Narrative:

I accomplished a thorough and careful preflight inspection of a C172 at the marshall county airport (74D). I drained fuel from the sump under the engine cowling on the ground and checked it for evidence of water contamination. None was present or found. This was consistent with there being absolutely no trace of water contamination in the fuel sample taken from the wing drain. (This last fact, in retrospect, should have alerted me to the fact that there was probably water in the form of ice in the fuel system because this particular aircraft normally harbors at least a small amount of water in the fuel tanks.) the operation of that fuel drain is from the pilot station in the cockpit. I was, therefore, unable to verify the specific flow or volume of the sample taken. The aircraft was covered entirely with a light to moderate coat of frost and it took me about 25 mins to remove or reduce the frost on various parts of the airframe to the point where I deemed it safe for flight. On this particular morning, however, I did not have the ability to preheat the aircraft in any way. While this is not a specific requirement listed in the flight manual for the aircraft, I now believe that I should have done this. I experienced difficulty starting the engine, more difficulty than I would have expected or had experienced with this aircraft previously. The engine would fire a few times and try to start but die with the application of throttle. I now believe that the problem that I was experiencing was most probably due to a fuel flow problem created by a small amount of ice contamination of a particular fuel line. (The second warning flag that hindsight strongly suggests I ignored.) the suspect fuel line on the 100 series cessna is one that is located immediately after the fuel selector valve where it establishes the lowest point in the fuel system. I know that cessna provides a kit SK132-13A for the C150 and C152 aircraft and I know that later model C172's come with the kit from the factory. The runup and takeoff were in all aspects normal. I climbed and leveled off at approximately 3000 ft. About 7 or 8 mins later, however, my attention was drawn to the fact that I was slowly but progressively losing power, it was when I discovered that I had the throttle in the full open position and was not achieving full power that I realized that I had a problem. My first thought was carburetor ice and so I deployed the carburetor heat mechanism with the effect that the engine immediately lost power entirely. I then reversed that action, but to no avail as the engine continued to windmill without developing power. I then deployed carburetor heat again and left it that way for the rest of the flight. My situation at this time was dire in the extreme. But I was at least very familiar with the terrain both from the air and the ground where I frequently drive. It was still completely dark. Below me on the ridge tops at this point were the small towns or wheeling suburbs of bethlehem and mount olivet, wv. The ohio river valley that I was slowly descending towards was wrapped in a deep thick eerie predawn fog. Ahead I could see a thinning or partial clearing in the fog and the lights of 2 interstate hwys became distinctly visible. At this point I tried the engine primer and for perhaps 2 or 3 slow strokes I did get some positive results momentarily as the engine began to develop some power. Then the primer system itself seemed to stop working. I now believe that it too was starved of fuel although the fuel gauges indicated fuel in the tanks and I knew from the preflight inspection that I had confirmed that fact. I was probably at an altitude of 800 ft AGL. 2 interstates were visible to me (interstate I-470 and I-70). The traffic was moderately heavy on I-470. I