS HESITANCY IN SHUTTING DOWN AN ENG FOR A FIRE WARNING THAT MAY HAVE BEEN FALSE WHEN 25 MI E OF YKM, WA.

Narrative: THE R FIRE WARNING LIGHT AND MASTER WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED INFLT AT A CRUISE ALT OF 10000 FT MSL. I VISUALLY INSPECTED THE ENG AND ENG INSTS FOR ANY INDICATIONS OF AN ENG FIRE. I DID NOT OBSERVE ANY SMOKE OR FIRE AND ALL THE ENG INSTS APPEARED NORMAL. AFTER CONSIDERING THE WX AND THE ACFT'S CONDITIONS (ACFT WT, DENSITY ALT, CLOUD LAYERS, VISIBILITY, ICE, ETC), I ELECTED TO DO A PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN, INCLUDING DISCHARGING THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER BOTTLE. TO SHUT DOWN THE ENG, I PERFORMED ALL OF THE REQUIRED MEMORY ITEMS AND THEN FOLLOWED UP WITH THE ENG FAILURE/ENG FIRE CHKLIST. I THEN REQUESTED, AND WAS GIVEN, RADAR VECTORS TO THE NEAREST ARPT FROM ATC. I INFORMED THEM THAT THE R ENG HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN. ATC ASKED FOR FUEL REMAINING AND NUMBER OF SOULS ON BOARD. I WAS TOLD THAT THE FIRE CREWS WERE STANDING BY. I UNDERSTOOD THAT I WAS BEING GIVEN EMER HANDLING AND IT DID NOT SEEM NECESSARY TO DECLARE AN EMER. AFTER LNDG, I VISUALLY INSPECTED THE ENG AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE OR FIRE DAMAGE. HAD THERE BEEN AN ACTUAL ENG FIRE, THE FEAR OF BEING PUNISHED BY MY EMPLOYER FOR CAUSING A CUSTOMER DELAY MAY HAVE RAISED SAFETY CONCERNS BECAUSE OF MY RELUCTANCE TO PERFORM THE REQUIRED ENG SHUTDOWN. WHAT I WOULD DO DIFFERENTLY NEXT TIME: AFTER THIS INCIDENT, IT WAS EXPLAINED TO ME THAT SINCE THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF A FIRE, A BETTER COURSE OF ACTION MAY HAVE BEEN TO LEAVE THE 'APPARENTLY NORMAL' ENG RUNNING, INSTEAD OF SHUTTING IT DOWN. BY DOING IT THIS WAY, I COULD HAVE AVOIDED PUTTING MYSELF IN A POTENTIALLY MORE DANGEROUS SIT BY TAKING AWAY THE SECOND ENG AND THE GREAT AMOUNT OF EXCESS PWR THAT GOES WITH IT. HAD ICING CONDITIONS BEEN ENCOUNTERED OR A GAR BEEN NECESSARY, THIS SIT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN EVEN BIGGER EMER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.