Narrative:

Just prior to pushback my flight received an amendment to our departure clearance. We pushed back from gate, started engines, and received taxi instructions from ground to taxi to runway 28L but hold short of runway 1L. I read back and understood instructions and erroneously assumed captain understood them as well. While taxiing, my head was down momentarily as I was busy inserting the final load numbers, speeds, and updating our amended departure clearance into FMC. Meanwhile, captain had mistakenly taxied aircraft across runway 1L to hold short of runway 1R. Ground control called to inform us of our mistake. I think the following corrective actions could be taken to prevent this type of miscom in the future: 1) as first officer, I need to have a heightened awareness of runways we are crossing or holding short of now that I'm on a FMC aircraft which occasionally requires heads down updates. 2) as first officer, I should have been more positive that the captain fully understood our taxi instructions. 3) the captain should have read back the hold short instructions so that we both were in agreement. 4) the captain should have asked me if we were 'clear on the right?' prior to crossing runway 1R. This would have given us one last chance to catch the mistake. 5) ground control might alleviate some confusion by simplifying taxi instructions to only the point aircraft is cleared to hold short of. Possibly, in retrospect, the prudent action would have been to update our departure routing in the FMC prior to taxiing at all. Although I don't believe a conflict arose from our particular runway incursion, one could have and I think it's important for acrs to not be complacent on ground (especially in FMC aircraft where only 1 pilot might be monitoring aircraft's progress). All ground taxiing clrncs need to be treated with as much respect and positive, professional and deliberate cockpit communications as in-flight clrncs.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 CREW HAD RWY INCURSION.

Narrative: JUST PRIOR TO PUSHBACK MY FLT RECEIVED AN AMENDMENT TO OUR DEP CLRNC. WE PUSHED BACK FROM GATE, STARTED ENGS, AND RECEIVED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS FROM GND TO TAXI TO RWY 28L BUT HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1L. I READ BACK AND UNDERSTOOD INSTRUCTIONS AND ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED CAPT UNDERSTOOD THEM AS WELL. WHILE TAXIING, MY HEAD WAS DOWN MOMENTARILY AS I WAS BUSY INSERTING THE FINAL LOAD NUMBERS, SPDS, AND UPDATING OUR AMENDED DEP CLRNC INTO FMC. MEANWHILE, CAPT HAD MISTAKENLY TAXIED ACFT ACROSS RWY 1L TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1R. GND CTL CALLED TO INFORM US OF OUR MISTAKE. I THINK THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF MISCOM IN THE FUTURE: 1) AS FO, I NEED TO HAVE A HEIGHTENED AWARENESS OF RWYS WE ARE XING OR HOLDING SHORT OF NOW THAT I'M ON A FMC ACFT WHICH OCCASIONALLY REQUIRES HEADS DOWN UPDATES. 2) AS FO, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE POSITIVE THAT THE CAPT FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. 3) THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE READ BACK THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS SO THAT WE BOTH WERE IN AGREEMENT. 4) THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE ASKED ME IF WE WERE 'CLR ON THE R?' PRIOR TO XING RWY 1R. THIS WOULD HAVE GIVEN US ONE LAST CHANCE TO CATCH THE MISTAKE. 5) GND CTL MIGHT ALLEVIATE SOME CONFUSION BY SIMPLIFYING TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO ONLY THE POINT ACFT IS CLRED TO HOLD SHORT OF. POSSIBLY, IN RETROSPECT, THE PRUDENT ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO UPDATE OUR DEP ROUTING IN THE FMC PRIOR TO TAXIING AT ALL. ALTHOUGH I DON'T BELIEVE A CONFLICT AROSE FROM OUR PARTICULAR RWY INCURSION, ONE COULD HAVE AND I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT FOR ACRS TO NOT BE COMPLACENT ON GND (ESPECIALLY IN FMC ACFT WHERE ONLY 1 PLT MIGHT BE MONITORING ACFT'S PROGRESS). ALL GND TAXIING CLRNCS NEED TO BE TREATED WITH AS MUCH RESPECT AND POSITIVE, PROFESSIONAL AND DELIBERATE COCKPIT COMS AS INFLT CLRNCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.