Narrative:

Another pilot and myself departed from middletown, de, on a ferry flight en route to lincoln, northeast. I was in the right seat performing the duties of first officer. Our entanglement started shortly after takeoff at approximately 5000 ft MSL while we were being vectored by phl approach control. We were given a clearance to maintain 250 KTS while we were at 5000 ft. Subsequently, we were given another clearance to maintain 9000 ft and shortly after that a clearance to maintain 10000 ft with the restr, 250 KTS at 10000 ft. Prior to reaching 10000 ft, we were reclred to 17000 ft. We continued the climb to 17000 ft utilizing a routine 250 KT climb schedule. It appeared that approach control was very busy during this time. We were handed off to ZNY during the climb and leveled off at 17000 ft. During the seconds just prior to and shortly after leveling at 17000 ft I was preoccupied with completing the climb checklist and rechking the navigation receivers and FMS. It was during this time that the ZNY controller asked our indicated speed. It was more a command than a request, actually. I replied, 250 KTS, since that was the last speed I witnessed just seconds prior to the request. In actuality, the aircraft had accelerated to 330 KIAS. The edge in the controller's voice tipped us off to the possibility that something was amiss and the aircraft was immediately slowed to 250 KTS. While this was occurring, the controller queried us as to why our 250 KTS was faster than the preceding aircraft's 250 KTS. I did not respond since it seemed inappropriate to get into a protracted conversation at that time. Subsequently, we were given a vector of 080 degrees and handed off to the next sector. Immediately after checking in with the new controller we were queried as to whether or not we had received a speed restr from phl approach. I advised the controller that it was our understanding that we were to maintain 250 KTS at 10000 ft and that we were unaware of any speed restr above that altitude. The controller responded by saying that we were relying on semantics, rather than following the clearance, as he perceived it. After I inquired if there was a problem with the previous controller, there was a brief pause and we were then instructed to call ZNY when we got on the ground. This controller made several very sarcastic remarks to several aircraft, and once in the blind, while we were on his frequency. After landing, I called ZNY and spoke with the sector supervisor. He informed me that the tapes had been pulled, reviewed and a determination made that it was a pilot deviation that caused the erosion of separation, thus triggering, the 'snitch' computer. This event really caught both of us off guard, since there was no ambiguity in our minds regarding any of the clrncs. Certainly no pilot would purposely want to erode the protective buffer provided by ATC and jeopardize the lives of all involved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN ISRAEL 1125 ASTRA EXCEEDED AIRSPD RESTR DURING CLB DUE TO CLRNC MISUNDERSTANDING.

Narrative: ANOTHER PLT AND MYSELF DEPARTED FROM MIDDLETOWN, DE, ON A FERRY FLT ENRTE TO LINCOLN, NE. I WAS IN THE R SEAT PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF FO. OUR ENTANGLEMENT STARTED SHORTLY AFTER TKOF AT APPROX 5000 FT MSL WHILE WE WERE BEING VECTORED BY PHL APCH CTL. WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS WHILE WE WERE AT 5000 FT. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE WERE GIVEN ANOTHER CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 9000 FT AND SHORTLY AFTER THAT A CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 10000 FT WITH THE RESTR, 250 KTS AT 10000 FT. PRIOR TO REACHING 10000 FT, WE WERE RECLRED TO 17000 FT. WE CONTINUED THE CLB TO 17000 FT UTILIZING A ROUTINE 250 KT CLB SCHEDULE. IT APPEARED THAT APCH CTL WAS VERY BUSY DURING THIS TIME. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO ZNY DURING THE CLB AND LEVELED OFF AT 17000 FT. DURING THE SECONDS JUST PRIOR TO AND SHORTLY AFTER LEVELING AT 17000 FT I WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH COMPLETING THE CLB CHKLIST AND RECHKING THE NAV RECEIVERS AND FMS. IT WAS DURING THIS TIME THAT THE ZNY CTLR ASKED OUR INDICATED SPD. IT WAS MORE A COMMAND THAN A REQUEST, ACTUALLY. I REPLIED, 250 KTS, SINCE THAT WAS THE LAST SPD I WITNESSED JUST SECONDS PRIOR TO THE REQUEST. IN ACTUALITY, THE ACFT HAD ACCELERATED TO 330 KIAS. THE EDGE IN THE CTLR'S VOICE TIPPED US OFF TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMETHING WAS AMISS AND THE ACFT WAS IMMEDIATELY SLOWED TO 250 KTS. WHILE THIS WAS OCCURRING, THE CTLR QUERIED US AS TO WHY OUR 250 KTS WAS FASTER THAN THE PRECEDING ACFT'S 250 KTS. I DID NOT RESPOND SINCE IT SEEMED INAPPROPRIATE TO GET INTO A PROTRACTED CONVERSATION AT THAT TIME. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR OF 080 DEGS AND HANDED OFF TO THE NEXT SECTOR. IMMEDIATELY AFTER CHKING IN WITH THE NEW CTLR WE WERE QUERIED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE HAD RECEIVED A SPD RESTR FROM PHL APCH. I ADVISED THE CTLR THAT IT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WERE TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS AT 10000 FT AND THAT WE WERE UNAWARE OF ANY SPD RESTR ABOVE THAT ALT. THE CTLR RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT WE WERE RELYING ON SEMANTICS, RATHER THAN FOLLOWING THE CLRNC, AS HE PERCEIVED IT. AFTER I INQUIRED IF THERE WAS A PROB WITH THE PREVIOUS CTLR, THERE WAS A BRIEF PAUSE AND WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO CALL ZNY WHEN WE GOT ON THE GND. THIS CTLR MADE SEVERAL VERY SARCASTIC REMARKS TO SEVERAL ACFT, AND ONCE IN THE BLIND, WHILE WE WERE ON HIS FREQ. AFTER LNDG, I CALLED ZNY AND SPOKE WITH THE SECTOR SUPVR. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE TAPES HAD BEEN PULLED, REVIEWED AND A DETERMINATION MADE THAT IT WAS A PLTDEV THAT CAUSED THE EROSION OF SEPARATION, THUS TRIGGERING, THE 'SNITCH' COMPUTER. THIS EVENT REALLY CAUGHT BOTH OF US OFF GUARD, SINCE THERE WAS NO AMBIGUITY IN OUR MINDS REGARDING ANY OF THE CLRNCS. CERTAINLY NO PLT WOULD PURPOSELY WANT TO ERODE THE PROTECTIVE BUFFER PROVIDED BY ATC AND JEOPARDIZE THE LIVES OF ALL INVOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.