Narrative:

While in the descent for shv, approximately 8 mins from the airport, passing through 6000 ft MSL, we received a single stroke chime, master caution, and the yellow 'right chip detect' light. We had already called in range to company on the airport, we had received that ATIS, had completed the descent and approach checklist including notifying the flight attendant to prepare for landing. As the captain was passing me the QRH to begin procedures on the right engine chip light, I noticed smoke through some light beams shining in the cockpit. I immediately called 'smoke in the cockpit.' as I was reaching around to put my oxygen mask on, the captain and I began verbally reciting the memory item for smoke in the cockpit. As soon as I had placed my mask on, verified the regular was in the 100% position, turned the flow of oxygen on, switched my microphone switch from boom to mask, placed my head set on. The captain said 'your aircraft' where I then took control of the aircraft continuing a descent towards the planned destination airport. After donning his same equipment, he said 'my aircraft' twice and he was again flying. He had to shout his aircraft twice because he later admitted to me that he had not turned his microphone switch to mask from the boom position. Immediately after he began flying the aircraft again, we experienced a large explosion from the right engine and the aircraft suddenly decelerated and yawed to the right and the captain (PF) immediately regained control of the aircraft and began commanding the 'engine failure' memory item checklist. I was already trying to scan what instruments and gauges I could see to confirm that we indeed did have a right engine failure. The smoke was so thick by this time that the gauges were just a faint glow on the panel. He commanded 'right power lever.' I placed my hand on it and we concurred and he said retard and I retarded the power lever. He then commanded right condition lever, fuel off, and I pulled the condition lever to fuel off. I could see that the propeller had feathered and I then began the QRH procedures. Approaching the airport the captain called for gear down and we began the before landing checklist using the QRH. Upon the rollout and landing, I asked the captain if we were going to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft on the runway. He said yes, and I heard him say to the right. As I was informing the flight attendant to evacuate/evacuation to the right, he said 'no, no, left, left.' at that time I informed the flight attendant twice that we would be evacing to the left. Upon the aircraft stopping, I immediately went to the evacuate/evacuation checklist on the yoke and began those procedures which included shutting down the remaining running #1 engine. The captain then told me twice to leave the aircraft, at which point I began assisting the flight attendant in evacing the remaining passenger, which included grabbing hand-held items from the passenger that were trying to carry items with them during the evacuate/evacuation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the cockpit filled with smoke with the visibility limited to about 24 inches and the only engine warning was a 'chip' detector light and master caution chime. The reporter said shortly after the smoke was discovered, the engine suffered a catastrophic failure with a deafening bang. The reporter stated that even with the engine failure the only warning light illuminated was the 'chip' detector light, no low oil pressure warning light or other indications associated with an engine failure. The reporter said maintenance reported the engine failure was caused by the failure of the 'a-3' internal oil seal allowing engine oil to contaminate the bleed air resulting in smoke in the cabin and cockpit. The reporter said the engine was a ge CT7-9b2 and was replaced and sent to the overhaul shop.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB120 ON APCH AT 6000 FT DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT CAUSED BY THE R ENG LOSS OF OIL AND CATASTROPHIC FAILURE.

