Narrative:

Thunderstorms came up from the southwest as we arrived from the north. Another pilot accepted our approach clearance and I delayed descent until the confusion was resolved. I was high and fast as I crossed the OM. I slowed for confign then dived for the GS. The autoplt was slow to get back up to the GS and the GPWS warnings started. We saw the approach lights at a low angle at 200 ft. As the radar altimeter neared 100 ft, I missed the approach. I was a little high and fast on the second ILS but was able to stabilize and land ok despite the nearing storm cells. I shouldn't have let internal pressures to complete the flight override better judgement to divert to the alternate. I became complacent from my experience in forgiving turboprops in destabilized approachs. ATC frequently pressures pilots to go too fast and sometimes too high to the FAF. Ultimately, safety is my responsibility as captain, regardless of the circumstances.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN EMBRAER 145 WAS DELAYED IN DSNDING ON AN ILS APCH DUE TO ANOTHER ACFT RESPONDING TO HIS CLRNC CAUSING HIM TO DIVE TO CATCH UP WITH THE GS INSIDE THE OM WHICH THEN RESULTED IN A GPWS WARNING DUE TO HIS HIGH RATE OF DSCNT. A SUBSEQUENT MISSED APCH WAS MADE AT 100 FT AGL.

Narrative: TSTMS CAME UP FROM THE SW AS WE ARRIVED FROM THE N. ANOTHER PLT ACCEPTED OUR APCH CLRNC AND I DELAYED DSCNT UNTIL THE CONFUSION WAS RESOLVED. I WAS HIGH AND FAST AS I CROSSED THE OM. I SLOWED FOR CONFIGN THEN DIVED FOR THE GS. THE AUTOPLT WAS SLOW TO GET BACK UP TO THE GS AND THE GPWS WARNINGS STARTED. WE SAW THE APCH LIGHTS AT A LOW ANGLE AT 200 FT. AS THE RADAR ALTIMETER NEARED 100 FT, I MISSED THE APCH. I WAS A LITTLE HIGH AND FAST ON THE SECOND ILS BUT WAS ABLE TO STABILIZE AND LAND OK DESPITE THE NEARING STORM CELLS. I SHOULDN'T HAVE LET INTERNAL PRESSURES TO COMPLETE THE FLT OVERRIDE BETTER JUDGEMENT TO DIVERT TO THE ALTERNATE. I BECAME COMPLACENT FROM MY EXPERIENCE IN FORGIVING TURBOPROPS IN DESTABILIZED APCHS. ATC FREQUENTLY PRESSURES PLTS TO GO TOO FAST AND SOMETIMES TOO HIGH TO THE FAF. ULTIMATELY, SAFETY IS MY RESPONSIBILITY AS CAPT, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.