Narrative:

Location: hirst intersection, jen arrival dfw. We were cleared to cross hirst intersection at 11000 ft. He, the first officer, got down a bit early and leveled at 13000 ft. I wondered why he did not just continue to 11000 ft, but figured he would start down in time to make the intersection as he has a habit of waiting until the last possible moment to do everything, like landing gear, final flaps, initiating dscnts, you know, just to make it easy on the other guy. I was looking at the approach plate, looked up and saw we had 4 mi to go and 2000 ft to lose. I said we need to get down. Instead of just doing it he questioned if I was right. I immediately notified ATC that we would not make the restr. They said it was okay and there appeared to be no traffic conflict. The first officer then blamed the gfms screen because he was reading the wrong mileage of it. He had earlier in the flight misprogrammed the box and started to go the wrong direction when we both had the VOR already selected and all that was necessary was to fly to the needle on the rmdi. That gfms box has some kind of mystical attraction to a lot of the guys. So next time I will take the airplane when I see it's high or better yet just watch 'em like a hawk. I should have caught it earlier, but he wore me down.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN S80 ON A DFW STAR ARR FAILS TO MAKE THE ALT XING RESTR AS ASSIGNED. A CREW INTRA-COORD PROB.

Narrative: LOCATION: HIRST INTXN, JEN ARR DFW. WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS HIRST INTXN AT 11000 FT. HE, THE FO, GOT DOWN A BIT EARLY AND LEVELED AT 13000 FT. I WONDERED WHY HE DID NOT JUST CONTINUE TO 11000 FT, BUT FIGURED HE WOULD START DOWN IN TIME TO MAKE THE INTXN AS HE HAS A HABIT OF WAITING UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT TO DO EVERYTHING, LIKE LNDG GEAR, FINAL FLAPS, INITIATING DSCNTS, YOU KNOW, JUST TO MAKE IT EASY ON THE OTHER GUY. I WAS LOOKING AT THE APCH PLATE, LOOKED UP AND SAW WE HAD 4 MI TO GO AND 2000 FT TO LOSE. I SAID WE NEED TO GET DOWN. INSTEAD OF JUST DOING IT HE QUESTIONED IF I WAS RIGHT. I IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED ATC THAT WE WOULD NOT MAKE THE RESTR. THEY SAID IT WAS OKAY AND THERE APPEARED TO BE NO TFC CONFLICT. THE FO THEN BLAMED THE GFMS SCREEN BECAUSE HE WAS READING THE WRONG MILEAGE OF IT. HE HAD EARLIER IN THE FLT MISPROGRAMMED THE BOX AND STARTED TO GO THE WRONG DIRECTION WHEN WE BOTH HAD THE VOR ALREADY SELECTED AND ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY WAS TO FLY TO THE NEEDLE ON THE RMDI. THAT GFMS BOX HAS SOME KIND OF MYSTICAL ATTRACTION TO A LOT OF THE GUYS. SO NEXT TIME I WILL TAKE THE AIRPLANE WHEN I SEE IT'S HIGH OR BETTER YET JUST WATCH 'EM LIKE A HAWK. I SHOULD HAVE CAUGHT IT EARLIER, BUT HE WORE ME DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.