Narrative:

Conducted an IOE with new hire first officer. The pressure controller started oscillating back and forth. Had seen in aircraft log, aircraft had a history of pressurization problems. I finally switched to standby controller, which solved problem. I took time to explain to first officer what I had done and that we should carefully watch the pressurization. We climbed on up and just as we were getting to the top of climb, we got a 'right hydraulic pressure low' light and noted low pressure and falling quantity. We did the QRH procedures and started towards phl. The right system supplies power to rudder and we were run in manual. Phl had strong xwinds and were holding due to slow traffic with wind. We diverted to bwi, declared emergency, and had normal approach and landing (having to free fall gear). During climb out on next flight, I realized I never put both center fuel pumps on (on after takeoff check). This is against procedure to burn out of center first, then mains. The first officer said he had been about to ask me, when he noticed the hydraulic pressure light. He confirmed we never got pumps on. We were ok, because once mains would have depleted, the one center pump on for takeoff would have fed that fuel. But I hate to have had to rely on that. We communicated with ATC, company (and dispatch through ACARS), flight attendants, and passenger. I was honest about the situation (not going into detail with passenger) and told them they would see rescue equipment on landing. We landed and stopped on runway. The mechanics pinned the gear doors (unstowed because of no pressure) and aircraft was towed to the gate. I taught the original CRM course here at air carrier about 9 yrs ago. I feel good about the emergency, but very bad I got distraction from the fuel on the after takeoff checklist. A lot of factors were at work here. This was day 12 of 11 days working (1 day off for legality). The winds were extremely strong due to a strong cold front. I was working with a new copilot and was watching him closely. I will try to be more vigilant and encourage him to speak out immediately when a red flag of situational awareness comes out. I do feel good about the management in general with the emergency. We were very careful and I asked approach for more time to get things done. We learned a lot. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft was an MD80 and the loss of the right main hydraulic system was caused by a hydraulic fluid quantity limiter failing on the pressure side. The reporter said either a seal or the fitting on the pressure side of the unit failed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 AT START OF CRUISE FL280 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO R MAIN HYD SYS LOSS OF PRESSURE AND QUANTITY CAUSED BY A FAILED HYD FLUID LIMITER.

Narrative: CONDUCTED AN IOE WITH NEW HIRE FO. THE PRESSURE CONTROLLER STARTED OSCILLATING BACK AND FORTH. HAD SEEN IN ACFT LOG, ACFT HAD A HISTORY OF PRESSURIZATION PROBS. I FINALLY SWITCHED TO STANDBY CONTROLLER, WHICH SOLVED PROB. I TOOK TIME TO EXPLAIN TO FO WHAT I HAD DONE AND THAT WE SHOULD CAREFULLY WATCH THE PRESSURIZATION. WE CLBED ON UP AND JUST AS WE WERE GETTING TO THE TOP OF CLB, WE GOT A 'R HYD PRESSURE LOW' LIGHT AND NOTED LOW PRESSURE AND FALLING QUANTITY. WE DID THE QRH PROCS AND STARTED TOWARDS PHL. THE R SYS SUPPLIES PWR TO RUDDER AND WE WERE RUN IN MANUAL. PHL HAD STRONG XWINDS AND WERE HOLDING DUE TO SLOW TFC WITH WIND. WE DIVERTED TO BWI, DECLARED EMER, AND HAD NORMAL APCH AND LNDG (HAVING TO FREE FALL GEAR). DURING CLB OUT ON NEXT FLT, I REALIZED I NEVER PUT BOTH CTR FUEL PUMPS ON (ON AFTER TKOF CHK). THIS IS AGAINST PROC TO BURN OUT OF CTR FIRST, THEN MAINS. THE FO SAID HE HAD BEEN ABOUT TO ASK ME, WHEN HE NOTICED THE HYD PRESSURE LIGHT. HE CONFIRMED WE NEVER GOT PUMPS ON. WE WERE OK, BECAUSE ONCE MAINS WOULD HAVE DEPLETED, THE ONE CTR PUMP ON FOR TKOF WOULD HAVE FED THAT FUEL. BUT I HATE TO HAVE HAD TO RELY ON THAT. WE COMMUNICATED WITH ATC, COMPANY (AND DISPATCH THROUGH ACARS), FLT ATTENDANTS, AND PAX. I WAS HONEST ABOUT THE SIT (NOT GOING INTO DETAIL WITH PAX) AND TOLD THEM THEY WOULD SEE RESCUE EQUIP ON LNDG. WE LANDED AND STOPPED ON RWY. THE MECHS PINNED THE GEAR DOORS (UNSTOWED BECAUSE OF NO PRESSURE) AND ACFT WAS TOWED TO THE GATE. I TAUGHT THE ORIGINAL CRM COURSE HERE AT ACR ABOUT 9 YRS AGO. I FEEL GOOD ABOUT THE EMER, BUT VERY BAD I GOT DISTR FROM THE FUEL ON THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST. A LOT OF FACTORS WERE AT WORK HERE. THIS WAS DAY 12 OF 11 DAYS WORKING (1 DAY OFF FOR LEGALITY). THE WINDS WERE EXTREMELY STRONG DUE TO A STRONG COLD FRONT. I WAS WORKING WITH A NEW COPLT AND WAS WATCHING HIM CLOSELY. I WILL TRY TO BE MORE VIGILANT AND ENCOURAGE HIM TO SPEAK OUT IMMEDIATELY WHEN A RED FLAG OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS COMES OUT. I DO FEEL GOOD ABOUT THE MGMNT IN GENERAL WITH THE EMER. WE WERE VERY CAREFUL AND I ASKED APCH FOR MORE TIME TO GET THINGS DONE. WE LEARNED A LOT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS AN MD80 AND THE LOSS OF THE R MAIN HYD SYS WAS CAUSED BY A HYD FLUID QUANTITY LIMITER FAILING ON THE PRESSURE SIDE. THE RPTR SAID EITHER A SEAL OR THE FITTING ON THE PRESSURE SIDE OF THE UNIT FAILED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.