Narrative:

We were departing pvd at XA15 on flight xx to atl. The WX was 600 ft overcast, 7 mi visibility, winds 020 degrees at 8 KTS, 12 degrees C with a dewpoint of 11 degrees. The runway was wet with patches of standing water. We took off from runway 5R using normal power, flaps 11 degrees, slippery wet takeoff data and a takeoff gross weight of approximately 147000 pounds. (Maximum takeoff weight for this aircraft is 149500 pounds.) it was my leg and as we accelerated to vr, I began to raise the nose tire off the runway, at which time I heard a muffled bang and felt the aircraft begin to yaw to the right. I applied left rudder and continued the rotation. Almost immediately we began to hear a tremendous amount of commotion and yelling from the passenger cabin. We could clearly hear several people yelling 'fire.' the captain directed me to continue flying the aircraft. At that time we confirmed a positive rate of climb and raised the landing gear. The commotion continued in the main cabin and I also heard the cockpit call chime several times and repeated banging on the cockpit door. We declared an emergency with pvd tower and as the captain attempted to restore order in the cabin and calm the flight attendant in charge, I requested an immediate vector from the tower to the downwind and informed them that we had a report of smoke/fire in the cabin, as well as a failure of the right engine and would be returning to pvd for an emergency landing. Shortly after takeoff the right engine began to experience repeated compressor stalls as it attempts to regain power. I began my upwind turn at approximately 1000 ft then leveled off at 2000 ft in the downwind and accelerated to 180 KTS. During that time the captain conferred with the flight attendants, assessed the situation in the cabin and made an announcement to calm the passenger. He was able to determine that we in fact did not have a fire in the cabin and the small amount of smoke appeared to be coming from the air conditioning system as a result of the #2 engine failure. At that time we informed pvd tower that the smoke was a result of the engine failure and not a fire and requested a divert to bos. During my departure briefing I had discussed bos as our divert field in the event of an emergency due to our aircraft weight, the short runway at pvd and the wet field conditions. The captain completed the after takeoff and engine failure/shutdown/damage checklist. At that time, the #2 engine fire handle was pulled as we suspected the engine had sustained severe damage due to the repeated compressor stalls. He again briefed the passenger of our situation and the need to divert to bos. We received clearance from departure control to climb to 5000 ft and received radar vectors to bos. The FMS was reprogrammed with bos as our new destination and an ILS approach to runway 4R was loaded. The reported ceiling and visibility at bos was 400 ft overcast and 1 1/4 mi visibility in light rain. After intercepting the localizer, we were cleared to 3000 ft and cleared for the approach. The captain had completed all of the abnormal checklist items and briefed the single engine ILS approach and missed approach considerations. At that point he took control of the aircraft and I completed the descent, approach and landing checklists. After landing, as an extra precaution, the boston crash crew performed a heat scan of our #2 engine to confirm that there was no residual heat/fire. At that point the captain taxied to the gate and I made an additional announcement to the passenger to summarize the events of the flight, relay the information about the heat scan of the engine and to again explain the reason for our need to divert to bos. Upon our arrival at the gate we inspected the exterior of the aircraft and discovered that the #4 main tire tread had separated from the tire and was ingested into the #2 engine which caused the engine to fail/compressor stall. This was also the cause of the initial smoke in the cabin and the mistaken belief by the flight attendants and passenger that there was a fire in the aircraft cabin.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CREW OF MD88 CONFRONTED WITH ENG PWR LOSS AND POSSIBLE IMPENDING FAILURE AND POSSIBLE SMOKE IN CABIN AT VR SPD ON TKOF FROM PVD.

