Narrative:

On this day, I was flying an air tour for my company and departed from class D airspace on a standard pre-authority/authorized departure that is on file with the lihue tower as an LOA. This letter was developed many yrs ago to reduce takeoff noise for the community and is called the harbor departure. The harbor departure avoids the town and community of lihue by flying beside a mountain range that is commonly called the hoary head mountain range and it extends from the nawiliwili harbor towards the west for 7 SM. This has been the standard for at least 15 yrs. Sfar 71 does not include 'directed' traffic within controled airspace. Recently, the FAA has put 'undercover' agents on board helicopters to enforce sfar 71. The major problem is the 'interpretation' and subjective analysis of sfar 71 criteria. The 'undercover' agents were on board my helicopter on this particular flight and claimed I was less than 500 ft distance to the ridgeline. Again, this is a standard procedure for 15 yrs yet these 'agents' decided to make up their own interpretation of a standard procedure! In addition, they claimed that I had less than 3 mi visibility along the na pali coast and the hanalei valley. Fortunately, I have video cameras on board and afterwards I reviewed the video and established known physical features and measured them for actual distances and at no time throughout my flight was I below 3 1/2 mi measured visibility. Upon entering mt waialeale crater did the visibility get below the 3 mi as measured from my location towards the crater. Upon realizing the visibility would interfere with the flight, I made the decision to abort the flight path and made a 180 degree turn to depart the area. At no time did I get below the 3 mi visibility requirement. The problem with this kind of enforcement activity, and nowhere in the rest of the united states is such enforcement taking place, is the anxiety forced upon the pilots. Not knowing whether we are going to be busted for an 'interpretive' safety regulation and having 'undercover agents' who are not qualified to make these judgement assessments has created a hostile environment. So far, several pilots with many yrs of experience and thousands of hours flying in hawaii are leaving so as not to jeopardize their careers. This leaves the only option of hiring low time pilots with minimum experience who are willing to take the 'risk' to build flight time. This only will create a real safety issue and will cause more unnecessary accidents. Most pilots believe anxiety and fear caused the ohana accident. The pilot did not maintain far 135.207 but instead, maintained the higher sfar 71 altitudes increasing his chances of reduced visibility with a 'passing rain shower.' there is a real conflict between existing FARS and sfar 71.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING HARBOR DEP AT LIH, HI, PLT OF A SIGHTSEEING AS350 HELI OPERATED OUTSIDE OF SOME OF THE RESTRS OF SFAR 71, SUCH AS TERRAIN SEPARATION AND MINIMUM VISIBILITY CRITERIA, ACCORDING TO FAA REPRESENTATIVE ABOARD THE ACFT. SFAR 71 COVERS FLT RESTRS FOR THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

Narrative: ON THIS DAY, I WAS FLYING AN AIR TOUR FOR MY COMPANY AND DEPARTED FROM CLASS D AIRSPACE ON A STANDARD PRE-AUTH DEP THAT IS ON FILE WITH THE LIHUE TWR AS AN LOA. THIS LETTER WAS DEVELOPED MANY YRS AGO TO REDUCE TKOF NOISE FOR THE COMMUNITY AND IS CALLED THE HARBOR DEP. THE HARBOR DEP AVOIDS THE TOWN AND COMMUNITY OF LIHUE BY FLYING BESIDE A MOUNTAIN RANGE THAT IS COMMONLY CALLED THE HOARY HEAD MOUNTAIN RANGE AND IT EXTENDS FROM THE NAWILIWILI HARBOR TOWARDS THE W FOR 7 SM. THIS HAS BEEN THE STANDARD FOR AT LEAST 15 YRS. SFAR 71 DOES NOT INCLUDE 'DIRECTED' TFC WITHIN CTLED AIRSPACE. RECENTLY, THE FAA HAS PUT 'UNDERCOVER' AGENTS ON BOARD HELIS TO ENFORCE SFAR 71. THE MAJOR PROB IS THE 'INTERP' AND SUBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF SFAR 71 CRITERIA. THE 'UNDERCOVER' AGENTS WERE ON BOARD MY HELI ON THIS PARTICULAR FLT AND CLAIMED I WAS LESS THAN 500 FT DISTANCE TO THE RIDGELINE. AGAIN, THIS IS A STANDARD PROC FOR 15 YRS YET THESE 'AGENTS' DECIDED TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN INTERP OF A STANDARD PROC! IN ADDITION, THEY CLAIMED THAT I HAD LESS THAN 3 MI VISIBILITY ALONG THE NA PALI COAST AND THE HANALEI VALLEY. FORTUNATELY, I HAVE VIDEO CAMERAS ON BOARD AND AFTERWARDS I REVIEWED THE VIDEO AND ESTABLISHED KNOWN PHYSICAL FEATURES AND MEASURED THEM FOR ACTUAL DISTANCES AND AT NO TIME THROUGHOUT MY FLT WAS I BELOW 3 1/2 MI MEASURED VISIBILITY. UPON ENTERING MT WAIALEALE CRATER DID THE VISIBILITY GET BELOW THE 3 MI AS MEASURED FROM MY LOCATION TOWARDS THE CRATER. UPON REALIZING THE VISIBILITY WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE FLT, I MADE THE DECISION TO ABORT THE FLT PATH AND MADE A 180 DEG TURN TO DEPART THE AREA. AT NO TIME DID I GET BELOW THE 3 MI VISIBILITY REQUIREMENT. THE PROB WITH THIS KIND OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY, AND NOWHERE IN THE REST OF THE UNITED STATES IS SUCH ENFORCEMENT TAKING PLACE, IS THE ANXIETY FORCED UPON THE PLTS. NOT KNOWING WHETHER WE ARE GOING TO BE BUSTED FOR AN 'INTERPRETIVE' SAFETY REG AND HAVING 'UNDERCOVER AGENTS' WHO ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO MAKE THESE JUDGEMENT ASSESSMENTS HAS CREATED A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT. SO FAR, SEVERAL PLTS WITH MANY YRS OF EXPERIENCE AND THOUSANDS OF HRS FLYING IN HAWAII ARE LEAVING SO AS NOT TO JEOPARDIZE THEIR CAREERS. THIS LEAVES THE ONLY OPTION OF HIRING LOW TIME PLTS WITH MINIMUM EXPERIENCE WHO ARE WILLING TO TAKE THE 'RISK' TO BUILD FLT TIME. THIS ONLY WILL CREATE A REAL SAFETY ISSUE AND WILL CAUSE MORE UNNECESSARY ACCIDENTS. MOST PLTS BELIEVE ANXIETY AND FEAR CAUSED THE OHANA ACCIDENT. THE PLT DID NOT MAINTAIN FAR 135.207 BUT INSTEAD, MAINTAINED THE HIGHER SFAR 71 ALTS INCREASING HIS CHANCES OF REDUCED VISIBILITY WITH A 'PASSING RAIN SHOWER.' THERE IS A REAL CONFLICT BTWN EXISTING FARS AND SFAR 71.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.