Narrative:

LJ25 (cga X) checked on the frequency in descent to FL330. When clear of traffic about 50 mi south of orf, I gave cga X a clearance to cross 10 mi south of orf at FL290. He was out of about FL340 at the time. Cga X read back the clearance. I had air carrier Y north of orf at FL310. The clearance gave me room for the restr to work. Conflict alert activated. Cga X was out of FL317 about 15 mi south of orf, still enough time and distance to make his restr. At 10 mi south of orf, cga X was out of FL310. I issued a turn to 110 degrees and called traffic and then gave air carrier Y a turn to 270 degrees. At this time he said he had a TCASII resolution and was climbing. When I had separation, I gave air carrier Y back on course and cga X on course. Cga X made no comment. Supplemental information from acn 412890: on this specific leg (dixon - norfolk) we were in a steady descent from our cruising altitude of FL430. ZDC proceeded to give us a crossing restr as follows, 'cross 10 mi south of orf at and maintain FL290.' at the time of that clearance, we were descending through FL360. With a proper descent, that crossing restr should have not been a problem to maintain since we were still 4-5 mins from that point (10 mi south of orf). Nevertheless, I noticed that the current rate of descent would not allow compliance with that ATC clearance. I proceeded to tell the captain that we were not going to make the altitude unless we increased our rate of descent considerably. By the time we reached the foretold fix we were at FL305 to FL300. At that point, an airliner, flying the opposite direction along J174, reported us as a resolution on his TCASII and proceeded to turn towards the west to comply with his TCASII alert. We had visual on that traffic. The estimated distance to that traffic was approximately 3-4 NM. ATC instructed us to turn to heading of 090 degrees. After proper spacing had been reached, ATC re- established us along our flight planned route. I believe that this incident could have been avoided, would the captain have paid more attention to the task at hand. The 2 callouts on my part pointing directly to the problem should have been enough to result in proper actions of the PF. In my belief, the captain was primarily concerned with giving a smooth ride to the passenger aboard rather than meeting the restr. I also believe that a conversation between the captain and the passenger distraction him from establishing a proper rate of descent shortly after the clearance was issued.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CGA LR25 WAS ISSUED A CLRNC TO CROSS 10 MI S OF ORF AT FL290 WITH CONFLICTING B727 TFC AT FL310. THE LR25 CROSSED ORF ABOVE THE ASSIGNED ALT RESULTING IN LTSS WITH THE ACR ACFT.

Narrative: LJ25 (CGA X) CHKED ON THE FREQ IN DSCNT TO FL330. WHEN CLR OF TFC ABOUT 50 MI S OF ORF, I GAVE CGA X A CLRNC TO CROSS 10 MI S OF ORF AT FL290. HE WAS OUT OF ABOUT FL340 AT THE TIME. CGA X READ BACK THE CLRNC. I HAD ACR Y N OF ORF AT FL310. THE CLRNC GAVE ME ROOM FOR THE RESTR TO WORK. CONFLICT ALERT ACTIVATED. CGA X WAS OUT OF FL317 ABOUT 15 MI S OF ORF, STILL ENOUGH TIME AND DISTANCE TO MAKE HIS RESTR. AT 10 MI S OF ORF, CGA X WAS OUT OF FL310. I ISSUED A TURN TO 110 DEGS AND CALLED TFC AND THEN GAVE ACR Y A TURN TO 270 DEGS. AT THIS TIME HE SAID HE HAD A TCASII RESOLUTION AND WAS CLBING. WHEN I HAD SEPARATION, I GAVE ACR Y BACK ON COURSE AND CGA X ON COURSE. CGA X MADE NO COMMENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 412890: ON THIS SPECIFIC LEG (DIXON - NORFOLK) WE WERE IN A STEADY DSCNT FROM OUR CRUISING ALT OF FL430. ZDC PROCEEDED TO GIVE US A XING RESTR AS FOLLOWS, 'CROSS 10 MI S OF ORF AT AND MAINTAIN FL290.' AT THE TIME OF THAT CLRNC, WE WERE DSNDING THROUGH FL360. WITH A PROPER DSCNT, THAT XING RESTR SHOULD HAVE NOT BEEN A PROB TO MAINTAIN SINCE WE WERE STILL 4-5 MINS FROM THAT POINT (10 MI S OF ORF). NEVERTHELESS, I NOTICED THAT THE CURRENT RATE OF DSCNT WOULD NOT ALLOW COMPLIANCE WITH THAT ATC CLRNC. I PROCEEDED TO TELL THE CAPT THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE THE ALT UNLESS WE INCREASED OUR RATE OF DSCNT CONSIDERABLY. BY THE TIME WE REACHED THE FORETOLD FIX WE WERE AT FL305 TO FL300. AT THAT POINT, AN AIRLINER, FLYING THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION ALONG J174, RPTED US AS A RESOLUTION ON HIS TCASII AND PROCEEDED TO TURN TOWARDS THE W TO COMPLY WITH HIS TCASII ALERT. WE HAD VISUAL ON THAT TFC. THE ESTIMATED DISTANCE TO THAT TFC WAS APPROX 3-4 NM. ATC INSTRUCTED US TO TURN TO HDG OF 090 DEGS. AFTER PROPER SPACING HAD BEEN REACHED, ATC RE- ESTABLISHED US ALONG OUR FLT PLANNED RTE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, WOULD THE CAPT HAVE PAID MORE ATTN TO THE TASK AT HAND. THE 2 CALLOUTS ON MY PART POINTING DIRECTLY TO THE PROB SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO RESULT IN PROPER ACTIONS OF THE PF. IN MY BELIEF, THE CAPT WAS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH GIVING A SMOOTH RIDE TO THE PAX ABOARD RATHER THAN MEETING THE RESTR. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT A CONVERSATION BTWN THE CAPT AND THE PAX DISTR HIM FROM ESTABLISHING A PROPER RATE OF DSCNT SHORTLY AFTER THE CLRNC WAS ISSUED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.