Narrative:

The main cabin from about rows 13 to 27 filled with dense smoke. Passenger started to panic. Not knowing cause, we initiated an evacuate/evacuation. I think the airline in question was limiting in what I as a crew member should be feeling or reacting to in the aftermath. I should not have been required to deal with passenger later. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that the problem which occurred after the evacuate/evacuation was of company policy and procedures. There is apparently a new process whereby the emergencys are categorized as to the level of emergency involved so that cabin crew can be reassigned or not. This was so new it was not even in the flight attendants' manuals when this incident occurred. The required form is to be completed immediately after the incident and indicates that an evacuate/evacuation from the jetway is not considered too severe an occurrence. This was definitely not true for this flight attendant crew. The smoke was very thick and passenger were beginning to panic. The flight attendants followed proper procedures and were able to evacuate/evacuation all passenger without anyone trying to enter the overhead bins which would have been a disaster. This cabin crew had not dealt with an actual evacuate/evacuation before and the adrenalin was extremely high. When company tried to reassign them to another flight they could not believe it. One called the union and then the company backed down and released them to go home. Reporter indicated that 2 of them had rather severe post traumatic shock within the next couple of days. Mechanics were working in the cockpit when the smoke developed in the cabin. Apparently there was no relationship between the 2 events. Smoke very likely came from the air conditioning system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CABIN ATTENDANT RPT REGARDING AN EVAC AT THE GATE WHEN SMOKE BEGAN TO FILL THE CABIN. COMPANY WANTED THE CABIN CREW TO ACCEPT ANOTHER FLT IMMEDIATELY.

Narrative: THE MAIN CABIN FROM ABOUT ROWS 13 TO 27 FILLED WITH DENSE SMOKE. PAX STARTED TO PANIC. NOT KNOWING CAUSE, WE INITIATED AN EVAC. I THINK THE AIRLINE IN QUESTION WAS LIMITING IN WHAT I AS A CREW MEMBER SHOULD BE FEELING OR REACTING TO IN THE AFTERMATH. I SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH PAX LATER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT THE PROB WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THE EVAC WAS OF COMPANY POLICY AND PROCS. THERE IS APPARENTLY A NEW PROCESS WHEREBY THE EMERS ARE CATEGORIZED AS TO THE LEVEL OF EMER INVOLVED SO THAT CABIN CREW CAN BE REASSIGNED OR NOT. THIS WAS SO NEW IT WAS NOT EVEN IN THE FLT ATTENDANTS' MANUALS WHEN THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED. THE REQUIRED FORM IS TO BE COMPLETED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INCIDENT AND INDICATES THAT AN EVAC FROM THE JETWAY IS NOT CONSIDERED TOO SEVERE AN OCCURRENCE. THIS WAS DEFINITELY NOT TRUE FOR THIS FLT ATTENDANT CREW. THE SMOKE WAS VERY THICK AND PAX WERE BEGINNING TO PANIC. THE FLT ATTENDANTS FOLLOWED PROPER PROCS AND WERE ABLE TO EVAC ALL PAX WITHOUT ANYONE TRYING TO ENTER THE OVERHEAD BINS WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN A DISASTER. THIS CABIN CREW HAD NOT DEALT WITH AN ACTUAL EVAC BEFORE AND THE ADRENALIN WAS EXTREMELY HIGH. WHEN COMPANY TRIED TO REASSIGN THEM TO ANOTHER FLT THEY COULD NOT BELIEVE IT. ONE CALLED THE UNION AND THEN THE COMPANY BACKED DOWN AND RELEASED THEM TO GO HOME. RPTR INDICATED THAT 2 OF THEM HAD RATHER SEVERE POST TRAUMATIC SHOCK WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS. MECHS WERE WORKING IN THE COCKPIT WHEN THE SMOKE DEVELOPED IN THE CABIN. APPARENTLY THERE WAS NO RELATIONSHIP BTWN THE 2 EVENTS. SMOKE VERY LIKELY CAME FROM THE AIR CONDITIONING SYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.