Narrative:

Power management controls were inoperative and autothrottles were deactivated per MEL's. All events up to and including liftoff were normal and in accordance with company policy and procedures. At 1000 ft AGL, I called for climb power and looked down to check the DME in preparation for the first turn. When I looked up, the first officer's hand was just reaching the throttles and both egt's in-instrument red lights were on. I said 'over temperature! Get the throttles back!' we continued with the departure and climb out. After we were established, I asked first officer if he had noted the engine temperatures. His response was that the right engine was 970 degrees C, and left was 954 degrees C. I said 'how long? About 3 seconds?' he replied, 'no more than that, probably less.' I then asked him to get in touch with las maintenance and tell them what had happened and give them the readings, time, and outside air temperature (31 degrees C). Las maintenance told us to contact phx maintenance. Phx maintenance was contacted and given the information, they told us to stand by. After what seemed a long time with no communication, we tried to talk to them, with no result. We then went through the whole procedure again. Phx again asked for all the information and told us to stand by. This happened about 4 times. Phx finally said they were trying to find out if they could get the maintenance done in msp. I asked, 'haven't you looked at the QRH, you have one don't you?' 'if you can't tell me you have more definitive information that will let me continue, I'm coming back!' they said, 'if you bring it back, bring it to phx.' I said 'I'll take it to the closest airport.' as it turned out, from our point in space, there was only 1 mi difference between las and phx -- I went to phx. The aircraft operated normally through all this. There was only a 20 degree spread between engine egt readings and we landed at phx at 113000 pounds. I didn't have to compound the problem with an overweight landing. I was expecting maintenance control to have more information than what was available to me. I was hoping that they would tell me that per manual XXX, page XXX, graph/table XXX, I could continue, john DOE #XXX. I could enter this into the log book and continue to msp. That not being the case, we needed to get the aircraft on the ground. This didn't happen! They just wanted me to continue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 ON INITIAL CLBOUT AT 1000 FT AGL HAD BOTH ENG EXHAUST GAS TEMPS EXCEED LIMITS. AFTER CHKING WITH MAINT, ACFT DIVERTED TO PHX.

Narrative: PWR MGMNT CTLS WERE INOP AND AUTOTHROTTLES WERE DEACTIVATED PER MEL'S. ALL EVENTS UP TO AND INCLUDING LIFTOFF WERE NORMAL AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY POLICY AND PROCS. AT 1000 FT AGL, I CALLED FOR CLB PWR AND LOOKED DOWN TO CHK THE DME IN PREPARATION FOR THE FIRST TURN. WHEN I LOOKED UP, THE FO'S HAND WAS JUST REACHING THE THROTTLES AND BOTH EGT'S IN-INST RED LIGHTS WERE ON. I SAID 'OVER TEMP! GET THE THROTTLES BACK!' WE CONTINUED WITH THE DEP AND CLBOUT. AFTER WE WERE ESTABLISHED, I ASKED FO IF HE HAD NOTED THE ENG TEMPS. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT THE R ENG WAS 970 DEGS C, AND L WAS 954 DEGS C. I SAID 'HOW LONG? ABOUT 3 SECONDS?' HE REPLIED, 'NO MORE THAN THAT, PROBABLY LESS.' I THEN ASKED HIM TO GET IN TOUCH WITH LAS MAINT AND TELL THEM WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND GIVE THEM THE READINGS, TIME, AND OUTSIDE AIR TEMP (31 DEGS C). LAS MAINT TOLD US TO CONTACT PHX MAINT. PHX MAINT WAS CONTACTED AND GIVEN THE INFO, THEY TOLD US TO STAND BY. AFTER WHAT SEEMED A LONG TIME WITH NO COM, WE TRIED TO TALK TO THEM, WITH NO RESULT. WE THEN WENT THROUGH THE WHOLE PROC AGAIN. PHX AGAIN ASKED FOR ALL THE INFO AND TOLD US TO STAND BY. THIS HAPPENED ABOUT 4 TIMES. PHX FINALLY SAID THEY WERE TRYING TO FIND OUT IF THEY COULD GET THE MAINT DONE IN MSP. I ASKED, 'HAVEN'T YOU LOOKED AT THE QRH, YOU HAVE ONE DON'T YOU?' 'IF YOU CAN'T TELL ME YOU HAVE MORE DEFINITIVE INFO THAT WILL LET ME CONTINUE, I'M COMING BACK!' THEY SAID, 'IF YOU BRING IT BACK, BRING IT TO PHX.' I SAID 'I'LL TAKE IT TO THE CLOSEST ARPT.' AS IT TURNED OUT, FROM OUR POINT IN SPACE, THERE WAS ONLY 1 MI DIFFERENCE BTWN LAS AND PHX -- I WENT TO PHX. THE ACFT OPERATED NORMALLY THROUGH ALL THIS. THERE WAS ONLY A 20 DEG SPREAD BTWN ENG EGT READINGS AND WE LANDED AT PHX AT 113000 LBS. I DIDN'T HAVE TO COMPOUND THE PROB WITH AN OVERWT LNDG. I WAS EXPECTING MAINT CTL TO HAVE MORE INFO THAN WHAT WAS AVAILABLE TO ME. I WAS HOPING THAT THEY WOULD TELL ME THAT PER MANUAL XXX, PAGE XXX, GRAPH/TABLE XXX, I COULD CONTINUE, JOHN DOE #XXX. I COULD ENTER THIS INTO THE LOG BOOK AND CONTINUE TO MSP. THAT NOT BEING THE CASE, WE NEEDED TO GET THE ACFT ON THE GND. THIS DIDN'T HAPPEN! THEY JUST WANTED ME TO CONTINUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.