Narrative:

Cleared for a visual approach by spokane approach control, we were making a descending right downwind for runway 11 as per chart pg 10-7F mso. At midfield, about 5000 ft, I (PF) noticed we were not on tower frequency. First officer changed frequencys and reported our location. Mso tower cleared us to land, but also asked when we were given a frequency change by approach control. Neither of us remembers being given a frequency change, but mso tower called spokane approach and was told that we were told to contact tower over the mso VOR and cleared for a visual approach to runway 11. In post flight discussions, neither pilot recalls being told to change. That doesn't mean we weren't given the change. It was the first officer's first time into mso, and the approach and descent can be quite challenging. I could have been concentrating on this fact, and he could have missed the change too, by concentrating on the approach and landing. Vigilance is the key for me for future demanding high altitude airports with an inexperienced first officer. Note: spokane approach control has given me cause for reflection and increased vigilance before. They are very laid back and once gave me a holding clearance over kona (ind) NDB which required 4 radio xmissions to get complete instructions at this fix, which has no published holding pattern. We all back each other up and have to guard against complacency. Supplemental information from acn 431691: aircraft was on visual approach to missoula, having been cleared visual approach by spokane approach. Our company's custom visual approach to mso involves numerous turns and stepdown altitudes when arriving from the east, and landing on runway 11. During the approach the captain mentioned that we hadn't been cleared over to tower, so I called tower, and we got clearance to land. The tower controller asked when we were handed over, and we said that we had not been handed off, but instead called him when we realized that we were in his airspace. When the captain went into the terminal he called the tower, even though we were not asked to do so. At that time, the tower controller said that spokane gave the handoff in the same transmission as the approach clearance. It was my second time doing this visual approach, and the second or third time for the captain as well. We were both paying careful attention to the requirements of the visual approach (turns and dscnts). The captain swears he never heard the handoff, and I'm quite convinced I did not hear it as well. If a handoff was given by spokane, the high degree of workload during this visual approach (it's more complicated than the ILS to runway 11) distraction us enough not to realize it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC9 CREW CONTACTED MSO TWR WHEN THEY REALIZED APCH CTLR DID NOT ISSUE CLRNC TO CHANGE FREQS.

Narrative: CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH BY SPOKANE APCH CTL, WE WERE MAKING A DSNDING R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 11 AS PER CHART PG 10-7F MSO. AT MIDFIELD, ABOUT 5000 FT, I (PF) NOTICED WE WERE NOT ON TWR FREQ. FO CHANGED FREQS AND RPTED OUR LOCATION. MSO TWR CLRED US TO LAND, BUT ALSO ASKED WHEN WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE BY APCH CTL. NEITHER OF US REMEMBERS BEING GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE, BUT MSO TWR CALLED SPOKANE APCH AND WAS TOLD THAT WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT TWR OVER THE MSO VOR AND CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 11. IN POST FLT DISCUSSIONS, NEITHER PLT RECALLS BEING TOLD TO CHANGE. THAT DOESN'T MEAN WE WEREN'T GIVEN THE CHANGE. IT WAS THE FO'S FIRST TIME INTO MSO, AND THE APCH AND DSCNT CAN BE QUITE CHALLENGING. I COULD HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATING ON THIS FACT, AND HE COULD HAVE MISSED THE CHANGE TOO, BY CONCENTRATING ON THE APCH AND LNDG. VIGILANCE IS THE KEY FOR ME FOR FUTURE DEMANDING HIGH ALT ARPTS WITH AN INEXPERIENCED FO. NOTE: SPOKANE APCH CTL HAS GIVEN ME CAUSE FOR REFLECTION AND INCREASED VIGILANCE BEFORE. THEY ARE VERY LAID BACK AND ONCE GAVE ME A HOLDING CLRNC OVER KONA (IND) NDB WHICH REQUIRED 4 RADIO XMISSIONS TO GET COMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS AT THIS FIX, WHICH HAS NO PUBLISHED HOLDING PATTERN. WE ALL BACK EACH OTHER UP AND HAVE TO GUARD AGAINST COMPLACENCY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 431691: ACFT WAS ON VISUAL APCH TO MISSOULA, HAVING BEEN CLRED VISUAL APCH BY SPOKANE APCH. OUR COMPANY'S CUSTOM VISUAL APCH TO MSO INVOLVES NUMEROUS TURNS AND STEPDOWN ALTS WHEN ARRIVING FROM THE E, AND LNDG ON RWY 11. DURING THE APCH THE CAPT MENTIONED THAT WE HADN'T BEEN CLRED OVER TO TWR, SO I CALLED TWR, AND WE GOT CLRNC TO LAND. THE TWR CTLR ASKED WHEN WE WERE HANDED OVER, AND WE SAID THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN HANDED OFF, BUT INSTEAD CALLED HIM WHEN WE REALIZED THAT WE WERE IN HIS AIRSPACE. WHEN THE CAPT WENT INTO THE TERMINAL HE CALLED THE TWR, EVEN THOUGH WE WERE NOT ASKED TO DO SO. AT THAT TIME, THE TWR CTLR SAID THAT SPOKANE GAVE THE HDOF IN THE SAME XMISSION AS THE APCH CLRNC. IT WAS MY SECOND TIME DOING THIS VISUAL APCH, AND THE SECOND OR THIRD TIME FOR THE CAPT AS WELL. WE WERE BOTH PAYING CAREFUL ATTN TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VISUAL APCH (TURNS AND DSCNTS). THE CAPT SWEARS HE NEVER HEARD THE HDOF, AND I'M QUITE CONVINCED I DID NOT HEAR IT AS WELL. IF A HDOF WAS GIVEN BY SPOKANE, THE HIGH DEGREE OF WORKLOAD DURING THIS VISUAL APCH (IT'S MORE COMPLICATED THAN THE ILS TO RWY 11) DISTR US ENOUGH NOT TO REALIZE IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.