Narrative:

Flight rted circuitously jfk-NAS via charleston-jax-ormond beach-vero beach-freeport-nassau. Per dispatcher, this was due to aircraft shown as non overwater aircraft. Aircraft was, in fact, equipped with life vests and shown on a list of MD80 aircraft configns by tail number as a life vest equipped aircraft. Therefore, in the interests of fuel conservation and on-time operation, I requested and received an overwater rerting via diw-AR7-adoor direct zfp-fpr to NAS. Also rerted via AR7 on NAS-jfk return trip same day, saving approximately 20 mins each direction. Upon return to jfk, I was advised that this aircraft is not one of the model series listed in the air carrier's operations specifications as an overwater certified aircraft. (It is one of a small group of MD80 aircraft recently xferred from a european carrier which are basically MD82 series aircraft with some MD83 series equipment upgrades, including glass flight instrument displays and life vests.) why this aircraft with life vests is not overwater qualified is not known at this time. Upon return to jfk, I was grounded pending disciplinary action. Human performance considerations: based on my training regarding the life vest rule, and the confign listing showing the aircraft equipped with life vests, there was no doubt in my mind that this aircraft was legal for overwater operations. I checked operations specifications while on the ground at NAS, noted the series discrepancy, but concluded that it was a case of the operations specifications not having been updated to reflect the recent fleet additions with nonstandard configns. A further decision factor was my recent experience of incorrect dispatch releases following relocation of the dispatch facility, and a virtually complete turnover of dispatch staff. This led me to believe that the dispatcher had incorrect information regarding the equipment status of the aircraft. Various logistical factors contributed to a decision not to call dispatch at NAS to inquire further about the flight plan discrepancy for NAS-jfk. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the FAA has not contacted him further regarding possible violation action after he gave them his explanation of the incident. The company dispatcher had complained to the company regarding reporter's overriding decision to alter the flight plan routing. He further explained that he was given, during training on the aircraft, the aircraft's equipment list which showed that the required overwater equipment was installed. However, he was advised that the aircraft had not been shown on the current operation specifications at that time, but which has been done by the FAA now after this incident. Reporter is back on duty.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN MD82 RERTED IFR FLT PLAN DURING PREFLT TO SHOW AN OVERWATER RTE IN ORDER TO SHORTEN THE FLT TIME WHEN THE ACFT WAS NOT APPROVED FOR OVERWATER ON THE COMPANY OPS SPECS.

Narrative: FLT RTED CIRCUITOUSLY JFK-NAS VIA CHARLESTON-JAX-ORMOND BEACH-VERO BEACH-FREEPORT-NASSAU. PER DISPATCHER, THIS WAS DUE TO ACFT SHOWN AS NON OVERWATER ACFT. ACFT WAS, IN FACT, EQUIPPED WITH LIFE VESTS AND SHOWN ON A LIST OF MD80 ACFT CONFIGNS BY TAIL NUMBER AS A LIFE VEST EQUIPPED ACFT. THEREFORE, IN THE INTERESTS OF FUEL CONSERVATION AND ON-TIME OP, I REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN OVERWATER RERTING VIA DIW-AR7-ADOOR DIRECT ZFP-FPR TO NAS. ALSO RERTED VIA AR7 ON NAS-JFK RETURN TRIP SAME DAY, SAVING APPROX 20 MINS EACH DIRECTION. UPON RETURN TO JFK, I WAS ADVISED THAT THIS ACFT IS NOT ONE OF THE MODEL SERIES LISTED IN THE ACR'S OPS SPECS AS AN OVERWATER CERTIFIED ACFT. (IT IS ONE OF A SMALL GROUP OF MD80 ACFT RECENTLY XFERRED FROM A EUROPEAN CARRIER WHICH ARE BASICALLY MD82 SERIES ACFT WITH SOME MD83 SERIES EQUIP UPGRADES, INCLUDING GLASS FLT INST DISPLAYS AND LIFE VESTS.) WHY THIS ACFT WITH LIFE VESTS IS NOT OVERWATER QUALIFIED IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME. UPON RETURN TO JFK, I WAS GNDED PENDING DISCIPLINARY ACTION. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: BASED ON MY TRAINING REGARDING THE LIFE VEST RULE, AND THE CONFIGN LISTING SHOWING THE ACFT EQUIPPED WITH LIFE VESTS, THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THIS ACFT WAS LEGAL FOR OVERWATER OPS. I CHKED OPS SPECS WHILE ON THE GND AT NAS, NOTED THE SERIES DISCREPANCY, BUT CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS A CASE OF THE OPS SPECS NOT HAVING BEEN UPDATED TO REFLECT THE RECENT FLEET ADDITIONS WITH NONSTANDARD CONFIGNS. A FURTHER DECISION FACTOR WAS MY RECENT EXPERIENCE OF INCORRECT DISPATCH RELEASES FOLLOWING RELOCATION OF THE DISPATCH FACILITY, AND A VIRTUALLY COMPLETE TURNOVER OF DISPATCH STAFF. THIS LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE DISPATCHER HAD INCORRECT INFO REGARDING THE EQUIP STATUS OF THE ACFT. VARIOUS LOGISTICAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO A DECISION NOT TO CALL DISPATCH AT NAS TO INQUIRE FURTHER ABOUT THE FLT PLAN DISCREPANCY FOR NAS-JFK. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE FAA HAS NOT CONTACTED HIM FURTHER REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATION ACTION AFTER HE GAVE THEM HIS EXPLANATION OF THE INCIDENT. THE COMPANY DISPATCHER HAD COMPLAINED TO THE COMPANY REGARDING RPTR'S OVERRIDING DECISION TO ALTER THE FLT PLAN ROUTING. HE FURTHER EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS GIVEN, DURING TRAINING ON THE ACFT, THE ACFT'S EQUIP LIST WHICH SHOWED THAT THE REQUIRED OVERWATER EQUIP WAS INSTALLED. HOWEVER, HE WAS ADVISED THAT THE ACFT HAD NOT BEEN SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OP SPECS AT THAT TIME, BUT WHICH HAS BEEN DONE BY THE FAA NOW AFTER THIS INCIDENT. RPTR IS BACK ON DUTY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.