Narrative:

While reviewing the flight papers during preflight planning, I noticed the aircraft was dispatched and arrived from sea to sjc with 2 MEL items relating to fuel gauges inoperative and 2 cdl items regarding a missing slat seal and flap hinge fairing. I reviewed the MEL/cdl manual in operations, calculated the cdl additive performance penalties, and determined the plan for fueling with an inoperative fuel gauge with the fueler and operations personnel. I phoned sea dispatch regarding the fuel load. The cdl's were familiar to me, since within the previous few months I had flown several different aircraft with the same missing equipment. I did not notice that 2 fairing were listed on the dispatch release, and when reviewing the maintenance logbook checked the cdl number, date, and compared it against the dispatch release. The first officer and I discussed the performance penalties. Since this was the first time either of us had to do the fuel dripstick procedures, we took the fueling manual and accomplished fueling the tank with the inoperative gauge together. I called maintenance control on the radio prior to departure and confirmed the logbook procedure for departing a non maintenance base with an inoperative fuel gauge. The flight departed sjc and arrived in sea without incident. Upon arrival, I discussed with the oncoming first officer the fueling procedures and he mentioned that the oncoming captain was checking with maintenance to determine if 2 aft flap fairings could be missing according to the cdl. When the oncoming captain arrived, I went outside with him and observed the 2 aft fairings on the left wing were missing. Only 1 could be missing according to the cdl. Factors affecting our not catching the error in the cdl were: assuming that since the aircraft had flown from sea without any new discrepancies that it remained ok for dispatch, concentrating on the performance penalties rather than the write-up, familiarity with the same cdl on previous flts and airplanes, concern with fuel dripstick and inoperative fuel gauge procedures. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the cdl item had been reviewed and corrected by the airline. Also stated the airline has self disclosed this incident with the FAA. Supplemental information from acn 437996: one particular cdl (57-50-01) was questioned but was told it was ok. It is clear that maintenance control itself was confused on this issue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 FLC OPERATED A FLT WITH MORE ITEMS THAN AUTH ON THE CDL.

Narrative: WHILE REVIEWING THE FLT PAPERS DURING PREFLT PLANNING, I NOTICED THE ACFT WAS DISPATCHED AND ARRIVED FROM SEA TO SJC WITH 2 MEL ITEMS RELATING TO FUEL GAUGES INOP AND 2 CDL ITEMS REGARDING A MISSING SLAT SEAL AND FLAP HINGE FAIRING. I REVIEWED THE MEL/CDL MANUAL IN OPS, CALCULATED THE CDL ADDITIVE PERFORMANCE PENALTIES, AND DETERMINED THE PLAN FOR FUELING WITH AN INOP FUEL GAUGE WITH THE FUELER AND OPS PERSONNEL. I PHONED SEA DISPATCH REGARDING THE FUEL LOAD. THE CDL'S WERE FAMILIAR TO ME, SINCE WITHIN THE PREVIOUS FEW MONTHS I HAD FLOWN SEVERAL DIFFERENT ACFT WITH THE SAME MISSING EQUIP. I DID NOT NOTICE THAT 2 FAIRING WERE LISTED ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE, AND WHEN REVIEWING THE MAINT LOGBOOK CHKED THE CDL NUMBER, DATE, AND COMPARED IT AGAINST THE DISPATCH RELEASE. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE PERFORMANCE PENALTIES. SINCE THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME EITHER OF US HAD TO DO THE FUEL DRIPSTICK PROCS, WE TOOK THE FUELING MANUAL AND ACCOMPLISHED FUELING THE TANK WITH THE INOP GAUGE TOGETHER. I CALLED MAINT CTL ON THE RADIO PRIOR TO DEP AND CONFIRMED THE LOGBOOK PROC FOR DEPARTING A NON MAINT BASE WITH AN INOP FUEL GAUGE. THE FLT DEPARTED SJC AND ARRIVED IN SEA WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON ARR, I DISCUSSED WITH THE ONCOMING FO THE FUELING PROCS AND HE MENTIONED THAT THE ONCOMING CAPT WAS CHKING WITH MAINT TO DETERMINE IF 2 AFT FLAP FAIRINGS COULD BE MISSING ACCORDING TO THE CDL. WHEN THE ONCOMING CAPT ARRIVED, I WENT OUTSIDE WITH HIM AND OBSERVED THE 2 AFT FAIRINGS ON THE L WING WERE MISSING. ONLY 1 COULD BE MISSING ACCORDING TO THE CDL. FACTORS AFFECTING OUR NOT CATCHING THE ERROR IN THE CDL WERE: ASSUMING THAT SINCE THE ACFT HAD FLOWN FROM SEA WITHOUT ANY NEW DISCREPANCIES THAT IT REMAINED OK FOR DISPATCH, CONCENTRATING ON THE PERFORMANCE PENALTIES RATHER THAN THE WRITE-UP, FAMILIARITY WITH THE SAME CDL ON PREVIOUS FLTS AND AIRPLANES, CONCERN WITH FUEL DRIPSTICK AND INOP FUEL GAUGE PROCS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE CDL ITEM HAD BEEN REVIEWED AND CORRECTED BY THE AIRLINE. ALSO STATED THE AIRLINE HAS SELF DISCLOSED THIS INCIDENT WITH THE FAA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 437996: ONE PARTICULAR CDL (57-50-01) WAS QUESTIONED BUT WAS TOLD IT WAS OK. IT IS CLR THAT MAINT CTL ITSELF WAS CONFUSED ON THIS ISSUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.