then realized that the area of I-70 I was considering had a rest area or weigh station that looked to provide a safe haven once I was on the ground. Also, I recognized the area as one that I had frequented as a helicopter pilot. In addition, this particular area and stretch of interstate happened to be one that I had recently scouted out in detail from both the air and ground in order to provide helicopter approach and landing information. My knowledge and experience as a glider pilot helped me to maneuver between the overhead lights on the highway. I executed a normal landing, sequencing myself into the traffic that was at that hour of the morning, mercifully light. I taxied (power off) just beyond the west exit of the weigh station and stopped as far to the right of the highway as the landing gear and obstructions would allow. With approximately 38 ft of wing span, the left wing, however, still infringed upon or obstructed the right lane of the interstate highway. The left wingtip was absent any light that would be visible to warn oncoming traffic. I recognized at this juncture that the situation was now equally, if not more perilous than a few moments before when at 3000 ft the engine died. I deplaned and watched in horror as 2 automobiles passed under the wing of the aircraft at high speed. The security of the situation deteriorated even further as passers by began to stop on the highway and get out of their vehicles to offer assistance. In short, I felt that I was sitting on a time bomb that would eventually explode with disastrous consequences when the first large truck or delivery van came down the highway in the right lane. A cursory examination of the aircraft revealed no problems that would preclude the engine from running and I resolved to try to start the engine again. The engine started and ran normally in all respects. A magneto check and a static check and a carburetor heat check of the engine all proved normal. Under these new circumstances that I was then confronted with I felt that I had no choice but to depart. While one of the motorists who had stopped by the road side signaled that all was clear and there was a complete lull in traffic, I applied full takeoff power and after a slightly prolonged high speed taxi on the highway of approximately 2/10 of a mi. I made a normal takeoff and flew to the closest airport which was wheeling-ohio county airport (hlg). An inspection of the aircraft by another mechanic revealed no problems with the aircraft or the engine. He reported that there was a small amount of water present in both fuel tanks. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter said that if he had the newer type 172 that had the SK132-13A kit installed he probably would have been alerted to the problem of ice lying within the lower fuel line since he could have observed the flow of fluid from an outside line drain. This kit allows the exterior draining of the lower fuel line. This kit connects to that line at a point between the selector valve and the fuel bowl on the firewall. The fuel bowl is where the present interior drain system flows, but does not allow the pilot to observe or collect the fluid. His aircraft in this incident was a very early model 172, a rental aircraft. He believes that this kit should be an airworthiness directive from the FAA for installation on older C172's. He reported this incident to the FAA and they did criticize him for the takeoff from the highway without prior notification. They then gave him a '609 check ride' taking particular notice of his preflight procedures.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C172 PLT SUFFERS FUEL LINE ICE BLOCKAGE ENRTE TO HLG ARPT AT NIGHT. HE PERFORMS AN EMER OFF ARPT LNDG ON FREEWAY SW OF THE CITY. WITH FEAR OF HAVING HIS ACFT'S EXPOSED L WING HIT BY PASSING CARS AND TRUCKS, HE DEPARTS AFTER BEING SATISFIED THAT THE ICE IN THE FUEL LINE WAS NOW NO LONGER A FACTOR.

