Narrative:

Unscheduled off airport landing, XL00 hours, feb/xa/00. The aircraft departed pwa at approximately XA30 hours on an IFR flight to iws with full fuel, 80 gallons. The trip took a little more than 2 1/2 hours at a cruising altitude of 9000 ft with an estimated fuel burn of 15 gph. The tachometer recorded 2.70 hours for the trip. I estimated fuel usage for the trip to be approximately 40 gallons. Upon arrival, I requested and received 10 gallons of fuel per side for a total of 20 gallons of fuel. Prior to the return flight, I sumped the tanks and the engine compartment as well as checked the oil level in addition to the other preflight checks. When I departed iws, I contacted houston clearance to pick up my IFR clearance. I received the clearance and prior to taxi, I noticed that I had more fuel in the left tank than in the right tank. I commented on this to my passenger and contacted the FBO stating my conclusion that all 20 gallons had been put in the left tank. The fuel gauges indicated the left tank virtually full and the right tank a little more than 1/2 full. The FBO radioed back confirming that the fuel had been dispensed as requested, commenting on the difficulty in closing the right fuel cap. The fuel cap was secure. I taxied to runway 15 and did my runup and predep checks. I contacted clearance notifying them that I was #1 at runway 15. I was instructed to continue to hold for release. I waited approximately 15-20 mins prior to being released. The fuel selector switch was set to the left tank in order to achieve equal fuel levels in the tanks. Upon departure, I flew the usual routing of a 270 degree departure with a turn to 360 degrees and then to 030 degrees before being directed to proceed to the leona VOR and then direct. My requested cruising altitude for the return flight was 6000 ft for the most favorable winds. At this altitude I do not lean the fuel mixture quite as much as the trip down. I set the mixture for a 16 1/2 - 17 gph fuel burn. The trip did not take any more time than usual. After flying for more than 1 hour, I switched fuel tanks as the left gauge indicated the same approximately fuel level as the right tank. I do not specifically recall switching fuel tanks again until the engine quit. The tachometer recorded 2.77 hours. As I approached okc, I descended to 3000 ft as instructed. When I was due west of will rogers, I was cleared for the approach to runway 35R at wiley post. At this point I experienced a total loss of power and engine stoppage. I radioed approach control of my situation while trying to restart the engine by going to full throttle and full rich and engaging the fuel boost pump. I lowered the landing gear knowing that it would reduce my glide capabilities but also put me in position to land without having to remember the gear in the midst of my current problems. The engine started and then died again. I tried again. Switched fuel tanks and made 2 efforts to restart while communicating with approach about the emergency situation. I stated that I could not make pwa but would try for runway 13 at will rogers. It became apparent as I turned to a heading of roughly 060 degrees that I would not make will rogers either. I radioed that I was going to attempt to land on highway 152. With the gear down and trying to avoid a stall, I directed the plane for the highway. I turned on the landing light and taxi light and lined up with the road. I watched oncoming traffic carefully and timed my descent to clear an oncoming vehicle, landing behind it. My other concern was traffic traveling the same direction as the plane, but I could not see below the wing and lost sight of this traffic as I descended. I landed without incident and taxied until I turned off the road. The landing did not cause any accidents or near misses on the ground. I radioed approach control that I was on the ground without accident or damage to the plane. I made sure all lights were on until emergency ground personnel arrived on the scene. With the help of motorists, I was able to move the plane completely clear of the highway and shoulder. Later when mr X of the local FSDO arrived, we drained fuel from each tank and checked the fuel gauges. The left gauge indicated 1/4 tank but the right gauge indicated almost empty. No attempt was made to restart theeng on the ground until the following day when in the presence of mr X 2 mechanics conducted an inspection of the fuel system. Both fuel tanks were drained with the left tank having approximately 8 gallons while the right tank had about 1 quart. The fuel lines, pumps and filters were checked. No abnormal characteristics were noted. The fuel was put back into the tank with an additional 28 gallons. The plane was started and the fuel system checked, including a booster pump check. The plane performed normally. Mr X cleared the plane as airworthy and gave us permission to leave. With mr Y at the controls, we departed highway 152 and flew to wiley post airport. The plane has flown 3 times since without incident. In my opinion, several related matters created this adverse situation. Even though I try to be very diligent in monitoring the fuel gauges and switching tanks at regular intervals, I may have neglected to do so this time. I utilized a higher than required fuel setting for the return trip to oklahoma city resulting in excessive fuel usage. I purchased additional fuel which should have been more than adequate to meet fuel reserve requirements but a few extra gallons might have made the difference. I did not anticipate having to wait for an IFR release and used fuel that might have made the difference. I did not closely monitor the fuel gauges nor did I calculate an accurate fuel consumption for the trip. Having made this trip on many occasions without incident, I conclude that my complacency may have led to a forced off-airport landing short of my destination. I believe that I unsuccessfully exercised the proper restart procedures and with the grace of god I was able to land safely without injuring either my passenger or motorists on the ground nor did the airplane sustain any damage. This point was made clear to me when on the ground I noticed the abundance of power lines that I had avoided. As it was dark and I couldn't see the power lines anyway, I must admit that the thought of these did not even cross my mind.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE33 PLT HAD A NIGHT FORCED LNDG AFTER THE ENG FAILED FROM FUEL STARVATION.

