Narrative:

Our flight was from lga to bos. Because of WX in bos (low ceilings and visibility) we were given VMC holding instructions over the pvd VOR. We were on top and began our speed reduction (230 KTS) early to conserve fuel and minimize our time in holding. As we entered holding, the ZBW controller called us and inquired about our deviation from our clearance. We had inadvertently entered holding over the norwich (orw) VOR. The controller vectored us back to the pvd VOR and we re-entered holding. I fly this route regularly, and the majority of the time we are given a clearance direct to pvd, bypassing orw. I believe that because of the low workload at the time (FL210, level flight, 230 KTS) and the out of the ordinary clearance, we became complacent and neglected to xchk our selected VOR frequencys. Relating this to crew resource management, loss of situational awareness is normally attributed to high workload sits. Cockpit crews also have to be cautious of loss of situational awareness due to low workload sits and complacency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A B727 INADVERTENTLY ENTERED HOLDING OVER THE WRONG VOR. ARTCC RADAR CTLR INTERVENED AND VECTORED THEM TO THE PROPER VOR FOR THE ASSIGNED HOLDING.

Narrative: OUR FLT WAS FROM LGA TO BOS. BECAUSE OF WX IN BOS (LOW CEILINGS AND VISIBILITY) WE WERE GIVEN VMC HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS OVER THE PVD VOR. WE WERE ON TOP AND BEGAN OUR SPD REDUCTION (230 KTS) EARLY TO CONSERVE FUEL AND MINIMIZE OUR TIME IN HOLDING. AS WE ENTERED HOLDING, THE ZBW CTLR CALLED US AND INQUIRED ABOUT OUR DEV FROM OUR CLRNC. WE HAD INADVERTENTLY ENTERED HOLDING OVER THE NORWICH (ORW) VOR. THE CTLR VECTORED US BACK TO THE PVD VOR AND WE RE-ENTERED HOLDING. I FLY THIS RTE REGULARLY, AND THE MAJORITY OF THE TIME WE ARE GIVEN A CLRNC DIRECT TO PVD, BYPASSING ORW. I BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE OF THE LOW WORKLOAD AT THE TIME (FL210, LEVEL FLT, 230 KTS) AND THE OUT OF THE ORDINARY CLRNC, WE BECAME COMPLACENT AND NEGLECTED TO XCHK OUR SELECTED VOR FREQS. RELATING THIS TO CREW RESOURCE MGMNT, LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IS NORMALLY ATTRIBUTED TO HIGH WORKLOAD SITS. COCKPIT CREWS ALSO HAVE TO BE CAUTIOUS OF LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DUE TO LOW WORKLOAD SITS AND COMPLACENCY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.