Narrative:

Our flight crew was scheduled to fly a charter from dov to clt. The original departure time was pushed back due to minimum rest requirements for the flight crew. We (the flight crew) arrived to base operations approximately XA00. The captain and first officer then began to review the departure papers. I copied down the necessary information for me to complete my performance calculations as well as fuel load data. With this, I then proceeded out to the ramp to perform my preflight inspections. Due to unforeseen circumstances from our arrival earlier that day, we were unable to use certain fuel trucks on our aircraft so it had been arranged that a contract vendor would be available for fueling. As I approached the aircraft the fueler appeared to have been already hooked up to the aircraft awaiting a fuel order. I promptly gave him the fuel order. I then began to perform my exterior safety inspection. During this inspection I encountered the person in charge on the ramp near the aircraft. I asked her how long she had been waiting and she said that they had been waiting approximately 1 hour. I then noticed that there were people standing in the main cabin door entry. I proceeded up the stairs and into the cockpit to assure external power was available to begin the fueling process. As I recall, the external power was connected to the aircraft and I believe at that time I may have switched the ship's power to external if it had not already been done. I then continued my conversation with the spokesperson about the passenger. She informed me that a dispatcher/flight control gave her the permission to board the aircraft without the flight crew or flight attendants on board. Meanwhile the fueler has already begun the fueling process. I evaluated the situation and initially thought that fueling the aircraft with passenger on board with no flight attendants was acceptable as long as the main cabin door was open and a crew member was aboard. After referencing my operations manual, I realized the previous statement was incorrect. Before I was able to alter the situation, the fueling process was complete. The fueler came aboard and requested payment. I informed him that the captain had the company credit card and was in base operations. Now I was stuck with a plane full of delayed passenger, fully fueled and no way to contact the captain at base operations. The APU was started in order to give the passenger air conditioning and ventilation. After further inspection of the back of the aircraft, I realized the passenger elected to feed themselves from the catering carts in the galley. Empty food boxes and litter were thrown about the cabin. The captain and first officer arrived later. Once the captain realized the passenger were boarded he proceeded back to base operations to contact company. The first officer and myself elected to stay with the aircraft. It was later decided that the passenger would deplane the aircraft so the flight attendants would be able to perform their required safety checks. Upon completion, the flight departed without further incident. I believe that several factors contributed to this event: prior approval from company to allow the boarding to begin without qualified crew members present. Misconception of the legality of fueling the aircraft with passenger aboard and no qualified crew members aboard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FLC FLYING A B727 AT DOV RPTS CONFUSION BTWN THE FLC AND DISPATCH REGARDING THE BOARDING OF PAX WITHOUT FLC OR CABIN CREW TO SUPERVISE.

Narrative: OUR FLC WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY A CHARTER FROM DOV TO CLT. THE ORIGINAL DEP TIME WAS PUSHED BACK DUE TO MINIMUM REST REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FLC. WE (THE FLC) ARRIVED TO BASE OPS APPROX XA00. THE CAPT AND FO THEN BEGAN TO REVIEW THE DEP PAPERS. I COPIED DOWN THE NECESSARY INFO FOR ME TO COMPLETE MY PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS AS WELL AS FUEL LOAD DATA. WITH THIS, I THEN PROCEEDED OUT TO THE RAMP TO PERFORM MY PREFLT INSPECTIONS. DUE TO UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES FROM OUR ARR EARLIER THAT DAY, WE WERE UNABLE TO USE CERTAIN FUEL TRUCKS ON OUR ACFT SO IT HAD BEEN ARRANGED THAT A CONTRACT VENDOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR FUELING. AS I APCHED THE ACFT THE FUELER APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN ALREADY HOOKED UP TO THE ACFT AWAITING A FUEL ORDER. I PROMPTLY GAVE HIM THE FUEL ORDER. I THEN BEGAN TO PERFORM MY EXTERIOR SAFETY INSPECTION. DURING THIS INSPECTION I ENCOUNTERED THE PERSON IN CHARGE ON THE RAMP NEAR THE ACFT. I ASKED HER HOW LONG SHE HAD BEEN WAITING AND SHE SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN WAITING APPROX 1 HR. I THEN NOTICED THAT THERE WERE PEOPLE STANDING IN THE MAIN CABIN DOOR ENTRY. I PROCEEDED UP THE STAIRS AND INTO THE COCKPIT TO ASSURE EXTERNAL PWR WAS AVAILABLE TO BEGIN THE FUELING PROCESS. AS I RECALL, THE EXTERNAL PWR WAS CONNECTED TO THE ACFT AND I BELIEVE AT THAT TIME I MAY HAVE SWITCHED THE SHIP'S PWR TO EXTERNAL IF IT HAD NOT ALREADY BEEN DONE. I THEN CONTINUED MY CONVERSATION WITH THE SPOKESPERSON ABOUT THE PAX. SHE INFORMED ME THAT A DISPATCHER/FLT CTL GAVE HER THE PERMISSION TO BOARD THE ACFT WITHOUT THE FLC OR FLT ATTENDANTS ON BOARD. MEANWHILE THE FUELER HAS ALREADY BEGUN THE FUELING PROCESS. I EVALUATED THE SIT AND INITIALLY THOUGHT THAT FUELING THE ACFT WITH PAX ON BOARD WITH NO FLT ATTENDANTS WAS ACCEPTABLE AS LONG AS THE MAIN CABIN DOOR WAS OPEN AND A CREW MEMBER WAS ABOARD. AFTER REFING MY OPS MANUAL, I REALIZED THE PREVIOUS STATEMENT WAS INCORRECT. BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO ALTER THE SIT, THE FUELING PROCESS WAS COMPLETE. THE FUELER CAME ABOARD AND REQUESTED PAYMENT. I INFORMED HIM THAT THE CAPT HAD THE COMPANY CREDIT CARD AND WAS IN BASE OPS. NOW I WAS STUCK WITH A PLANE FULL OF DELAYED PAX, FULLY FUELED AND NO WAY TO CONTACT THE CAPT AT BASE OPS. THE APU WAS STARTED IN ORDER TO GIVE THE PAX AIR CONDITIONING AND VENTILATION. AFTER FURTHER INSPECTION OF THE BACK OF THE ACFT, I REALIZED THE PAX ELECTED TO FEED THEMSELVES FROM THE CATERING CARTS IN THE GALLEY. EMPTY FOOD BOXES AND LITTER WERE THROWN ABOUT THE CABIN. THE CAPT AND FO ARRIVED LATER. ONCE THE CAPT REALIZED THE PAX WERE BOARDED HE PROCEEDED BACK TO BASE OPS TO CONTACT COMPANY. THE FO AND MYSELF ELECTED TO STAY WITH THE ACFT. IT WAS LATER DECIDED THAT THE PAX WOULD DEPLANE THE ACFT SO THE FLT ATTENDANTS WOULD BE ABLE TO PERFORM THEIR REQUIRED SAFETY CHKS. UPON COMPLETION, THE FLT DEPARTED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THAT SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT: PRIOR APPROVAL FROM COMPANY TO ALLOW THE BOARDING TO BEGIN WITHOUT QUALIFIED CREW MEMBERS PRESENT. MISCONCEPTION OF THE LEGALITY OF FUELING THE ACFT WITH PAX ABOARD AND NO QUALIFIED CREW MEMBERS ABOARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.