Narrative:

On sep/xa/99 at approximately XA55Z, I taxied across an active runway (runway 17/35) at hector international, fargo, nd. There was no traffic in the pattern, on approach, nor on any txwys. The problem arose as a result of using a new applicant for the first time to serve in my place as an international contract pilot. This gentleman was french and my perception was that he appeared to be in good command of the language. We were to fly from fargo, nd, to bridgeport, ct, that evening. I asked him to copy the clearance while I taxied to the active and ran the taxi checklist. He was unable to copy the clearance completely and required my assistance. Included during the taxi was a doublechk of the FMS data of the clearance we had received. I then asked him to get our taxi clearance. It was at this point that CRM began to unravel. Contributing factors were my lack of knowledge as to his abilities and a serious language barrier (his understanding of the ATC language) that led directly to the incursion. I taxied out slowly from the ramp because of my unfamiliarity with the airport. I had opened the approach plates to the fargo airport diagram and handed the applicant the book. We were cleared to taxi to runway 35 via txwys C/B and hold short of runway 31. The copilot read back the taxi clearance without the hold short instructions. The tower interrogated his readback requesting the acknowledgement of the hold short. The copilot responded a second time incorrectly. Apparently the rapidity of the spoken tongue and a new expression confused him. I saw his problem and transmitted the hold short requirement. The language/communication problem consumed a few hundred ft on taxi on taxiway C. By this time I had taxied past the taxiway B signage. I asked my copilot how we were doing since we were still taxiing to the active. He held up the book about 4 ft away from me and pointed to taxiway C on the chart and then pointed to the taxiway across the runway. I used poor judgement and failed to doublechk the letter assigned to the taxiway and mistakenly followed his directions. We continued to taxi while I tried to explain the lahso regulations. I mentioned that they were an effective program to control runway incursions and that it was mandatory to reply as to the hold short instructions. He thanked me for the help and information. As we began to cross runway 35, the tower called and said that we had missed our turn, that we had been cleared txwys C/B with a hold short at runway 31, and that we were now crossing the active runway 35. He told us to continue across and taxi left on taxiway a. I felt sick. Corrective actions were pretty simple at this point. I took the approach plates and handled all communications. The damage was done and I was angry at myself for allowing this to happen. The applicant is on his way to tahiti.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C550B TAXIES ACROSS ACTIVE RWY 35 WITHOUT CLRNC AT FAR, ND.

Narrative: ON SEP/XA/99 AT APPROX XA55Z, I TAXIED ACROSS AN ACTIVE RWY (RWY 17/35) AT HECTOR INTL, FARGO, ND. THERE WAS NO TFC IN THE PATTERN, ON APCH, NOR ON ANY TXWYS. THE PROB AROSE AS A RESULT OF USING A NEW APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME TO SERVE IN MY PLACE AS AN INTL CONTRACT PLT. THIS GENTLEMAN WAS FRENCH AND MY PERCEPTION WAS THAT HE APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD COMMAND OF THE LANGUAGE. WE WERE TO FLY FROM FARGO, ND, TO BRIDGEPORT, CT, THAT EVENING. I ASKED HIM TO COPY THE CLRNC WHILE I TAXIED TO THE ACTIVE AND RAN THE TAXI CHKLIST. HE WAS UNABLE TO COPY THE CLRNC COMPLETELY AND REQUIRED MY ASSISTANCE. INCLUDED DURING THE TAXI WAS A DOUBLECHK OF THE FMS DATA OF THE CLRNC WE HAD RECEIVED. I THEN ASKED HIM TO GET OUR TAXI CLRNC. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT CRM BEGAN TO UNRAVEL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE MY LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AS TO HIS ABILITIES AND A SERIOUS LANGUAGE BARRIER (HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE ATC LANGUAGE) THAT LED DIRECTLY TO THE INCURSION. I TAXIED OUT SLOWLY FROM THE RAMP BECAUSE OF MY UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT. I HAD OPENED THE APCH PLATES TO THE FARGO ARPT DIAGRAM AND HANDED THE APPLICANT THE BOOK. WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 35 VIA TXWYS C/B AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 31. THE COPLT READ BACK THE TAXI CLRNC WITHOUT THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. THE TWR INTERROGATED HIS READBACK REQUESTING THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE HOLD SHORT. THE COPLT RESPONDED A SECOND TIME INCORRECTLY. APPARENTLY THE RAPIDITY OF THE SPOKEN TONGUE AND A NEW EXPRESSION CONFUSED HIM. I SAW HIS PROB AND XMITTED THE HOLD SHORT REQUIREMENT. THE LANGUAGE/COM PROB CONSUMED A FEW HUNDRED FT ON TAXI ON TXWY C. BY THIS TIME I HAD TAXIED PAST THE TXWY B SIGNAGE. I ASKED MY COPLT HOW WE WERE DOING SINCE WE WERE STILL TAXIING TO THE ACTIVE. HE HELD UP THE BOOK ABOUT 4 FT AWAY FROM ME AND POINTED TO TXWY C ON THE CHART AND THEN POINTED TO THE TXWY ACROSS THE RWY. I USED POOR JUDGEMENT AND FAILED TO DOUBLECHK THE LETTER ASSIGNED TO THE TXWY AND MISTAKENLY FOLLOWED HIS DIRECTIONS. WE CONTINUED TO TAXI WHILE I TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE LAHSO REGS. I MENTIONED THAT THEY WERE AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM TO CTL RWY INCURSIONS AND THAT IT WAS MANDATORY TO REPLY AS TO THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. HE THANKED ME FOR THE HELP AND INFO. AS WE BEGAN TO CROSS RWY 35, THE TWR CALLED AND SAID THAT WE HAD MISSED OUR TURN, THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TXWYS C/B WITH A HOLD SHORT AT RWY 31, AND THAT WE WERE NOW XING THE ACTIVE RWY 35. HE TOLD US TO CONTINUE ACROSS AND TAXI L ON TXWY A. I FELT SICK. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE PRETTY SIMPLE AT THIS POINT. I TOOK THE APCH PLATES AND HANDLED ALL COMS. THE DAMAGE WAS DONE AND I WAS ANGRY AT MYSELF FOR ALLOWING THIS TO HAPPEN. THE APPLICANT IS ON HIS WAY TO TAHITI.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.