Narrative:

This flight was the start of our shift. The first officer did the walkaround preflight and I did the acceptance check in the cockpit. Everything was normal until after takeoff. The first officer was the PF. After the 'gear up' call was made by the first officer as the PF, I raised the gear handle, nothing happened. I cycled the gear handle a few times and the gear still did not retract. We completed all our checklists for our return to phx and I started to look around in the cockpit for clues to our problem. My first officer swore that he had checked that the gear pins were removed and stored in their compartment in the airstair door, he checked that during the walkaround. At this time I looked at the overhead panel and noticed the alternate release door ajar, I then proceeded to push the door shut. Now we looked at each other like we knew what the problem was. I selected gear up with the gear handle and the gear retracted normally. Then I selected gear down and the gear extended normally. We elected to return to phx because our remaining fuel now being below minimum fuel required for completion of the flight according to our release. A check of the gear assembly and the wheel well was made. No hydraulic leaks or any other deficiencies were found and hydraulic quantities in the wheel well read normal levels. We departed on our flight again and gear retracted normally, the flight was completed without any incidents. In conclusion, I was not aware I had to write up anything since we had found the gear to cycle correctly in the air after closing the alternate release door before landing. Further the mechanic found nothing wrong during their investigation on the ground. Lesson learned from this is to be more diligent with the acceptance checklist and put your hand on the alternate release door every time. Another lesson learned is to write up any perceived mechanical difficulties even if all system seem to be working and have a mechanic sign off the release if there is any doubt as to a mechanical irregularity. How we can prevent this from happening in the future, is in our initial and recurrent training emphasizing the closure of the alternate release door. Also a procedure in the abnormal section of the cfm for failure of gear to retract would be helpful to all pilots.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DCH8-200 RETURNS TO PHX, AZ, WHEN LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT AFTER TKOF. ALTERNATE GEAR RELEASE DOOR WAS LEFT OPEN PREVENTING NORMAL OP.

Narrative: THIS FLT WAS THE START OF OUR SHIFT. THE FO DID THE WALKAROUND PREFLT AND I DID THE ACCEPTANCE CHK IN THE COCKPIT. EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL UNTIL AFTER TKOF. THE FO WAS THE PF. AFTER THE 'GEAR UP' CALL WAS MADE BY THE FO AS THE PF, I RAISED THE GEAR HANDLE, NOTHING HAPPENED. I CYCLED THE GEAR HANDLE A FEW TIMES AND THE GEAR STILL DID NOT RETRACT. WE COMPLETED ALL OUR CHKLISTS FOR OUR RETURN TO PHX AND I STARTED TO LOOK AROUND IN THE COCKPIT FOR CLUES TO OUR PROB. MY FO SWORE THAT HE HAD CHKED THAT THE GEAR PINS WERE REMOVED AND STORED IN THEIR COMPARTMENT IN THE AIRSTAIR DOOR, HE CHKED THAT DURING THE WALKAROUND. AT THIS TIME I LOOKED AT THE OVERHEAD PANEL AND NOTICED THE ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR AJAR, I THEN PROCEEDED TO PUSH THE DOOR SHUT. NOW WE LOOKED AT EACH OTHER LIKE WE KNEW WHAT THE PROB WAS. I SELECTED GEAR UP WITH THE GEAR HANDLE AND THE GEAR RETRACTED NORMALLY. THEN I SELECTED GEAR DOWN AND THE GEAR EXTENDED NORMALLY. WE ELECTED TO RETURN TO PHX BECAUSE OUR REMAINING FUEL NOW BEING BELOW MINIMUM FUEL REQUIRED FOR COMPLETION OF THE FLT ACCORDING TO OUR RELEASE. A CHK OF THE GEAR ASSEMBLY AND THE WHEEL WELL WAS MADE. NO HYD LEAKS OR ANY OTHER DEFICIENCIES WERE FOUND AND HYD QUANTITIES IN THE WHEEL WELL READ NORMAL LEVELS. WE DEPARTED ON OUR FLT AGAIN AND GEAR RETRACTED NORMALLY, THE FLT WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT ANY INCIDENTS. IN CONCLUSION, I WAS NOT AWARE I HAD TO WRITE UP ANYTHING SINCE WE HAD FOUND THE GEAR TO CYCLE CORRECTLY IN THE AIR AFTER CLOSING THE ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR BEFORE LNDG. FURTHER THE MECH FOUND NOTHING WRONG DURING THEIR INVESTIGATION ON THE GND. LESSON LEARNED FROM THIS IS TO BE MORE DILIGENT WITH THE ACCEPTANCE CHKLIST AND PUT YOUR HAND ON THE ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR EVERY TIME. ANOTHER LESSON LEARNED IS TO WRITE UP ANY PERCEIVED MECHANICAL DIFFICULTIES EVEN IF ALL SYS SEEM TO BE WORKING AND HAVE A MECH SIGN OFF THE RELEASE IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT AS TO A MECHANICAL IRREGULARITY. HOW WE CAN PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING IN THE FUTURE, IS IN OUR INITIAL AND RECURRENT TRAINING EMPHASIZING THE CLOSURE OF THE ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR. ALSO A PROC IN THE ABNORMAL SECTION OF THE CFM FOR FAILURE OF GEAR TO RETRACT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ALL PLTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.