Narrative: UNSCHEDULED OFF ARPT LNDG, XL00 HRS, FEB/XA/00. THE ACFT DEPARTED PWA AT APPROX XA30 HRS ON AN IFR FLT TO IWS WITH FULL FUEL, 80 GALLONS. THE TRIP TOOK A LITTLE MORE THAN 2 1/2 HRS AT A CRUISING ALT OF 9000 FT WITH AN ESTIMATED FUEL BURN OF 15 GPH. THE TACHOMETER RECORDED 2.70 HRS FOR THE TRIP. I ESTIMATED FUEL USAGE FOR THE TRIP TO BE APPROX 40 GALLONS. UPON ARR, I REQUESTED AND RECEIVED 10 GALLONS OF FUEL PER SIDE FOR A TOTAL OF 20 GALLONS OF FUEL. PRIOR TO THE RETURN FLT, I SUMPED THE TANKS AND THE ENG COMPARTMENT AS WELL AS CHKED THE OIL LEVEL IN ADDITION TO THE OTHER PREFLT CHKS. WHEN I DEPARTED IWS, I CONTACTED HOUSTON CLRNC TO PICK UP MY IFR CLRNC. I RECEIVED THE CLRNC AND PRIOR TO TAXI, I NOTICED THAT I HAD MORE FUEL IN THE L TANK THAN IN THE R TANK. I COMMENTED ON THIS TO MY PAX AND CONTACTED THE FBO STATING MY CONCLUSION THAT ALL 20 GALLONS HAD BEEN PUT IN THE L TANK. THE FUEL GAUGES INDICATED THE L TANK VIRTUALLY FULL AND THE R TANK A LITTLE MORE THAN 1/2 FULL. THE FBO RADIOED BACK CONFIRMING THAT THE FUEL HAD BEEN DISPENSED AS REQUESTED, COMMENTING ON THE DIFFICULTY IN CLOSING THE R FUEL CAP. THE FUEL CAP WAS SECURE. I TAXIED TO RWY 15 AND DID MY RUNUP AND PREDEP CHKS. I CONTACTED CLRNC NOTIFYING THEM THAT I WAS #1 AT RWY 15. I WAS INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE TO HOLD FOR RELEASE. I WAITED APPROX 15-20 MINS PRIOR TO BEING RELEASED. THE FUEL SELECTOR SWITCH WAS SET TO THE L TANK IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE EQUAL FUEL LEVELS IN THE TANKS. UPON DEP, I FLEW THE USUAL ROUTING OF A 270 DEG DEP WITH A TURN TO 360 DEGS AND THEN TO 030 DEGS BEFORE BEING DIRECTED TO PROCEED TO THE LEONA VOR AND THEN DIRECT. MY REQUESTED CRUISING ALT FOR THE RETURN FLT WAS 6000 FT FOR THE MOST FAVORABLE WINDS. AT THIS ALT I DO NOT LEAN THE FUEL MIXTURE QUITE AS MUCH AS THE TRIP DOWN. I SET THE MIXTURE FOR A 16 1/2 - 17 GPH FUEL BURN. THE TRIP DID NOT TAKE ANY MORE TIME THAN USUAL. AFTER FLYING FOR MORE THAN 1 HR, I SWITCHED FUEL TANKS AS THE L GAUGE INDICATED THE SAME APPROX FUEL LEVEL AS THE R TANK. I DO NOT SPECIFICALLY RECALL SWITCHING FUEL TANKS AGAIN UNTIL THE ENG QUIT. THE TACHOMETER RECORDED 2.77 HRS. AS I APCHED OKC, I DSNDED TO 3000 FT AS INSTRUCTED. WHEN I WAS DUE W OF WILL ROGERS, I WAS CLRED FOR THE APCH TO RWY 35R AT WILEY POST. AT THIS POINT I EXPERIENCED A TOTAL LOSS OF PWR AND ENG STOPPAGE. I RADIOED APCH CTL OF MY SIT WHILE TRYING TO RESTART THE ENG BY GOING TO FULL THROTTLE AND FULL RICH AND ENGAGING THE FUEL BOOST PUMP. I LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR KNOWING THAT IT WOULD REDUCE MY GLIDE CAPABILITIES BUT ALSO PUT ME IN POS TO LAND WITHOUT HAVING TO REMEMBER THE GEAR IN THE MIDST OF MY CURRENT PROBS. THE ENG STARTED AND THEN DIED AGAIN. I TRIED AGAIN. SWITCHED FUEL TANKS AND MADE 2 EFFORTS TO RESTART WHILE COMMUNICATING WITH APCH ABOUT THE EMER SIT. I STATED THAT I COULD NOT MAKE PWA BUT WOULD TRY FOR RWY 13 AT WILL ROGERS. IT BECAME APPARENT AS I TURNED TO A HDG OF ROUGHLY 060 DEGS THAT I WOULD NOT MAKE WILL ROGERS EITHER. I RADIOED THAT I WAS GOING TO ATTEMPT TO LAND ON HWY 152. WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND