Narrative:

On climb out out of boston, during climb checks, checked engine instruments per the checklist. The #1 engine oil temperature was exceeding the upper limit (135 degrees C). We shut down the #1 engine per the appropriate emergency checklists. We returned to boston and landed uneventfully. Upon review, we realized that we had let the first officer continue to be the PF since it was his leg, and he landed the aircraft. The problem was he has under 100 hours as a sic in type, and per our flight operations manual, the PIC should make the landing. Extenuating circumstances: strictly following the 3 checklists involved, and reading the notes of all checklists, I falsely believed I had covered everything necessary to land safely. The checklists make no reference to this issue. The first officer did a good job of flying the aircraft during the emergency, so I didn't suspect that I had to intervene. The autoplt was MEL'ed inoperative, so it had actually worked to our benefit to have the first officer fly the initial shutdown and positioning of the aircraft for the approach. So I, as the captain, could be thinking of all the issues involved. But again, never thought of the 100 hour sic requirement. I guess I lost the big picture with forgetting the 100 sic rule. There were thunderstorms in the area, so we had one more distraction to deal with, too.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF AN ACR DH8 RETURN LAND, AND AN EMER DECLARED AFTER HIGH ENG OIL TEMP CAUSED AN INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN OF THE #1 ENG, WHEN HE DID NOT HAVE AT LEAST 100 HRS AS SIC IN TYPE OF ACFT PER COMPANY FLT OPS MANUAL.

Narrative: ON CLBOUT OUT OF BOSTON, DURING CLB CHKS, CHKED ENG INSTS PER THE CHKLIST. THE #1 ENG OIL TEMP WAS EXCEEDING THE UPPER LIMIT (135 DEGS C). WE SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG PER THE APPROPRIATE EMER CHKLISTS. WE RETURNED TO BOSTON AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. UPON REVIEW, WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD LET THE FO CONTINUE TO BE THE PF SINCE IT WAS HIS LEG, AND HE LANDED THE ACFT. THE PROB WAS HE HAS UNDER 100 HRS AS A SIC IN TYPE, AND PER OUR FLT OPS MANUAL, THE PIC SHOULD MAKE THE LNDG. EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES: STRICTLY FOLLOWING THE 3 CHKLISTS INVOLVED, AND READING THE NOTES OF ALL CHKLISTS, I FALSELY BELIEVED I HAD COVERED EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO LAND SAFELY. THE CHKLISTS MAKE NO REF TO THIS ISSUE. THE FO DID A GOOD JOB OF FLYING THE ACFT DURING THE EMER, SO I DIDN'T SUSPECT THAT I HAD TO INTERVENE. THE AUTOPLT WAS MEL'ED INOP, SO IT HAD ACTUALLY WORKED TO OUR BENEFIT TO HAVE THE FO FLY THE INITIAL SHUTDOWN AND POSITIONING OF THE ACFT FOR THE APCH. SO I, AS THE CAPT, COULD BE THINKING OF ALL THE ISSUES INVOLVED. BUT AGAIN, NEVER THOUGHT OF THE 100 HR SIC REQUIREMENT. I GUESS I LOST THE BIG PICTURE WITH FORGETTING THE 100 SIC RULE. THERE WERE TSTMS IN THE AREA, SO WE HAD ONE MORE DISTR TO DEAL WITH, TOO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.