Narrative: WE WERE DEPARTING PVD AT XA15 ON FLT XX TO ATL. THE WX WAS 600 FT OVCST, 7 MI VISIBILITY, WINDS 020 DEGS AT 8 KTS, 12 DEGS C WITH A DEWPOINT OF 11 DEGS. THE RWY WAS WET WITH PATCHES OF STANDING WATER. WE TOOK OFF FROM RWY 5R USING NORMAL PWR, FLAPS 11 DEGS, SLIPPERY WET TKOF DATA AND A TKOF GROSS WT OF APPROX 147000 LBS. (MAX TKOF WT FOR THIS ACFT IS 149500 LBS.) IT WAS MY LEG AND AS WE ACCELERATED TO VR, I BEGAN TO RAISE THE NOSE TIRE OFF THE RWY, AT WHICH TIME I HEARD A MUFFLED BANG AND FELT THE ACFT BEGIN TO YAW TO THE R. I APPLIED L RUDDER AND CONTINUED THE ROTATION. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WE BEGAN TO HEAR A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF COMMOTION AND YELLING FROM THE PAX CABIN. WE COULD CLRLY HEAR SEVERAL PEOPLE YELLING 'FIRE.' THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO CONTINUE FLYING THE ACFT. AT THAT TIME WE CONFIRMED A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB AND RAISED THE LNDG GEAR. THE COMMOTION CONTINUED IN THE MAIN CABIN AND I ALSO HEARD THE COCKPIT CALL CHIME SEVERAL TIMES AND REPEATED BANGING ON THE COCKPIT DOOR. WE DECLARED AN EMER WITH PVD TWR AND AS THE CAPT ATTEMPTED TO RESTORE ORDER IN THE CABIN AND CALM THE FLT ATTENDANT IN CHARGE, I REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE VECTOR FROM THE TWR TO THE DOWNWIND AND INFORMED THEM THAT WE HAD A RPT OF SMOKE/FIRE IN THE CABIN, AS WELL AS A FAILURE OF THE R ENG AND WOULD BE RETURNING TO PVD FOR AN EMER LNDG. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF THE R ENG BEGAN TO EXPERIENCE REPEATED COMPRESSOR STALLS AS IT ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN PWR. I BEGAN MY UPWIND TURN AT APPROX 1000 FT THEN LEVELED OFF AT 2000 FT IN THE DOWNWIND AND ACCELERATED TO 180 KTS. DURING THAT TIME THE CAPT CONFERRED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS, ASSESSED THE SIT IN THE CABIN AND MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO CALM THE PAX. HE WAS ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT WE IN FACT DID NOT HAVE A FIRE IN THE CABIN AND THE SMALL AMOUNT OF SMOKE APPEARED TO BE COMING FROM THE AIR CONDITIONING SYS AS A RESULT OF THE #2 ENG FAILURE. AT THAT TIME WE INFORMED PVD TWR THAT THE SMOKE WAS A RESULT OF THE ENG FAILURE AND NOT A FIRE AND REQUESTED A DIVERT TO BOS. DURING MY DEP BRIEFING I HAD DISCUSSED BOS AS OUR DIVERT FIELD IN THE EVENT OF AN EMER DUE TO OUR ACFT WT, THE SHORT RWY AT PVD AND THE WET FIELD CONDITIONS. THE CAPT COMPLETED THE AFTER TKOF AND ENG FAILURE/SHUTDOWN/DAMAGE CHKLIST. AT THAT TIME, THE #2 ENG FIRE HANDLE WAS PULLED AS WE SUSPECTED THE ENG HAD SUSTAINED SEVERE DAMAGE DUE TO THE REPEATED COMPRESSOR STALLS. HE AGAIN BRIEFED THE PAX OF OUR SIT AND THE NEED TO DIVERT TO BOS. WE RECEIVED CLRNC FROM DEP CTL TO CLB TO 5000 FT AND RECEIVED RADAR VECTORS TO BOS. THE FMS WAS REPROGRAMMED WITH BOS AS OUR NEW DEST AND AN ILS APCH TO RWY 4R WAS LOADED. THE RPTED CEILING AND VISIBILITY AT BOS WAS 400 FT OVCST AND 1 1/4 MI VISIBILITY IN LIGHT RAIN. AFTER INTERCEPTING THE LOC, WE WERE CLRED TO 3000 FT AND CLRED FOR THE APCH. THE CAPT HAD COMPLETED ALL OF THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST ITEMS AND BRIEFED THE SINGLE ENG ILS APCH AND MISSED APCH CONSIDERATIONS. AT THAT POINT HE TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND I COMPLETED THE DSCNT, APCH AND LNDG CHKLISTS. AFTER LNDG, AS AN EXTRA PRECAUTION, THE BOSTON CRASH CREW PERFORMED A HEAT SCAN OF OUR #2 ENG TO CONFIRM THAT THERE WAS NO RESIDUAL HEAT/FIRE. AT THAT POINT THE CAPT TAXIED TO THE GATE AND I MADE AN ADDITIONAL ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX TO SUMMARIZE THE EVENTS OF THE FLT, RELAY THE INFO ABOUT THE HEAT SCAN OF THE ENG AND TO AGAIN EXPLAIN THE REASON FOR OUR NEED TO DIVERT TO BOS. UPON OUR ARR AT THE GATE WE INSPECTED THE EXTERIOR OF THE ACFT AND DISCOVERED THAT THE #4 MAIN TIRE TREAD HAD SEPARATED FROM THE TIRE AND WAS INGESTED INTO THE #2 ENG WHICH CAUSED THE ENG TO FAIL/COMPRESSOR STALL. THIS WAS ALSO THE CAUSE OF THE INITIAL SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND THE MISTAKEN BELIEF BY THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX THAT THERE WAS A FIRE IN THE ACFT CABIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.