Narrative:

I was receiving aircraft familiarization instruction, from the PIC who is a current cfii, on a ferry flight from st claire, mo, with an intended destination of teb, nj. We were on a VFR descent into aoo, PA, during which time the PIC, not I, was the sole manipulator of the controls. Due to approaching night conditions, snow and MVFR, the PIC picked up an en route instrument clearance for aoo. The PIC reviewed the aoo approach plates. During vectoring, the directional gyro became unreliable (and the compass was swinging heavily) and therefore the PIC requested a 'no gyro' approach. As it continued to darken, it became apparent that the instrument backgnd and overhead lights were ineffective. Sitting in the left seat, I shone 1 of 2 onboard flashlights on the instruments to make them visible. ZOB was vectoring us 'no gyro' for aoo runway 22, when the engine quit. The PIC immediately switched fuel tanks (the boost pump was already on) and increased carburetor heat (which had already been partially out at that point) to keep the temperature on the carburetor temperature gauge above 0 degrees C. This immediately restored engine power. At the time the engine quit, I immediately called 'mayday' to ZOB. When power was restored, I informed ZOB. ZOB continued giving no gyro vectors to zoo and at approximately 2 mi out, the field's runway lights and VASI became visible. The PIC lined up and descended on the VASI. The PIC pushed down the landing gear lever to bring the gear down, but the green down lock bulb did not illuminate. When throttle was retarded, the gear warning light sounded. On short final, we did a go around, which I radioed in, due to the apparent landing gear problem. The PIC attempted twice more to recycle the gear, to no avail. During the recycling, the ammeter indicated in the normal range. We turned to runway 30, and as per the PIC's instructions, I radioed on the unicom frequency to request that someone do a gear check as we did a low pass. A party responded, but was unsure of the location of the aircraft. I began to undertake manual extension of the landing gear, but at that point the engine started running rough, so it was decided, given the poor engine performance (especially in light of the engine quitting earlier), the low visibility, the partial panel, and ineffective panel lighting, that an additional go around would not be prudent. Instead, we both agreed that it was the safest course to put the plane down while we were on a clear approach to the runway. The PIC landed, and the gear was indeed up and the propeller struck the ground. We slid, staying straight on the runway, for approximately 4 seconds, and upon stopping, the PIC shut down the plane's electrical system, and we both immediately evacuate/evacuationed ourselves. There was no fire, and there were no injuries. There appeared to be no major or structural damage to the airframe. Prior to our departure from st claire, mo, the PIC and I questioned the pilots who were then regularly flying the aircraft, and they imparted that they had no problems with it. Prior to departure, the PIC examined the logbooks and indicated that the maintenance on the aircraft appeared appropriate. Prior to departure, a thorough preflight inspection was conducted. On our approach for refueling, the fuel gauges indicated 1/4 tank remaining per side. The fuel tanks were both completely topped off (to the point of overflow) prior to our departure from st claire. The PIC's calculations indicated that at our altitude, we would have a sufficient fuel supply plus required reserve for a landing at altoona. The PIC regularly leaned the engine and monitored the egt during flight, and the fuel tanks were switched at 1/2 hour intervals throughout. Contributing factors to the incident include: inadequate fuel gauges (they need better calibration), unreliable landing gear (at this point we have not been advised of the nature of the gear problem, but according to the maintenance logs, they were worked on and passed muster approximately 2 months prior to this flight), unreliable directional gyro (again, the maintenance logs indicated that it was recently repaired). From the perspective of a pilot, items that could help prevent a similar situation in the future include: a backup means of gear extension that is rapid and that does not distract from the pilot's attention to flying, the creation of a simple means of testing instrument lighting during daylight conditions, the installation of a backup directional gyro, the installation of a push-to-talk switch on the aircraft (this aircraft was not so equipped, and as a result the PIC and I were forced to fumble with a handheld microphone during critical stages of the flight). Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the FAA was investigating this incident and that nothing had been found wrong with the gear extension mechanism. He said that the gear was partially out of the wheel wells during touchdown indicating that his efforts to manually lower the gear were working, but there was not sufficient time to complete the lowering due to deteriorating WX and lack of fuel for another go around. Reporter was advised of the required fuel gauge accuracy as only empty, or zero.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT INSTRUCTOR, ACCOMPANIED BY AN ACFT TRANSITING PUT PUT, IN A PIPER PA24 MADE A GEAR UP LNDG AFTER EXTENSION OF THE LNDG GEAR WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. ACFT RECEIVED DAMAGE TO THE PROP AND LNDG GEAR WHEELS SINCE GEAR WAS PARTIALLY EXTENDED.

