Narrative:

We were proceeding direct to joses intersection at FL260, in VFR conditions daylight. We were given direct by santo domingo ARTCC. Our scheduled passenger trip was from aua-mco- pit, which my crew had done many times before. We were flight planned at FL350 but due to traffic, were told by curacao ATC to maintain FL260. We repeated our request for FL350 to santo domingo but again told to maintain altitude. 10 mins prior to joses intersection I gave radio #1 (port-au-prince) to my first officer, who was flying, so I could call ZMA with our estimate for joses. I leaned back from putting the new squawk in the transponder when I noticed the TCASII with a yellow circle with a -07 next to it. As I was asking my crew if they had the traffic in sight, the TCASII went off 'traffic, traffic' followed immediately by 'descend, descend.' the volume is very weak so I looked at the TCASII and it showed a 4000 FPM descent command. I immediately took control of the airplane and banked it hard to the right (in excess of 45 degrees) and pushed the nose over. While I was doing this maneuver, I looked out my side window (left) and I saw a B727 pulling up and banking to the right. After we passed each other I gave the airplane back to my first officer and we climbed back to FL260. My first officer was still monitoring port-au-prince radio and advised them of the TCASII resolution. The B727 jet did the same. I was still talking with miami and I advised him of the resolution and he said he saw a 700 ft difference and that he would notify his supervisor and mark the tapes. Everybody in the back of my plane was fine, other than some food trays on the floor. Port-au-prince ATC had given the B727 jet a descent to FL230 from FL270, which is why he was descending. The jet cargo B727 had TCASII also and there is no doubt that had he not done his pull-up we would be dead. If this situation were at night or in IFR conditions, we most certainly would be dead. All cargo aircraft need TCASII. It is another back-up system in the ATC system. My crew of 6 and 86 passenger owe their lives to TCASII. The volume on the TCASII needs to be turned up. Since port-au-prince is non radar, they need to place more qualified personnel into these position. Supplemental information from acn 470072: even though he was a cargo jet (B727) had TCASII also. We are also a cargo fleet but we were flying passenger, therefore, we had TCASII. TCASII saved our lives as haiti approach control directed both airplanes in the same route in opposing crossing altitudes. The rest of our cargo-only airplanes don't have TCASII since it's not required by law. If the other cargo operator had had no TCASII we would have had a midair crash. Santo domingo noticed the incident and we told them to talk to haiti (we were quickly handed over to santo domingo). We were able to communicate afterwards with the other airplane and they felt the same way we did.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN NMAC IS AVOIDED WHEN 2 B727'S MANEUVER AWAY FROM EACH OTHER NW OF PAP, FO. ONE B727 HAD BEEN CLRED THROUGH THE OTHER'S ALT BY A NON RADAR CTLR AT MTEG CTR IN PORT-AU- PRINCE.

Narrative: WE WERE PROCEEDING DIRECT TO JOSES INTXN AT FL260, IN VFR CONDITIONS DAYLIGHT. WE WERE GIVEN DIRECT BY SANTO DOMINGO ARTCC. OUR SCHEDULED PAX TRIP WAS FROM AUA-MCO- PIT, WHICH MY CREW HAD DONE MANY TIMES BEFORE. WE WERE FLT PLANNED AT FL350 BUT DUE TO TFC, WERE TOLD BY CURACAO ATC TO MAINTAIN FL260. WE REPEATED OUR REQUEST FOR FL350 TO SANTO DOMINGO BUT AGAIN TOLD TO MAINTAIN ALT. 10 MINS PRIOR TO JOSES INTXN I GAVE RADIO #1 (PORT-AU-PRINCE) TO MY FO, WHO WAS FLYING, SO I COULD CALL ZMA WITH OUR ESTIMATE FOR JOSES. I LEANED BACK FROM PUTTING THE NEW SQUAWK IN THE XPONDER WHEN I NOTICED THE TCASII WITH A YELLOW CIRCLE WITH A -07 NEXT TO IT. AS I WAS ASKING MY CREW IF THEY HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT, THE TCASII WENT OFF 'TFC, TFC' FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY 'DSND, DSND.' THE VOLUME IS VERY WEAK SO I LOOKED AT THE TCASII AND IT SHOWED A 4000 FPM DSCNT COMMAND. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE AIRPLANE AND BANKED IT HARD TO THE R (IN EXCESS OF 45 DEGS) AND PUSHED THE NOSE OVER. WHILE I WAS DOING THIS MANEUVER, I LOOKED OUT MY SIDE WINDOW (L) AND I SAW A B727 PULLING UP AND BANKING TO THE R. AFTER WE PASSED EACH OTHER I GAVE THE AIRPLANE BACK TO MY FO AND WE CLBED BACK TO FL260. MY FO WAS STILL MONITORING PORT-AU-PRINCE RADIO AND ADVISED THEM OF THE TCASII RESOLUTION. THE B727 JET DID THE SAME. I WAS STILL TALKING WITH MIAMI AND I ADVISED HIM OF THE RESOLUTION AND HE SAID HE SAW A 700 FT DIFFERENCE AND THAT HE WOULD NOTIFY HIS SUPVR AND MARK THE TAPES. EVERYBODY IN THE BACK OF MY PLANE WAS FINE, OTHER THAN SOME FOOD TRAYS ON THE FLOOR. PORT-AU-PRINCE ATC HAD GIVEN THE B727 JET A DSCNT TO FL230 FROM FL270, WHICH IS WHY HE WAS DSNDING. THE JET CARGO B727 HAD TCASII ALSO AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT HAD HE NOT DONE HIS PULL-UP WE WOULD BE DEAD. IF THIS SIT WERE AT NIGHT OR IN IFR CONDITIONS, WE MOST CERTAINLY WOULD BE DEAD. ALL CARGO ACFT NEED TCASII. IT IS ANOTHER BACK-UP SYS IN THE ATC SYS. MY CREW OF 6 AND 86 PAX OWE THEIR LIVES TO TCASII. THE VOLUME ON THE TCASII NEEDS TO BE TURNED UP. SINCE PORT-AU-PRINCE IS NON RADAR, THEY NEED TO PLACE MORE QUALIFIED PERSONNEL INTO THESE POS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 470072: EVEN THOUGH HE WAS A CARGO JET (B727) HAD TCASII ALSO. WE ARE ALSO A CARGO FLEET BUT WE WERE FLYING PAX, THEREFORE, WE HAD TCASII. TCASII SAVED OUR LIVES AS HAITI APCH CTL DIRECTED BOTH AIRPLANES IN THE SAME RTE IN OPPOSING XING ALTS. THE REST OF OUR CARGO-ONLY AIRPLANES DON'T HAVE TCASII SINCE IT'S NOT REQUIRED BY LAW. IF THE OTHER CARGO OPERATOR HAD HAD NO TCASII WE WOULD HAVE HAD A MIDAIR CRASH. SANTO DOMINGO NOTICED THE INCIDENT AND WE TOLD THEM TO TALK TO HAITI (WE WERE QUICKLY HANDED OVER TO SANTO DOMINGO). WE WERE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE AFTERWARDS WITH THE OTHER AIRPLANE AND THEY FELT THE SAME WAY WE DID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.