Narrative: I ACCOMPLISHED A THOROUGH AND CAREFUL PREFLT INSPECTION OF A C172 AT THE MARSHALL COUNTY ARPT (74D). I DRAINED FUEL FROM THE SUMP UNDER THE ENG COWLING ON THE GND AND CHKED IT FOR EVIDENCE OF WATER CONTAMINATION. NONE WAS PRESENT OR FOUND. THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH THERE BEING ABSOLUTELY NO TRACE OF WATER CONTAMINATION IN THE FUEL SAMPLE TAKEN FROM THE WING DRAIN. (THIS LAST FACT, IN RETROSPECT, SHOULD HAVE ALERTED ME TO THE FACT THAT THERE WAS PROBABLY WATER IN THE FORM OF ICE IN THE FUEL SYS BECAUSE THIS PARTICULAR ACFT NORMALLY HARBORS AT LEAST A SMALL AMOUNT OF WATER IN THE FUEL TANKS.) THE OP OF THAT FUEL DRAIN IS FROM THE PLT STATION IN THE COCKPIT. I WAS, THEREFORE, UNABLE TO VERIFY THE SPECIFIC FLOW OR VOLUME OF THE SAMPLE TAKEN. THE ACFT WAS COVERED ENTIRELY WITH A LIGHT TO MODERATE COAT OF FROST AND IT TOOK ME ABOUT 25 MINS TO REMOVE OR REDUCE THE FROST ON VARIOUS PARTS OF THE AIRFRAME TO THE POINT WHERE I DEEMED IT SAFE FOR FLT. ON THIS PARTICULAR MORNING, HOWEVER, I DID NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO PREHEAT THE ACFT IN ANY WAY. WHILE THIS IS NOT A SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT LISTED IN THE FLT MANUAL FOR THE ACFT, I NOW BELIEVE THAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE THIS. I EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY STARTING THE ENG, MORE DIFFICULTY THAN I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED OR HAD EXPERIENCED WITH THIS ACFT PREVIOUSLY. THE ENG WOULD FIRE A FEW TIMES AND TRY TO START BUT DIE WITH THE APPLICATION OF THROTTLE. I NOW BELIEVE THAT THE PROB THAT I WAS EXPERIENCING WAS MOST PROBABLY DUE TO A FUEL FLOW PROB CREATED BY A SMALL AMOUNT OF ICE CONTAMINATION OF A PARTICULAR FUEL LINE. (THE SECOND WARNING FLAG THAT HINDSIGHT STRONGLY SUGGESTS I IGNORED.) THE SUSPECT FUEL LINE ON THE 100 SERIES CESSNA IS ONE THAT IS LOCATED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FUEL SELECTOR VALVE WHERE IT ESTABLISHES THE LOWEST POINT IN THE FUEL SYS. I KNOW THAT CESSNA PROVIDES A KIT SK132-13A FOR THE C150 AND C152 ACFT AND I KNOW THAT LATER MODEL C172'S COME WITH THE KIT FROM THE FACTORY. THE RUNUP AND TKOF WERE IN ALL ASPECTS NORMAL. I CLBED AND LEVELED OFF AT APPROX 3000 FT. ABOUT 7 OR 8 MINS LATER, HOWEVER, MY ATTN WAS DRAWN TO THE FACT THAT I WAS SLOWLY BUT PROGRESSIVELY LOSING PWR, IT WAS WHEN I DISCOVERED THAT I HAD THE THROTTLE IN THE FULL OPEN POS AND WAS NOT ACHIEVING FULL PWR THAT I REALIZED THAT I HAD A PROB. MY FIRST THOUGHT WAS CARB ICE AND SO I DEPLOYED THE CARB HEAT MECHANISM WITH THE EFFECT THAT THE ENG IMMEDIATELY LOST PWR ENTIRELY. I THEN REVERSED THAT ACTION, BUT TO NO AVAIL AS THE ENG CONTINUED TO WINDMILL WITHOUT DEVELOPING PWR. I THEN DEPLOYED CARB HEAT AGAIN AND LEFT IT THAT WAY FOR THE REST OF THE FLT. MY SIT AT THIS TIME WAS DIRE IN THE EXTREME. BUT I WAS AT LEAST VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE TERRAIN BOTH FROM THE AIR AND THE GND WHERE I FREQUENTLY DRIVE. IT WAS STILL COMPLETELY DARK. BELOW ME ON THE RIDGE TOPS AT THIS POINT WERE THE SMALL TOWNS OR WHEELING SUBURBS OF BETHLEHEM AND MOUNT OLIVET, WV. THE OHIO RIVER VALLEY THAT I WAS SLOWLY DSNDING TOWARDS WAS WRAPPED IN A DEEP THICK EERIE PREDAWN FOG. AHEAD I COULD SEE A THINNING OR PARTIAL CLRING IN THE FOG AND THE LIGHTS OF 2 INTERSTATE HWYS BECAME DISTINCTLY VISIBLE. AT THIS POINT I TRIED THE ENG PRIMER AND FOR PERHAPS 2 OR 3 SLOW STROKES I DID GET SOME POSITIVE RESULTS MOMENTARILY AS THE ENG BEGAN TO DEVELOP SOME PWR. THEN THE PRIMER SYS ITSELF SEEMED TO STOP WORKING. I NOW BELIEVE THAT IT TOO WAS STARVED OF FUEL ALTHOUGH THE FUEL GAUGES INDICATED FUEL