Narrative:

First officer was flying the aircraft. I was giving IOE instruction to him as a new line pilot in the saab 340. During our descent, he began to brief the approach, and realized he did not have approach plates for cll. I gave him my approach plates so he could review them. The control tower was closed for the night and we anticipated we would be able to fly a visual approach. He briefed it as a visual approach, backed up by the ILS to runway 34. We tuned in the localizer frequency. Coming from dfw (the north), we would cross the cll VOR, which made for a very nice downwind leg for our approach to runway 34. Approximately 10 mi out, we told ZHU we had the airport in sight and were cleared for a visual approach to runway 34. As we crossed abeam the airport and began our descent into the traffic pattern for landing, we noticed runway lights on. As we turned toward the airport, we both saw the airport environment, including taxi lights, but were unable to establish contact with the runway 34. I did not have my approach plates in front of me and the notation is clearly there that the lights are pilot activated when the tower closes. We initiated a go around, first officer still flying, and at a safe altitude I asked for my approach plates back. Upon seeing the lighting notation, I felt that the lights had probably gone out -- we had failed to reactive them, the timer had turned them out. We clicked them up, but during the climb out we climbed up to missed approach altitude of 2500 ft MSL, into center's airspace and had not contacted them. We returned to the airport, landed and contacted center to cancel IFR and he advised us that we had climbed to an inappropriate altitude, but accepted our cancellation without further admonishment. I should have allowed my first officer to borrow the plates, but insisted on getting them back prior to approach. I would have noticed the lighting activation notation and activated them -- a basic night IFR rule to always activate the lighting in a situation like this upon commencing any approach. During the go around, I was distraction by assisting the first officer in flying the go around and did not contact center. Although no conflict with other traffic occurred, and it was in visual conditions, in other sits a potential for conflict could have occurred. In the future I will endeavor to assure that the first officer has their approach charts for the airport we are flying to -- especially when it is a new first officer and I am giving IOE to him. And, after flying the airplane first during a go around or other procedure, be sure to contact the ATC facility as workload commands.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTIONAL FLT IN S340 INADVERTENTLY PENETRATES FLOOR OF ZHU AIRSPACE ON VFR GAR AT CLL.

Narrative: FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT. I WAS GIVING IOE INSTRUCTION TO HIM AS A NEW LINE PLT IN THE SAAB 340. DURING OUR DSCNT, HE BEGAN TO BRIEF THE APCH, AND REALIZED HE DID NOT HAVE APCH PLATES FOR CLL. I GAVE HIM MY APCH PLATES SO HE COULD REVIEW THEM. THE CTL TWR WAS CLOSED FOR THE NIGHT AND WE ANTICIPATED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO FLY A VISUAL APCH. HE BRIEFED IT AS A VISUAL APCH, BACKED UP BY THE ILS TO RWY 34. WE TUNED IN THE LOC FREQ. COMING FROM DFW (THE N), WE WOULD CROSS THE CLL VOR, WHICH MADE FOR A VERY NICE DOWNWIND LEG FOR OUR APCH TO RWY 34. APPROX 10 MI OUT, WE TOLD ZHU WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 34. AS WE CROSSED ABEAM THE ARPT AND BEGAN OUR DSCNT INTO THE TFC PATTERN FOR LNDG, WE NOTICED RWY LIGHTS ON. AS WE TURNED TOWARD THE ARPT, WE BOTH SAW THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING TAXI LIGHTS, BUT WERE UNABLE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE RWY 34. I DID NOT HAVE MY APCH PLATES IN FRONT OF ME AND THE NOTATION IS CLRLY THERE THAT THE LIGHTS ARE PLT ACTIVATED WHEN THE TWR CLOSES. WE INITIATED A GAR, FO STILL FLYING, AND AT A SAFE ALT I ASKED FOR MY APCH PLATES BACK. UPON SEEING THE LIGHTING NOTATION, I FELT THAT THE LIGHTS HAD PROBABLY GONE OUT -- WE HAD FAILED TO REACTIVE THEM, THE TIMER HAD TURNED THEM OUT. WE CLICKED THEM UP, BUT DURING THE CLBOUT WE CLBED UP TO MISSED APCH ALT OF 2500 FT MSL, INTO CTR'S AIRSPACE AND HAD NOT CONTACTED THEM. WE RETURNED TO THE ARPT, LANDED AND CONTACTED CTR TO CANCEL IFR AND HE ADVISED US THAT WE HAD CLBED TO AN INAPPROPRIATE ALT, BUT ACCEPTED OUR CANCELLATION WITHOUT FURTHER ADMONISHMENT. I SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED MY FO TO BORROW THE PLATES, BUT INSISTED ON GETTING THEM BACK PRIOR TO APCH. I WOULD HAVE NOTICED THE LIGHTING ACTIVATION NOTATION AND ACTIVATED THEM -- A BASIC NIGHT IFR RULE TO ALWAYS ACTIVATE THE LIGHTING IN A SIT LIKE THIS UPON COMMENCING ANY APCH. DURING THE GAR, I WAS DISTR BY ASSISTING THE FO IN FLYING THE GAR AND DID NOT CONTACT CTR. ALTHOUGH NO CONFLICT WITH OTHER TFC OCCURRED, AND IT WAS IN VISUAL CONDITIONS, IN OTHER SITS A POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT COULD HAVE OCCURRED. IN THE FUTURE I WILL ENDEAVOR TO ASSURE THAT THE FO HAS THEIR APCH CHARTS FOR THE ARPT WE ARE FLYING TO -- ESPECIALLY WHEN IT IS A NEW FO AND I AM GIVING IOE TO HIM. AND, AFTER FLYING THE AIRPLANE FIRST DURING A GAR OR OTHER PROC, BE SURE TO CONTACT THE ATC FACILITY AS WORKLOAD COMMANDS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.