TRYING TO AVOID A STALL, I DIRECTED THE PLANE FOR THE HWY. I TURNED ON THE LNDG LIGHT AND TAXI LIGHT AND LINED UP WITH THE ROAD. I WATCHED ONCOMING TFC CAREFULLY AND TIMED MY DSCNT TO CLR AN ONCOMING VEHICLE, LNDG BEHIND IT. MY OTHER CONCERN WAS TFC TRAVELING THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE PLANE, BUT I COULD NOT SEE BELOW THE WING AND LOST SIGHT OF THIS TFC AS I DSNDED. I LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND TAXIED UNTIL I TURNED OFF THE ROAD. THE LNDG DID NOT CAUSE ANY ACCIDENTS OR NEAR MISSES ON THE GND. I RADIOED APCH CTL THAT I WAS ON THE GND WITHOUT ACCIDENT OR DAMAGE TO THE PLANE. I MADE SURE ALL LIGHTS WERE ON UNTIL EMER GND PERSONNEL ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. WITH THE HELP OF MOTORISTS, I WAS ABLE TO MOVE THE PLANE COMPLETELY CLR OF THE HWY AND SHOULDER. LATER WHEN MR X OF THE LCL FSDO ARRIVED, WE DRAINED FUEL FROM EACH TANK AND CHKED THE FUEL GAUGES. THE L GAUGE INDICATED 1/4 TANK BUT THE R GAUGE INDICATED ALMOST EMPTY. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RESTART THEENG ON THE GND UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY WHEN IN THE PRESENCE OF MR X 2 MECHS CONDUCTED AN INSPECTION OF THE FUEL SYS. BOTH FUEL TANKS WERE DRAINED WITH THE L TANK HAVING APPROX 8 GALLONS WHILE THE R TANK HAD ABOUT 1 QUART. THE FUEL LINES, PUMPS AND FILTERS WERE CHKED. NO ABNORMAL CHARACTERISTICS WERE NOTED. THE FUEL WAS PUT BACK INTO THE TANK WITH AN ADDITIONAL 28 GALLONS. THE PLANE WAS STARTED AND THE FUEL SYS CHKED, INCLUDING A BOOSTER PUMP CHK. THE PLANE PERFORMED NORMALLY. MR X CLRED THE PLANE AS AIRWORTHY AND GAVE US PERMISSION TO LEAVE. WITH MR Y AT THE CTLS, WE DEPARTED HWY 152 AND FLEW TO WILEY POST ARPT. THE PLANE HAS FLOWN 3 TIMES SINCE WITHOUT INCIDENT. IN MY OPINION, SEVERAL RELATED MATTERS CREATED THIS ADVERSE SIT. EVEN THOUGH I TRY TO BE VERY DILIGENT IN MONITORING THE FUEL GAUGES AND SWITCHING TANKS AT REGULAR INTERVALS, I MAY HAVE NEGLECTED TO DO SO THIS TIME. I UTILIZED A HIGHER THAN REQUIRED FUEL SETTING FOR THE RETURN TRIP TO OKLAHOMA CITY RESULTING IN EXCESSIVE FUEL USAGE. I PURCHASED ADDITIONAL FUEL WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO MEET FUEL RESERVE REQUIREMENTS BUT A FEW EXTRA GALLONS MIGHT HAVE MADE THE DIFFERENCE. I DID NOT ANTICIPATE HAVING TO WAIT FOR AN IFR RELEASE AND USED FUEL THAT MIGHT HAVE MADE THE DIFFERENCE. I DID NOT CLOSELY MONITOR THE FUEL GAUGES NOR DID I CALCULATE AN ACCURATE FUEL CONSUMPTION FOR THE TRIP. HAVING MADE THIS TRIP ON MANY OCCASIONS WITHOUT INCIDENT, I CONCLUDE THAT MY COMPLACENCY MAY HAVE LED TO A FORCED OFF-ARPT LNDG SHORT OF MY DEST. I BELIEVE THAT I UNSUCCESSFULLY EXERCISED THE PROPER RESTART PROCS AND WITH THE GRACE OF GOD I WAS ABLE TO LAND SAFELY WITHOUT INJURING EITHER MY PAX OR MOTORISTS ON THE GND NOR DID THE AIRPLANE SUSTAIN ANY DAMAGE. THIS POINT WAS MADE CLR TO ME WHEN ON THE GND I NOTICED THE ABUNDANCE OF PWR LINES THAT I HAD AVOIDED. AS IT WAS DARK AND I COULDN'T SEE THE PWR LINES ANYWAY, I MUST ADMIT THAT THE THOUGHT OF THESE DID NOT EVEN CROSS MY MIND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.