Narrative: WHILE IN THE DSCNT FOR SHV, APPROX 8 MINS FROM THE ARPT, PASSING THROUGH 6000 FT MSL, WE RECEIVED A SINGLE STROKE CHIME, MASTER CAUTION, AND THE YELLOW 'R CHIP DETECT' LIGHT. WE HAD ALREADY CALLED IN RANGE TO COMPANY ON THE ARPT, WE HAD RECEIVED THAT ATIS, HAD COMPLETED THE DSCNT AND APCH CHKLIST INCLUDING NOTIFYING THE FLT ATTENDANT TO PREPARE FOR LNDG. AS THE CAPT WAS PASSING ME THE QRH TO BEGIN PROCS ON THE R ENG CHIP LIGHT, I NOTICED SMOKE THROUGH SOME LIGHT BEAMS SHINING IN THE COCKPIT. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED 'SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT.' AS I WAS REACHING AROUND TO PUT MY OXYGEN MASK ON, THE CAPT AND I BEGAN VERBALLY RECITING THE MEMORY ITEM FOR SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. AS SOON AS I HAD PLACED MY MASK ON, VERIFIED THE REGULAR WAS IN THE 100% POS, TURNED THE FLOW OF OXYGEN ON, SWITCHED MY MIKE SWITCH FROM BOOM TO MASK, PLACED MY HEAD SET ON. THE CAPT SAID 'YOUR ACFT' WHERE I THEN TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT CONTINUING A DSCNT TOWARDS THE PLANNED DEST ARPT. AFTER DONNING HIS SAME EQUIP, HE SAID 'MY ACFT' TWICE AND HE WAS AGAIN FLYING. HE HAD TO SHOUT HIS ACFT TWICE BECAUSE HE LATER ADMITTED TO ME THAT HE HAD NOT TURNED HIS MIKE SWITCH TO MASK FROM THE BOOM POS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE BEGAN FLYING THE ACFT AGAIN, WE EXPERIENCED A LARGE EXPLOSION FROM THE R ENG AND THE ACFT SUDDENLY DECELERATED AND YAWED TO THE R AND THE CAPT (PF) IMMEDIATELY REGAINED CTL OF THE ACFT AND BEGAN COMMANDING THE 'ENG FAILURE' MEMORY ITEM CHKLIST. I WAS ALREADY TRYING TO SCAN WHAT INSTS AND GAUGES I COULD SEE TO CONFIRM THAT WE INDEED DID HAVE A R ENG FAILURE. THE SMOKE WAS SO THICK BY THIS TIME THAT THE GAUGES WERE JUST A FAINT GLOW ON THE PANEL. HE COMMANDED 'R PWR LEVER.' I PLACED MY HAND ON IT AND WE CONCURRED AND HE SAID RETARD AND I RETARDED THE PWR LEVER. HE THEN COMMANDED R CONDITION LEVER, FUEL OFF, AND I PULLED THE CONDITION LEVER TO FUEL OFF. I COULD SEE THAT THE PROP HAD FEATHERED AND I THEN BEGAN THE QRH PROCS. APCHING THE ARPT THE CAPT CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN AND WE BEGAN THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST USING THE QRH. UPON THE ROLLOUT AND LNDG, I ASKED THE CAPT IF WE WERE GOING TO EVAC THE ACFT ON THE RWY. HE SAID YES, AND I HEARD HIM SAY TO THE R. AS I WAS INFORMING THE FLT ATTENDANT TO EVAC TO THE R, HE SAID 'NO, NO, LEFT, LEFT.' AT THAT TIME I INFORMED THE FLT ATTENDANT TWICE THAT WE WOULD BE EVACING TO THE L. UPON THE ACFT STOPPING, I IMMEDIATELY WENT TO THE EVAC CHKLIST ON THE YOKE AND BEGAN THOSE PROCS WHICH INCLUDED SHUTTING DOWN THE REMAINING RUNNING #1 ENG. THE CAPT THEN TOLD ME TWICE TO LEAVE THE ACFT, AT WHICH POINT I BEGAN ASSISTING THE FLT ATTENDANT IN EVACING THE REMAINING PAX, WHICH INCLUDED GRABBING HAND-HELD ITEMS FROM THE PAX THAT WERE TRYING TO CARRY ITEMS WITH THEM DURING THE EVAC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE COCKPIT FILLED WITH SMOKE WITH THE VISIBILITY LIMITED TO ABOUT 24 INCHES AND THE ONLY ENG WARNING WAS A 'CHIP' DETECTOR LIGHT AND MASTER CAUTION CHIME. THE RPTR SAID SHORTLY AFTER THE SMOKE WAS DISCOVERED, THE ENG SUFFERED A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE WITH A DEAFENING BANG. THE RPTR STATED THAT EVEN WITH THE ENG FAILURE THE ONLY WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED WAS THE 'CHIP' DETECTOR LIGHT, NO LOW OIL PRESSURE WARNING LIGHT OR OTHER INDICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ENG FAILURE. THE RPTR SAID MAINT RPTED THE ENG FAILURE WAS CAUSED BY THE FAILURE OF THE 'A-3' INTERNAL OIL SEAL ALLOWING ENG OIL TO CONTAMINATE THE BLEED AIR RESULTING IN SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND COCKPIT. THE RPTR SAID THE ENG WAS A GE CT7-9B2 AND WAS REPLACED AND SENT TO THE OVERHAUL SHOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.