Narrative:

Captain's landing runway 31 lga, expressway visual approach. Automatic brakes set on medium. First flight after all 3 landing gear assemblies replaced (nose and both main mounts). Touched down at 135 KIAS bug speed. As we decelerated through 80 KIAS, I gently transitioned to manual brakes as I eased out of reverse. No unusual sounds or smells. Brakes felt fine. As we exited off runway 31 at taxiway right, tower informed us that our brakes were smoking, and to 'coast to a stop.' we stopped at the intersection of txwys right and B. The fire and rescue team arrived at the request of ATC, not us. I secured the right engine, asked first officer to initiate the smoke identify/removal checklist, and made a PA requesting the passenger remain seated and explaining the smoke. I opened the cockpit door to ease communication with the flight attendants, monitor the passenger, and let them see us up there working the situation. To their credit, everyone remained seated. I requested a discrete frequency from ground control for fire and rescue and was assigned one. They informed me only the right brake was smoking, not the left, and no fire. I noted the brake temperatures: left side 140 degrees C, right side 160 degrees C. I told the fire marshall the right engine was secured, started the APU, and secured the left engine to ensure the safety of ground personnel, lower the noise level, and prepare for tow-in to our gate. We called for maintenance and a tug, who informed us there was no fire or hot metal, and confirmed our suspicions that the smoke appeared to come from residual grease and fluid on the right brake. After conferring with the fire marshall, we all decided it would be safe to restart the left engine, test the brakes, and if okay, taxi slowly to the ramp. At my request, a fire truck and our tug followed us to gate just in case. Our subsequent taxi was uneventful. The first officer asked our ramp to have chocks ready, to confirm them in place via headset, and for all to remain clear of the main wheels as the fuse plugs might blow. All proceeded as requested, and the plugs remained in. Lga airport remark #16 refers to a 90-day test of the fire and rescue coordination frequency effective jul/xx/98. I was grateful for it, and the entire operation went smoothly and efficiently. They were most supportive. I requested a logbook entry be made, but never verified its completion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TWR CTLR INFORMED FLC OF AN MD88 THAT THERE WAS SMOKE COMING FROM THEIR MAIN GEAR TIRE AREA DURING LNDG ROLL. THE FLC STOPPED ON TXWY FOR THE FIRE RESCUE EQUIP AND PERSONNEL TO INSPECT THE ACFT FOR FIRE BEFORE TAXIING TO PARKING TO DEPLANE PAX.

Narrative: CAPT'S LNDG RWY 31 LGA, EXPRESSWAY VISUAL APCH. AUTO BRAKES SET ON MEDIUM. FIRST FLT AFTER ALL 3 LNDG GEAR ASSEMBLIES REPLACED (NOSE AND BOTH MAIN MOUNTS). TOUCHED DOWN AT 135 KIAS BUG SPD. AS WE DECELERATED THROUGH 80 KIAS, I GENTLY TRANSITIONED TO MANUAL BRAKES AS I EASED OUT OF REVERSE. NO UNUSUAL SOUNDS OR SMELLS. BRAKES FELT FINE. AS WE EXITED OFF RWY 31 AT TXWY R, TWR INFORMED US THAT OUR BRAKES WERE SMOKING, AND TO 'COAST TO A STOP.' WE STOPPED AT THE INTXN OF TXWYS R AND B. THE FIRE AND RESCUE TEAM ARRIVED AT THE REQUEST OF ATC, NOT US. I SECURED THE R ENG, ASKED FO TO INITIATE THE SMOKE IDENT/REMOVAL CHKLIST, AND MADE A PA REQUESTING THE PAX REMAIN SEATED AND EXPLAINING THE SMOKE. I OPENED THE COCKPIT DOOR TO EASE COM WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS, MONITOR THE PAX, AND LET THEM SEE US UP THERE WORKING THE SIT. TO THEIR CREDIT, EVERYONE REMAINED SEATED. I REQUESTED A DISCRETE FREQ FROM GND CTL FOR FIRE AND RESCUE AND WAS ASSIGNED ONE. THEY INFORMED ME ONLY THE R BRAKE WAS SMOKING, NOT THE L, AND NO FIRE. I NOTED THE BRAKE TEMPS: L SIDE 140 DEGS C, R SIDE 160 DEGS C. I TOLD THE FIRE MARSHALL THE R ENG WAS SECURED, STARTED THE APU, AND SECURED THE L ENG TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF GND PERSONNEL, LOWER THE NOISE LEVEL, AND PREPARE FOR TOW-IN TO OUR GATE. WE CALLED FOR MAINT AND A TUG, WHO INFORMED US THERE WAS NO FIRE OR HOT METAL, AND CONFIRMED OUR SUSPICIONS THAT THE SMOKE APPEARED TO COME FROM RESIDUAL GREASE AND FLUID ON THE R BRAKE. AFTER CONFERRING WITH THE FIRE MARSHALL, WE ALL DECIDED IT WOULD BE SAFE TO RESTART THE L ENG, TEST THE BRAKES, AND IF OKAY, TAXI SLOWLY TO THE RAMP. AT MY REQUEST, A FIRE TRUCK AND OUR TUG FOLLOWED US TO GATE JUST IN CASE. OUR SUBSEQUENT TAXI WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE FO ASKED OUR RAMP TO HAVE CHOCKS READY, TO CONFIRM THEM IN PLACE VIA HEADSET, AND FOR ALL TO REMAIN CLR OF THE MAIN WHEELS AS THE FUSE PLUGS MIGHT BLOW. ALL PROCEEDED AS REQUESTED, AND THE PLUGS REMAINED IN. LGA ARPT REMARK #16 REFERS TO A 90-DAY TEST OF THE FIRE AND RESCUE COORD FREQ EFFECTIVE JUL/XX/98. I WAS GRATEFUL FOR IT, AND THE ENTIRE OP WENT SMOOTHLY AND EFFICIENTLY. THEY WERE MOST SUPPORTIVE. I REQUESTED A LOGBOOK ENTRY BE MADE, BUT NEVER VERIFIED ITS COMPLETION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.