Narrative: I WAS RECEIVING ACFT FAMILIARIZATION INSTRUCTION, FROM THE PIC WHO IS A CURRENT CFII, ON A FERRY FLT FROM ST CLAIRE, MO, WITH AN INTENDED DEST OF TEB, NJ. WE WERE ON A VFR DSCNT INTO AOO, PA, DURING WHICH TIME THE PIC, NOT I, WAS THE SOLE MANIPULATOR OF THE CTLS. DUE TO APCHING NIGHT CONDITIONS, SNOW AND MVFR, THE PIC PICKED UP AN ENRTE INST CLRNC FOR AOO. THE PIC REVIEWED THE AOO APCH PLATES. DURING VECTORING, THE DIRECTIONAL GYRO BECAME UNRELIABLE (AND THE COMPASS WAS SWINGING HEAVILY) AND THEREFORE THE PIC REQUESTED A 'NO GYRO' APCH. AS IT CONTINUED TO DARKEN, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE INST BACKGND AND OVERHEAD LIGHTS WERE INEFFECTIVE. SITTING IN THE L SEAT, I SHONE 1 OF 2 ONBOARD FLASHLIGHTS ON THE INSTS TO MAKE THEM VISIBLE. ZOB WAS VECTORING US 'NO GYRO' FOR AOO RWY 22, WHEN THE ENG QUIT. THE PIC IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED FUEL TANKS (THE BOOST PUMP WAS ALREADY ON) AND INCREASED CARB HEAT (WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN PARTIALLY OUT AT THAT POINT) TO KEEP THE TEMP ON THE CARB TEMP GAUGE ABOVE 0 DEGS C. THIS IMMEDIATELY RESTORED ENG PWR. AT THE TIME THE ENG QUIT, I IMMEDIATELY CALLED 'MAYDAY' TO ZOB. WHEN PWR WAS RESTORED, I INFORMED ZOB. ZOB CONTINUED GIVING NO GYRO VECTORS TO ZOO AND AT APPROX 2 MI OUT, THE FIELD'S RWY LIGHTS AND VASI BECAME VISIBLE. THE PIC LINED UP AND DSNDED ON THE VASI. THE PIC PUSHED DOWN THE LNDG GEAR LEVER TO BRING THE GEAR DOWN, BUT THE GREEN DOWN LOCK BULB DID NOT ILLUMINATE. WHEN THROTTLE WAS RETARDED, THE GEAR WARNING LIGHT SOUNDED. ON SHORT FINAL, WE DID A GAR, WHICH I RADIOED IN, DUE TO THE APPARENT LNDG GEAR PROB. THE PIC ATTEMPTED TWICE MORE TO RECYCLE THE GEAR, TO NO AVAIL. DURING THE RECYCLING, THE AMMETER INDICATED IN THE NORMAL RANGE. WE TURNED TO RWY 30, AND AS PER THE PIC'S INSTRUCTIONS, I RADIOED ON THE UNICOM FREQ TO REQUEST THAT SOMEONE DO A GEAR CHK AS WE DID A LOW PASS. A PARTY RESPONDED, BUT WAS UNSURE OF THE LOCATION OF THE ACFT. I BEGAN TO UNDERTAKE MANUAL EXTENSION OF THE LNDG GEAR, BUT AT THAT POINT THE ENG STARTED RUNNING ROUGH, SO IT WAS DECIDED, GIVEN THE POOR ENG PERFORMANCE (ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE ENG QUITTING EARLIER), THE LOW VISIBILITY, THE PARTIAL PANEL, AND INEFFECTIVE PANEL LIGHTING, THAT AN ADDITIONAL GAR WOULD NOT BE PRUDENT. INSTEAD, WE BOTH AGREED THAT IT WAS THE SAFEST COURSE TO PUT THE PLANE DOWN WHILE WE WERE ON A CLR APCH TO THE RWY. THE PIC LANDED, AND THE GEAR WAS INDEED UP AND THE PROP STRUCK THE GND. WE SLID, STAYING STRAIGHT ON THE RWY, FOR APPROX 4 SECONDS, AND UPON STOPPING, THE PIC SHUT DOWN THE PLANE'S ELECTRICAL