IN THE TANKS AND I KNEW FROM THE PREFLT INSPECTION THAT I HAD CONFIRMED THAT FACT. I WAS PROBABLY AT AN ALT OF 800 FT AGL. 2 INTERSTATES WERE VISIBLE TO ME (INTERSTATE I-470 AND I-70). THE TFC WAS MODERATELY HVY ON I-470. I THEN REALIZED THAT THE AREA OF I-70 I WAS CONSIDERING HAD A REST AREA OR WEIGH STATION THAT LOOKED TO PROVIDE A SAFE HAVEN ONCE I WAS ON THE GND. ALSO, I RECOGNIZED THE AREA AS ONE THAT I HAD FREQUENTED AS A HELI PLT. IN ADDITION, THIS PARTICULAR AREA AND STRETCH OF INTERSTATE HAPPENED TO BE ONE THAT I HAD RECENTLY SCOUTED OUT IN DETAIL FROM BOTH THE AIR AND GND IN ORDER TO PROVIDE HELI APCH AND LNDG INFO. MY KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE AS A GLIDER PLT HELPED ME TO MANEUVER BTWN THE OVERHEAD LIGHTS ON THE HWY. I EXECUTED A NORMAL LNDG, SEQUENCING MYSELF INTO THE TFC THAT WAS AT THAT HR OF THE MORNING, MERCIFULLY LIGHT. I TAXIED (PWR OFF) JUST BEYOND THE W EXIT OF THE WEIGH STATION AND STOPPED AS FAR TO THE R OF THE HWY AS THE LNDG GEAR AND OBSTRUCTIONS WOULD ALLOW. WITH APPROX 38 FT OF WING SPAN, THE L WING, HOWEVER, STILL INFRINGED UPON OR OBSTRUCTED THE R LANE OF THE INTERSTATE HWY. THE L WINGTIP WAS ABSENT ANY LIGHT THAT WOULD BE VISIBLE TO WARN ONCOMING TFC. I RECOGNIZED AT THIS JUNCTURE THAT THE SIT WAS NOW EQUALLY, IF NOT MORE PERILOUS THAN A FEW MOMENTS BEFORE WHEN AT 3000 FT THE ENG DIED. I DEPLANED AND WATCHED IN HORROR AS 2 AUTOMOBILES PASSED UNDER THE WING OF THE ACFT AT HIGH SPD. THE SECURITY OF THE SIT DETERIORATED EVEN FURTHER AS PASSERS BY BEGAN TO STOP ON THE HWY AND GET OUT OF THEIR VEHICLES TO OFFER ASSISTANCE. IN SHORT, I FELT THAT I WAS SITTING ON A TIME BOMB THAT WOULD EVENTUALLY EXPLODE WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES WHEN THE FIRST LARGE TRUCK OR DELIVERY VAN CAME DOWN THE HWY IN THE R LANE. A CURSORY EXAM OF THE ACFT REVEALED NO PROBS THAT WOULD PRECLUDE THE ENG FROM RUNNING AND I RESOLVED TO TRY TO START THE ENG AGAIN. THE ENG STARTED AND RAN NORMALLY IN ALL RESPECTS. A MAGNETO CHK AND A STATIC CHK AND A CARB HEAT CHK OF THE ENG ALL PROVED NORMAL. UNDER THESE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES THAT I WAS THEN CONFRONTED WITH I FELT THAT I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO DEPART. WHILE ONE OF THE MOTORISTS WHO HAD STOPPED BY THE ROAD SIDE SIGNALED THAT ALL WAS CLR AND THERE WAS A COMPLETE LULL IN TFC, I APPLIED FULL TKOF PWR AND AFTER A SLIGHTLY PROLONGED HIGH SPD TAXI ON THE HWY OF APPROX 2/10 OF A MI. I MADE A NORMAL TKOF AND FLEW TO THE CLOSEST ARPT WHICH WAS WHEELING-OHIO COUNTY ARPT (HLG). AN INSPECTION OF THE ACFT BY ANOTHER MECH REVEALED NO PROBS WITH THE ACFT OR THE ENG. HE RPTED THAT THERE WAS A SMALL AMOUNT OF WATER PRESENT IN BOTH FUEL TANKS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAID THAT IF HE HAD THE NEWER TYPE 172 THAT HAD THE SK132-13A KIT INSTALLED HE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO THE PROB OF ICE LYING WITHIN THE LOWER FUEL LINE SINCE HE COULD HAVE OBSERVED THE FLOW OF FLUID FROM AN OUTSIDE LINE DRAIN. THIS KIT ALLOWS THE EXTERIOR DRAINING OF THE LOWER FUEL LINE. THIS KIT CONNECTS TO THAT LINE AT A POINT BTWN THE SELECTOR VALVE AND THE FUEL BOWL ON THE FIREWALL. THE FUEL BOWL IS WHERE THE PRESENT INTERIOR DRAIN SYS FLOWS, BUT DOES NOT ALLOW THE PLT TO OBSERVE OR COLLECT THE FLUID. HIS ACFT IN THIS INCIDENT WAS A VERY EARLY MODEL 172, A RENTAL ACFT. HE BELIEVES THAT THIS KIT SHOULD BE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE FROM THE FAA FOR INSTALLATION ON OLDER C172'S. HE RPTED THIS INCIDENT TO THE FAA AND THEY DID CRITICIZE HIM FOR THE TKOF FROM THE HWY WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION. THEY THEN GAVE HIM A '609 CHK RIDE' TAKING PARTICULAR NOTICE OF HIS PREFLT PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.