Narrative:

We, the crew of a scheduled air carrier flight from boston to presque isle, me, were about 40 mi southeast of pqi VOR when we were cleared to descend from 7000 ft to 5000 ft by ATC. Having already done our approach briefing and in range check, we already received the WX from ATC and AWOS at pqi. At about 20 mi out from pqi, we started getting vectored toward the airport for a visual to runway 19. We then were told to proceed direct to the VOR. Shortly thereafter we were told by ATC that the airport was 12 O'clock and 6 mi, so we looked toward the 12 O'clock position and spotted a beacon flashing altitude green and white light so we proceeded ahead. After querying the other crew member, we both decided that that had to be pqi airport. Since we did not notice any other airports or beacons, we called the airport in sight. We were cleared for the visual approach for runway 19 at pqi. We proceeded toward the airport at 3200 ft. The first officer turned the lights up on the CTAF frequency and we proceeded to enter the pattern and perform a normal approach and landing to runway 19, which we thought was pqi airport. After landing, we realized that we were not at pqi airport and we could not find any facilities that were open for us to contact our company or phones. We also tried repeatedly to contact company, ATC or anyone on unicom frequency, but to avail. After carefully figuring out our alternatives and looking up data such as performance charts, runway layout, weight of aircraft, fuel on board, field conditions and WX, we decided that it would be safe if we took off and try to contact someone in the air. When we got airborne, we were able to get a hold of ATC. We were asked to climb to a vectoring altitude of 3500 ft and were vectored to the localizer approach at pqi airport where we eventually made an uneventful approach and landing on runway 19 at pqi airport. I think that there were several factors that contributed to this occurrence, starting with a questionable vector from ATC, similar layout of airports (pqi and car), the same CTAF frequency at both airports. Lack of backing up visual approach with navigation to runway, not paying attention to VOR DME from airport, and lack of using ATC for backup by asking if we were lined up for a visual to the right airport. I have definitely learned a lot from this experience and hope that this never happens to anyone else, and I hope this report helps in the future.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A SUPPLEMENTAL ACR, UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREA, ACCEPTED A VISUAL APCH AND LANDED CAR RATHER THAN PQI. UNABLE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH ATC OR COMPANY, THE FLC DETERMINED IT SAFE TO DEPART CAR AND PROCEED TO PQI.

Narrative: WE, THE CREW OF A SCHEDULED ACR FLT FROM BOSTON TO PRESQUE ISLE, ME, WERE ABOUT 40 MI SE OF PQI VOR WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO DSND FROM 7000 FT TO 5000 FT BY ATC. HAVING ALREADY DONE OUR APCH BRIEFING AND IN RANGE CHK, WE ALREADY RECEIVED THE WX FROM ATC AND AWOS AT PQI. AT ABOUT 20 MI OUT FROM PQI, WE STARTED GETTING VECTORED TOWARD THE ARPT FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 19. WE THEN WERE TOLD TO PROCEED DIRECT TO THE VOR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE WERE TOLD BY ATC THAT THE ARPT WAS 12 O'CLOCK AND 6 MI, SO WE LOOKED TOWARD THE 12 O'CLOCK POS AND SPOTTED A BEACON FLASHING ALT GREEN AND WHITE LIGHT SO WE PROCEEDED AHEAD. AFTER QUERYING THE OTHER CREW MEMBER, WE BOTH DECIDED THAT THAT HAD TO BE PQI ARPT. SINCE WE DID NOT NOTICE ANY OTHER ARPTS OR BEACONS, WE CALLED THE ARPT IN SIGHT. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 19 AT PQI. WE PROCEEDED TOWARD THE ARPT AT 3200 FT. THE FO TURNED THE LIGHTS UP ON THE CTAF FREQ AND WE PROCEEDED TO ENTER THE PATTERN AND PERFORM A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG TO RWY 19, WHICH WE THOUGHT WAS PQI ARPT. AFTER LNDG, WE REALIZED THAT WE WERE NOT AT PQI ARPT AND WE COULD NOT FIND ANY FACILITIES THAT WERE OPEN FOR US TO CONTACT OUR COMPANY OR PHONES. WE ALSO TRIED REPEATEDLY TO CONTACT COMPANY, ATC OR ANYONE ON UNICOM FREQ, BUT TO AVAIL. AFTER CAREFULLY FIGURING OUT OUR ALTERNATIVES AND LOOKING UP DATA SUCH AS PERFORMANCE CHARTS, RWY LAYOUT, WT OF ACFT, FUEL ON BOARD, FIELD CONDITIONS AND WX, WE DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE SAFE IF WE TOOK OFF AND TRY TO CONTACT SOMEONE IN THE AIR. WHEN WE GOT AIRBORNE, WE WERE ABLE TO GET A HOLD OF ATC. WE WERE ASKED TO CLB TO A VECTORING ALT OF 3500 FT AND WERE VECTORED TO THE LOC APCH AT PQI ARPT WHERE WE EVENTUALLY MADE AN UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 19 AT PQI ARPT. I THINK THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OCCURRENCE, STARTING WITH A QUESTIONABLE VECTOR FROM ATC, SIMILAR LAYOUT OF ARPTS (PQI AND CAR), THE SAME CTAF FREQ AT BOTH ARPTS. LACK OF BACKING UP VISUAL APCH WITH NAV TO RWY, NOT PAYING ATTN TO VOR DME FROM ARPT, AND LACK OF USING ATC FOR BACKUP BY ASKING IF WE WERE LINED UP FOR A VISUAL TO THE RIGHT ARPT. I HAVE DEFINITELY LEARNED A LOT FROM THIS EXPERIENCE AND HOPE THAT THIS NEVER HAPPENS TO ANYONE ELSE, AND I HOPE THIS RPT HELPS IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.