SYS, AND WE BOTH IMMEDIATELY EVACED OURSELVES. THERE WAS NO FIRE, AND THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THERE APPEARED TO BE NO MAJOR OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO THE AIRFRAME. PRIOR TO OUR DEP FROM ST CLAIRE, MO, THE PIC AND I QUESTIONED THE PLTS WHO WERE THEN REGULARLY FLYING THE ACFT, AND THEY IMPARTED THAT THEY HAD NO PROBS WITH IT. PRIOR TO DEP, THE PIC EXAMINED THE LOGBOOKS AND INDICATED THAT THE MAINT ON THE ACFT APPEARED APPROPRIATE. PRIOR TO DEP, A THOROUGH PREFLT INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED. ON OUR APCH FOR REFUELING, THE FUEL GAUGES INDICATED 1/4 TANK REMAINING PER SIDE. THE FUEL TANKS WERE BOTH COMPLETELY TOPPED OFF (TO THE POINT OF OVERFLOW) PRIOR TO OUR DEP FROM ST CLAIRE. THE PIC'S CALCULATIONS INDICATED THAT AT OUR ALT, WE WOULD HAVE A SUFFICIENT FUEL SUPPLY PLUS REQUIRED RESERVE FOR A LNDG AT ALTOONA. THE PIC REGULARLY LEANED THE ENG AND MONITORED THE EGT DURING FLT, AND THE FUEL TANKS WERE SWITCHED AT 1/2 HR INTERVALS THROUGHOUT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE INCIDENT INCLUDE: INADEQUATE FUEL GAUGES (THEY NEED BETTER CALIBRATION), UNRELIABLE LNDG GEAR (AT THIS POINT WE HAVE NOT BEEN ADVISED OF THE NATURE OF THE GEAR PROB, BUT ACCORDING TO THE MAINT LOGS, THEY WERE WORKED ON AND PASSED MUSTER APPROX 2 MONTHS PRIOR TO THIS FLT), UNRELIABLE DIRECTIONAL GYRO (AGAIN, THE MAINT LOGS INDICATED THAT IT WAS RECENTLY REPAIRED). FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A PLT, ITEMS THAT COULD HELP PREVENT A SIMILAR SIT IN THE FUTURE INCLUDE: A BACKUP MEANS OF GEAR EXTENSION THAT IS RAPID AND THAT DOES NOT DISTRACT FROM THE PLT'S ATTN TO FLYING, THE CREATION OF A SIMPLE MEANS OF TESTING INST LIGHTING DURING DAYLIGHT CONDITIONS, THE INSTALLATION OF A BACKUP DIRECTIONAL GYRO, THE INSTALLATION OF A PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH ON THE ACFT (THIS ACFT WAS NOT SO EQUIPPED, AND AS A RESULT THE PIC AND I WERE FORCED TO FUMBLE WITH A HANDHELD MIKE DURING CRITICAL STAGES OF THE FLT). CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE FAA WAS INVESTIGATING THIS INCIDENT AND THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN FOUND WRONG WITH THE GEAR EXTENSION MECHANISM. HE SAID THAT THE GEAR WAS PARTIALLY OUT OF THE WHEEL WELLS DURING TOUCHDOWN INDICATING THAT HIS EFFORTS TO MANUALLY LOWER THE GEAR WERE WORKING, BUT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLETE THE LOWERING DUE TO DETERIORATING WX AND LACK OF FUEL FOR ANOTHER GAR. RPTR WAS ADVISED OF THE REQUIRED FUEL GAUGE ACCURACY AS ONLY EMPTY, OR ZERO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.