Narrative:

We were cleared for a visual approach to runway 24R at lax by socal approach while on downwind and just abeam romen (FAF). There was an experienced captain in the right side but unfamiliar with flying from that seat. He mistook runway 25R as runway 24R and delayed his turn to final until I took control and corrected back to runway 24R. Both socal and tower told us we were too far left of centerline and to correct back. I estimate we got 1.5 NM left of runway 24R centerline at 4 mi out. Even though the localizer for runway 24R was tuned and armed and the FMS map display showed the correct situational picture, the acting first officer didn't see the correlation and fixated on his visual picture. Since we came in from the north and made right traffic, my view was obstructed by the afternoon sun and the aircraft itself. When we didn't make the turn from base to final at the FMS's computer lead, I took control and made the corrections back to final. I need to be ready to make these corrections sooner. My oral inputs to what needed to be done were not heard or never heeded. Another factor is scheduling crews together that have a first officer with limited familiarization in a particular seat while running shuttles in a heavy workload environment. It's a huge burden on the other crew member. This will be discussed at our next manager's meeting.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DA90 CREW OVERSHOT THE TURN TO FINAL ON RWY 24R AT LAX.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R AT LAX BY SOCAL APCH WHILE ON DOWNWIND AND JUST ABEAM ROMEN (FAF). THERE WAS AN EXPERIENCED CAPT IN THE R SIDE BUT UNFAMILIAR WITH FLYING FROM THAT SEAT. HE MISTOOK RWY 25R AS RWY 24R AND DELAYED HIS TURN TO FINAL UNTIL I TOOK CTL AND CORRECTED BACK TO RWY 24R. BOTH SOCAL AND TWR TOLD US WE WERE TOO FAR L OF CTRLINE AND TO CORRECT BACK. I ESTIMATE WE GOT 1.5 NM L OF RWY 24R CTRLINE AT 4 MI OUT. EVEN THOUGH THE LOC FOR RWY 24R WAS TUNED AND ARMED AND THE FMS MAP DISPLAY SHOWED THE CORRECT SITUATIONAL PICTURE, THE ACTING FO DIDN'T SEE THE CORRELATION AND FIXATED ON HIS VISUAL PICTURE. SINCE WE CAME IN FROM THE N AND MADE R TFC, MY VIEW WAS OBSTRUCTED BY THE AFTERNOON SUN AND THE ACFT ITSELF. WHEN WE DIDN'T MAKE THE TURN FROM BASE TO FINAL AT THE FMS'S COMPUTER LEAD, I TOOK CTL AND MADE THE CORRECTIONS BACK TO FINAL. I NEED TO BE READY TO MAKE THESE CORRECTIONS SOONER. MY ORAL INPUTS TO WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE WERE NOT HEARD OR NEVER HEEDED. ANOTHER FACTOR IS SCHEDULING CREWS TOGETHER THAT HAVE A FO WITH LIMITED FAMILIARIZATION IN A PARTICULAR SEAT WHILE RUNNING SHUTTLES IN A HVY WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT. IT'S A HUGE BURDEN ON THE OTHER CREW MEMBER. THIS WILL BE DISCUSSED AT OUR NEXT MGR'S MEETING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.