Narrative:

For 2 weeks prior to the occurrence, both communication #1 and #2 had progressively worse transmission/reception problems. Captain #1 displayed a reluctance to write up the radios officially, as our maintenance department wouldn't be able to work on them for several days. Despite my prodding, he did nothing. The day before the occurrence we were unable to receive/transmit for several mins flying into bos class B airspace on an IFR flight plan in VMC. Again the captain did not wish to write up the issue, not feeling it was serious enough to ground the airplane. The day of the occurrence was widespread low IFR. We were returning to our home base of bed with a patient on board. Of course, we had been having intermittent failures of 1 communication, the other for small (5-10 second) periods of time. On vectors to the ILS runway 11 final, we realized we had not heard from bos approach for some time, and were about to be vectored through the final approach course. After passing through the localizer, we were able to receive approach (who had been calling us for several mins) and were given a turn back to final. I advised approach we were having radio problems, and asked that we be relayed to hanscom tower. We were switched to tower and did not have any subsequent radio problems. However, outside the FAF we were given an RVR of 4000 ft. The RVR for the approach (required) is 5000 ft. As we had not passed the FAF we were legally required to proceed to an alternate/hold until the RVR rose (under 135). Captain #2 (PF) elected to continue the approach. I agreed with the decision, as we did not know if the radios would fail again, leaving us no radio in busy airspace on a low IFR day. Obviously, the biggest contributing factor was a systemic problem in the company where multiple capts would not write up a maintenance problem for fear of grounding an airplane. In the future, I will not 'play the game' and will insist proper procedure is followed. This whole event could have been avoided with timely maintenance. Additionally, I feel the FAA needs to be aware that many part 135 organizations (this is not the first for me) encourage an unofficial policy of not writing up issues.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA31 AIR AMBULANCE FLC SUFFERS FROM CONTINUOUS RADIO COM PROBS WITHOUT WRITING UP THE PROBS. THE ACFT EVENTUALLY MAKES AN UNAUTH APCH TO BED WHILE UNABLE TO HEAR THE UNAUTH RVR APCH INFO. BED, MA.

Narrative: FOR 2 WKS PRIOR TO THE OCCURRENCE, BOTH COM #1 AND #2 HAD PROGRESSIVELY WORSE XMISSION/RECEPTION PROBS. CAPT #1 DISPLAYED A RELUCTANCE TO WRITE UP THE RADIOS OFFICIALLY, AS OUR MAINT DEPT WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO WORK ON THEM FOR SEVERAL DAYS. DESPITE MY PRODDING, HE DID NOTHING. THE DAY BEFORE THE OCCURRENCE WE WERE UNABLE TO RECEIVE/XMIT FOR SEVERAL MINS FLYING INTO BOS CLASS B AIRSPACE ON AN IFR FLT PLAN IN VMC. AGAIN THE CAPT DID NOT WISH TO WRITE UP THE ISSUE, NOT FEELING IT WAS SERIOUS ENOUGH TO GND THE AIRPLANE. THE DAY OF THE OCCURRENCE WAS WIDESPREAD LOW IFR. WE WERE RETURNING TO OUR HOME BASE OF BED WITH A PATIENT ON BOARD. OF COURSE, WE HAD BEEN HAVING INTERMITTENT FAILURES OF 1 COM, THE OTHER FOR SMALL (5-10 SECOND) PERIODS OF TIME. ON VECTORS TO THE ILS RWY 11 FINAL, WE REALIZED WE HAD NOT HEARD FROM BOS APCH FOR SOME TIME, AND WERE ABOUT TO BE VECTORED THROUGH THE FINAL APCH COURSE. AFTER PASSING THROUGH THE LOC, WE WERE ABLE TO RECEIVE APCH (WHO HAD BEEN CALLING US FOR SEVERAL MINS) AND WERE GIVEN A TURN BACK TO FINAL. I ADVISED APCH WE WERE HAVING RADIO PROBS, AND ASKED THAT WE BE RELAYED TO HANSCOM TWR. WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR AND DID NOT HAVE ANY SUBSEQUENT RADIO PROBS. HOWEVER, OUTSIDE THE FAF WE WERE GIVEN AN RVR OF 4000 FT. THE RVR FOR THE APCH (REQUIRED) IS 5000 FT. AS WE HAD NOT PASSED THE FAF WE WERE LEGALLY REQUIRED TO PROCEED TO AN ALTERNATE/HOLD UNTIL THE RVR ROSE (UNDER 135). CAPT #2 (PF) ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE APCH. I AGREED WITH THE DECISION, AS WE DID NOT KNOW IF THE RADIOS WOULD FAIL AGAIN, LEAVING US NO RADIO IN BUSY AIRSPACE ON A LOW IFR DAY. OBVIOUSLY, THE BIGGEST CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS A SYSTEMIC PROB IN THE COMPANY WHERE MULTIPLE CAPTS WOULD NOT WRITE UP A MAINT PROB FOR FEAR OF GNDING AN AIRPLANE. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT 'PLAY THE GAME' AND WILL INSIST PROPER PROC IS FOLLOWED. THIS WHOLE EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED WITH TIMELY MAINT. ADDITIONALLY, I FEEL THE FAA NEEDS TO BE AWARE THAT MANY PART 135 ORGANIZATIONS (THIS IS NOT THE FIRST FOR ME) ENCOURAGE AN UNOFFICIAL POLICY OF NOT WRITING UP ISSUES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.