Narrative:

Sct has implemented a program where you are held responsible if someone violates your airspace. This policy causes you to watch about 10-30 more aircraft data blocks than usual and coordinate with other facilities more than in the past. There is not enough staffing to allow handoff personnel to work with each radar position. This causes the radar person's workload to double or triple. The extra time spent with this extra coordination and the extra data blocks on the radar screen overload a radar controller's ability to provide the usual high level of safety we had prior to this new rule. The only 2 solutions that seem feasible are spend millions of dollars to get more controllers to work the handoffs or rescind the rule. The third option is obviously unacceptable, to allow the degradation of aviation safety by doubling or tripling the controller's workload without any assistance. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter claims that facility management has changed who is held accountable when a radar controller lets an aircraft enter another sector without a timely pointout or handoff. Reporter stated this recent change was brought to everyone's attention, when an aircraft with a limited data block entered a sector without either pointout or handoff. Past practice had been that the radar controller who allowed the aircraft to enter the other controller's sector was the only one held accountable. In a recent case, both controllers at whose sector the aircraft entered were taken off the sector and made part of the deviation package. Asked if any briefings had been held or was anything in the right&I binders? Reporter stated none. Asked if the union was doing anything about this? Reporter said that the union filed grievances, but they were denied.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR STATES THAT THE FACILITY HAS IMPLEMENTED A NEW POLICY REQUIRING CTLRS TO BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ANYONE THAT VIOLATES THEIR AIRSPACE. ACCORDING TO THE RPTR, THIS POLICY HAS INCREASED THEIR WORKLOAD.

Narrative: SCT HAS IMPLEMENTED A PROGRAM WHERE YOU ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE IF SOMEONE VIOLATES YOUR AIRSPACE. THIS POLICY CAUSES YOU TO WATCH ABOUT 10-30 MORE ACFT DATA BLOCKS THAN USUAL AND COORDINATE WITH OTHER FACILITIES MORE THAN IN THE PAST. THERE IS NOT ENOUGH STAFFING TO ALLOW HDOF PERSONNEL TO WORK WITH EACH RADAR POS. THIS CAUSES THE RADAR PERSON'S WORKLOAD TO DOUBLE OR TRIPLE. THE EXTRA TIME SPENT WITH THIS EXTRA COORD AND THE EXTRA DATA BLOCKS ON THE RADAR SCREEN OVERLOAD A RADAR CTLR'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE THE USUAL HIGH LEVEL OF SAFETY WE HAD PRIOR TO THIS NEW RULE. THE ONLY 2 SOLUTIONS THAT SEEM FEASIBLE ARE SPEND MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO GET MORE CTLRS TO WORK THE HDOFS OR RESCIND THE RULE. THE THIRD OPTION IS OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE, TO ALLOW THE DEGRADATION OF AVIATION SAFETY BY DOUBLING OR TRIPLING THE CTLR'S WORKLOAD WITHOUT ANY ASSISTANCE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR CLAIMS THAT FACILITY MGMNT HAS CHANGED WHO IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE WHEN A RADAR CTLR LETS AN ACFT ENTER ANOTHER SECTOR WITHOUT A TIMELY POINTOUT OR HDOF. RPTR STATED THIS RECENT CHANGE WAS BROUGHT TO EVERYONE'S ATTN, WHEN AN ACFT WITH A LIMITED DATA BLOCK ENTERED A SECTOR WITHOUT EITHER POINTOUT OR HDOF. PAST PRACTICE HAD BEEN THAT THE RADAR CTLR WHO ALLOWED THE ACFT TO ENTER THE OTHER CTLR'S SECTOR WAS THE ONLY ONE HELD ACCOUNTABLE. IN A RECENT CASE, BOTH CTLRS AT WHOSE SECTOR THE ACFT ENTERED WERE TAKEN OFF THE SECTOR AND MADE PART OF THE DEV PACKAGE. ASKED IF ANY BRIEFINGS HAD BEEN HELD OR WAS ANYTHING IN THE R&I BINDERS? RPTR STATED NONE. ASKED IF THE UNION WAS DOING ANYTHING ABOUT THIS? RPTR SAID THAT THE UNION FILED GRIEVANCES, BUT THEY WERE DENIED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.