Narrative:

Anc airport was experiencing a heavy snowstorm. The airport was covered with snow. The taxiway/runway signs and markings were either obscured or difficult to see. Visibility was limited. The mu readings for the runway were poor to fair with the ramp and txwys similar or worse. This was my second time into anc with my first being in jul. After deicing, we were given an incorrect taxi clearance (taxi to runway 32 via txwys left, east, and K) that created some confusion. Looking back, I should have stopped the aircraft and resolved the problem. I didn't break the 'chain of events' probably because of some self-imposed pressure of being late (50 mins of delays and deicing). However, ground control quickly corrected the clearance before we could ask for clarification. The new clearance was taxi to runway 32 via txwys east and K. After passing a snow covered taxiway which we believed to be taxiway left, we were approaching the area of txwys K, east, and G. There were no visible stop bar lights or in- ground yellow hold lights for runway 6L. I had either passed taxiway K or only had a partial turn onto taxiway G via taxiway K. I was now uncertain of my position so I applied the brakes to stop. Although I was taxiing very slow, the aircraft slid to a stop at the edge lights of runway 6L/24R. Ground had called 'air carrier X' and I told my copilot that ground had called. After we were stopped, ground called again. They told us to hold short of runway 6L and directed an aircraft on final to go around. My heart sank! We had broken the plane of the runway. We were then cleared the rest of the way into position and hold for runway 32 extension via runway 6L. I then forced myself to focus on the flight ahead and not the mistake behind. Ground control did an excellent job of detecting our mistake as well. They also directed a timely go around. Looking back, the interval between my uncertainty and disorientation in distance and time was short. However, with so much at stake there should be no course of action other than immediately stopping the aircraft at the first sign or feeling of uncertainty. Schedule should always be an extremely distant second to safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A B757 OVERSHOT RWY HOLD SHORT LINE DURING TAXI FOR TKOF CAUSING ANOTHER ACFT ON FINAL TO GO AROUND. THE ARPT WAS COVERED IN SNOW MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO SEE THE RWY TXWY SIGNS AND MARKINGS.

Narrative: ANC ARPT WAS EXPERIENCING A HVY SNOWSTORM. THE ARPT WAS COVERED WITH SNOW. THE TXWY/RWY SIGNS AND MARKINGS WERE EITHER OBSCURED OR DIFFICULT TO SEE. VISIBILITY WAS LIMITED. THE MU READINGS FOR THE RWY WERE POOR TO FAIR WITH THE RAMP AND TXWYS SIMILAR OR WORSE. THIS WAS MY SECOND TIME INTO ANC WITH MY FIRST BEING IN JUL. AFTER DEICING, WE WERE GIVEN AN INCORRECT TAXI CLRNC (TAXI TO RWY 32 VIA TXWYS L, E, AND K) THAT CREATED SOME CONFUSION. LOOKING BACK, I SHOULD HAVE STOPPED THE ACFT AND RESOLVED THE PROB. I DIDN'T BREAK THE 'CHAIN OF EVENTS' PROBABLY BECAUSE OF SOME SELF-IMPOSED PRESSURE OF BEING LATE (50 MINS OF DELAYS AND DEICING). HOWEVER, GND CTL QUICKLY CORRECTED THE CLRNC BEFORE WE COULD ASK FOR CLARIFICATION. THE NEW CLRNC WAS TAXI TO RWY 32 VIA TXWYS E AND K. AFTER PASSING A SNOW COVERED TXWY WHICH WE BELIEVED TO BE TXWY L, WE WERE APCHING THE AREA OF TXWYS K, E, AND G. THERE WERE NO VISIBLE STOP BAR LIGHTS OR IN- GND YELLOW HOLD LIGHTS FOR RWY 6L. I HAD EITHER PASSED TXWY K OR ONLY HAD A PARTIAL TURN ONTO TXWY G VIA TXWY K. I WAS NOW UNCERTAIN OF MY POS SO I APPLIED THE BRAKES TO STOP. ALTHOUGH I WAS TAXIING VERY SLOW, THE ACFT SLID TO A STOP AT THE EDGE LIGHTS OF RWY 6L/24R. GND HAD CALLED 'ACR X' AND I TOLD MY COPLT THAT GND HAD CALLED. AFTER WE WERE STOPPED, GND CALLED AGAIN. THEY TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 6L AND DIRECTED AN ACFT ON FINAL TO GO AROUND. MY HEART SANK! WE HAD BROKEN THE PLANE OF THE RWY. WE WERE THEN CLRED THE REST OF THE WAY INTO POS AND HOLD FOR RWY 32 EXTENSION VIA RWY 6L. I THEN FORCED MYSELF TO FOCUS ON THE FLT AHEAD AND NOT THE MISTAKE BEHIND. GND CTL DID AN EXCELLENT JOB OF DETECTING OUR MISTAKE AS WELL. THEY ALSO DIRECTED A TIMELY GAR. LOOKING BACK, THE INTERVAL BTWN MY UNCERTAINTY AND DISORIENTATION IN DISTANCE AND TIME WAS SHORT. HOWEVER, WITH SO MUCH AT STAKE THERE SHOULD BE NO COURSE OF ACTION OTHER THAN IMMEDIATELY STOPPING THE ACFT AT THE FIRST SIGN OR FEELING OF UNCERTAINTY. SCHEDULE SHOULD ALWAYS BE AN EXTREMELY DISTANT SECOND TO SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.