Flight crew of an medium large transport stopped their climb and started descending in response to a...

Attributes
ACN	435816
Time
Date	199905
Day	Sun
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	navaid : pmd.vortac
State Reference	CA
Altitude	msl bound lower : 16000 msl bound upper : 17400
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zla.artcc
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	other vortac
Flight Phase	climbout : vacating altitude
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zla.artcc
Operator	general aviation : corporate
Make Model Name	Gates Learjet Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Phase	cruise : level
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 17000 flight time type : 9900
ASRS Report	435816
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : commercial
Events
Anomaly	conflict : airborne critical other anomaly other
Independent Detector	atc equipment other atc equipment : radar aircraft equipment : tcas
Resolutory Action	controller : issued advisory flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action
Consequence	Other
Miss Distance	horizontal : 3000 vertical : 100
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative:

While climbing eastbound toward hec VOR near pmd VOR at approximately 16000 ft MSL, ZLA (frequency 128.07 I think, although there were about 5 different frequencys used in a short span of time) issued traffic to us at 10 O'clock, 8 mi (I think) sbound, a learjet, VFR, level at 17500 ft. We were climbing at about 2000 FPM, indicating 320 KTS. We started to look for the traffic and I cautioned the first officer (who was the PF) that a TCASII event may occur. Shortly thereafter, the learjet said they had us in sight. At about that time, our TCASII gave a TA showing the learjet at 10 O'clock and 4 mi. Almost immediately, TCASII gave an RA to descend. We still did not have the learjet in sight. The controller restated that the lear had us in sight and, according to the lear pilot, there would be no problem. I informed the controller that we must still respond to our TCASII commands. My first officer did not respond to TCASII until I prompted him to do so. Even then, he did not reach the TCASII commanded vertical descent rate. He then stated that he had the learjet in sight. However, at this point, partly I think due to my first officer's slow response to TCASII, our TCASII descend command increased. I then began to push on the yoke to reach the TCASII target vertical speed and again asked my first officer to comply fully with TCASII, even though he had the learjet in sight by now and also thought that there would be no problem. I now had the learjet in sight and saw that we would pass behind and a little below them. I estimate that we were about 1/2 mi from the learjet at the closest point and TCASII showed us 100 ft below the learjet. Our company policy is of course to comply with all TCASII RA commands. The policy is clear. I also brief all my first officer's to comply with TCASII first, look for traffic next. (Oddly enough, this first officer and I had what we believed to be a false TCASII the day before in another aircraft near slc.) additionally, to disconnect the autoplt if in use, which it was, and which my first officer didn't disconnect. He did push enough on the yoke to go into control wheel steering mode for pitch. Autothrottles were on and also not disconnected, however, we do not require that they be disconnected.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN MLG STOPPED THEIR CLB AND STARTED DSNDING IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII RA EVEN THOUGH THE FO FLYING HAD THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT AND ATC HAD ISSUED A TA IN ADVANCE OF THE TCASII WARNING.

Narrative: WHILE CLBING EBOUND TOWARD HEC VOR NEAR PMD VOR AT APPROX 16000 FT MSL, ZLA (FREQ 128.07 I THINK, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ABOUT 5 DIFFERENT FREQS USED IN A SHORT SPAN OF TIME) ISSUED TFC TO US AT 10 O'CLOCK, 8 MI (I THINK) SBOUND, A LEARJET, VFR, LEVEL AT 17500 FT. WE WERE CLBING AT ABOUT 2000 FPM, INDICATING 320 KTS. WE STARTED TO LOOK FOR THE TFC AND I CAUTIONED THE FO (WHO WAS THE PF) THAT A TCASII EVENT MAY OCCUR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE LEARJET SAID THEY HAD US IN SIGHT. AT ABOUT THAT TIME, OUR TCASII GAVE A TA SHOWING THE LEARJET AT 10 O'CLOCK AND 4 MI. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, TCASII GAVE AN RA TO DSND. WE STILL DID NOT HAVE THE LEARJET IN SIGHT. THE CTLR RESTATED THAT THE LEAR HAD US IN SIGHT AND, ACCORDING TO THE LEAR PLT, THERE WOULD BE NO PROB. I INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE MUST STILL RESPOND TO OUR TCASII COMMANDS. MY FO DID NOT RESPOND TO TCASII UNTIL I PROMPTED HIM TO DO SO. EVEN THEN, HE DID NOT REACH THE TCASII COMMANDED VERT DSCNT RATE. HE THEN STATED THAT HE HAD THE LEARJET IN SIGHT. HOWEVER, AT THIS POINT, PARTLY I THINK DUE TO MY FO'S SLOW RESPONSE TO TCASII, OUR TCASII DSND COMMAND INCREASED. I THEN BEGAN TO PUSH ON THE YOKE TO REACH THE TCASII TARGET VERT SPD AND AGAIN ASKED MY FO TO COMPLY FULLY WITH TCASII, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD THE LEARJET IN SIGHT BY NOW AND ALSO THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROB. I NOW HAD THE LEARJET IN SIGHT AND SAW THAT WE WOULD PASS BEHIND AND A LITTLE BELOW THEM. I ESTIMATE THAT WE WERE ABOUT 1/2 MI FROM THE LEARJET AT THE CLOSEST POINT AND TCASII SHOWED US 100 FT BELOW THE LEARJET. OUR COMPANY POLICY IS OF COURSE TO COMPLY WITH ALL TCASII RA COMMANDS. THE POLICY IS CLR. I ALSO BRIEF ALL MY FO'S TO COMPLY WITH TCASII FIRST, LOOK FOR TFC NEXT. (ODDLY ENOUGH, THIS FO AND I HAD WHAT WE BELIEVED TO BE A FALSE TCASII THE DAY BEFORE IN ANOTHER ACFT NEAR SLC.) ADDITIONALLY, TO DISCONNECT THE AUTOPLT IF IN USE, WHICH IT WAS, AND WHICH MY FO DIDN'T DISCONNECT. HE DID PUSH ENOUGH ON THE YOKE TO GO INTO CTL WHEEL STEERING MODE FOR PITCH. AUTOTHROTTLES WERE ON AND ALSO NOT DISCONNECTED, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT REQUIRE THAT THEY BE DISCONNECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Flight crew of an medium large transport stopped their climb and started descending in response to a TCASII RA even though the first officer flying had the other aircraft in sight and ATC had issued a TA in advance of the TCASII warning.