Narrative:

Air carrier X departed mdpc climbing to FL330. Air carrier Y sebound at FL330, non-radar. Air carrier X was on a vector around special use airspace. The icss (interfacility communication switching system) failed and communication was lost with both aircraft. Radio and landline communication was lost. After some minutes, I was able to relay to air carrier X thru tower to proceed direct to 22 north 60 east. Turn was issued too late and non-radar separation would be lost when air carrier X went off radar or in a matter of minutes. The non-radar controller was able to get thru to commercial radio on an outside line and climb air carrier Y. We remained without radio and landline communication at the positions for more than 1 1/2 hours. I have not received refresher training on the portable transceivers and could not select the frequencys I needed (121.5). We could not 'remap' (program) the icss because we did not have the training nor were the steps in the controller in charge binder. This last failure occurred on apr/xa/98 previously and an ucr was submitted. Management led us to believe that the passwords and procedures were to be included in the controller in charge binder. This we found out was false. Had this failure occurred 30 to 45 minutes later, things could have been much worse. We routinely approve and coordinate wrong for direction aircraft with the belief that we will have them in radar for 45 minutes to 1 hour in order to put them at an appropriate altitude or vector them around each other. If we do not, aircraft would be flying from FL180 up to FL390 or FL410. From saez to kjfk and vice versa. The previous failure affected only 2 sector control positions (R4/D4) and we were able to use another sector. This failure was at all positions and the international FSS which is on the same computer. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised the icss had failed once last year without known resolution. This time with controller in charge on duty during midnight configuration, with 3 control positions operating when the icss failed. Facility procedures did not provide for controller in charge password access, only supervisor. No supervisor was available in the control room. Since the system failure the reporter advises that management has not yet provided password access of additional controller training to 'remap' the icss during the midshift. Reporter advised he was concerned with system safety due to lack of icss training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZSU CTLR CLIMBS L101 INTO CONFLICT WITH ENROUTE MD80, EXPECTING TO APPLY ANOTHER TYPE OF APPROVED SEPARATION, WHEN EQUIPMENT FAILURE INTERRUPTS THE TIMELY APPLICATION OF POSITIVE SEPARATION.

Narrative: ACR X DEPARTED MDPC CLIMBING TO FL330. ACR Y SEBOUND AT FL330, NON-RADAR. ACR X WAS ON A VECTOR AROUND SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE. THE ICSS (INTERFACILITY COMMUNICATION SWITCHING SYS) FAILED AND COM WAS LOST WITH BOTH ACFT. RADIO AND LANDLINE COM WAS LOST. AFTER SOME MINUTES, I WAS ABLE TO RELAY TO ACR X THRU TWR TO PROCEED DIRECT TO 22 N 60 E. TURN WAS ISSUED TOO LATE AND NON-RADAR SEPARATION WOULD BE LOST WHEN ACR X WENT OFF RADAR OR IN A MATTER OF MINUTES. THE NON-RADAR CTLR WAS ABLE TO GET THRU TO COMMERCIAL RADIO ON AN OUTSIDE LINE AND CLB ACR Y. WE REMAINED WITHOUT RADIO AND LANDLINE COM AT THE POSITIONS FOR MORE THAN 1 1/2 HOURS. I HAVE NOT RECEIVED REFRESHER TRAINING ON THE PORTABLE TRANSCEIVERS AND COULD NOT SELECT THE FREQS I NEEDED (121.5). WE COULD NOT 'REMAP' (PROGRAM) THE ICSS BECAUSE WE DID NOT HAVE THE TRAINING NOR WERE THE STEPS IN THE CIC BINDER. THIS LAST FAILURE OCCURRED ON APR/XA/98 PREVIOUSLY AND AN UCR WAS SUBMITTED. MANAGEMENT LED US TO BELIEVE THAT THE PASSWORDS AND PROCEDURES WERE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CIC BINDER. THIS WE FOUND OUT WAS FALSE. HAD THIS FAILURE OCCURRED 30 TO 45 MINUTES LATER, THINGS COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE. WE ROUTINELY APPROVE AND COORDINATE WRONG FOR DIRECTION ACFT WITH THE BELIEF THAT WE WILL HAVE THEM IN RADAR FOR 45 MINUTES TO 1 HR IN ORDER TO PUT THEM AT AN APPROPRIATE ALT OR VECTOR THEM AROUND EACH OTHER. IF WE DO NOT, ACFT WOULD BE FLYING FROM FL180 UP TO FL390 OR FL410. FROM SAEZ TO KJFK AND VICE VERSA. THE PREVIOUS FAILURE AFFECTED ONLY 2 SECTOR CTL POSITIONS (R4/D4) AND WE WERE ABLE TO USE ANOTHER SECTOR. THIS FAILURE WAS AT ALL POSITIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL FSS WHICH IS ON THE SAME COMPUTER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THE ICSS HAD FAILED ONCE LAST YEAR WITHOUT KNOWN RESOLUTION. THIS TIME WITH CIC ON DUTY DURING MIDNIGHT CONFIGURATION, WITH 3 CTL POSITIONS OPERATING WHEN THE ICSS FAILED. FAC PROCEDURES DID NOT PROVIDE FOR CIC PASSWORD ACCESS, ONLY SUPVR. NO SUPVR WAS AVAILABLE IN THE CTL ROOM. SINCE THE SYS FAILURE THE RPTR ADVISES THAT MANAGEMENT HAS NOT YET PROVIDED PASSWORD ACCESS OF ADDITIONAL CTLR TRAINING TO 'REMAP' THE ICSS DURING THE MIDSHIFT. RPTR ADVISED HE WAS CONCERNED WITH SYS SAFETY DUE TO LACK OF ICSS TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.