Narrative:

On the morning of jul/xa/98, while conducting a routine periodic inspection on the beaumont, tx, ASR surveillance approachs, the ATC controller apparently thought we were doing a check similar to a military 'operations evaluation' where flight check crews maneuver contrary to issued clrncs and read clrncs back incorrectly. Our mission was to verify the listed controling obstacles for each ASR approach (runways 12, 30, 34, 16), ensure no new obstacles had been erected, and to evaluate the accuracy of the approach and quality of air traffic services in accordance with H8200.1, united states standard flight inspection manual. The inspection was routine as far as flight inspection was concerned. The only significant items noted by us were: 1) temporary cranes operating approximately 2 NM northwest of the airport. 2) an apparent discrepancy between extended centerline of runway 12 and the 'on course' line of the ASR video map for runway 12. 3) MSAW alerts issued by the controller as we descended from final approach fix to 100 ft below MDA (flight inspection requirement). 1) was idented visually and we informed the controller we would provide our own separation from all obstacles during the inspection. 2) a different controller took over and informed us they had changed to a different video map for that runway. 3) the MSAW alerts were timely and for the most part correct -- we would purposely set up a high rate of descent in order to see if the radar program would trigger properly. There has been a problem with this sort of thing at other facilities in the past. According to information passed to us by our management, the controller complained to his/her supervisor that we were conducting a test and evaluation of his/her abilities by busting altitudes, flying headings contrary to those assigned and giving incorrect readbacks. This was not the case. All maneuvers were pre-coordinated prior to execution. The facility manager apparently forwarded the controller's accusations to the southwest region office, who forwarded it to washington and from there to flight standards. As of this writing an alert bulletin has been issued by aat-20 stating that 'no pilot deviation or inappropriate actions were committed by either the crew of flight check aircraft or the beaumont, tx, air traffic personnel.' even though this statement was issued by aat-20, I have been informed by my supervisor that flight standards is 'working' on this as a possible pilot deviation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAA FLT CHK PLT CONCERNED WHEN HE RECEIVES INFO THAT SCHEDULED AIR TFC FACILITY INSPECTIONS MAY RESULT IN A PLTDEV.

Narrative: ON THE MORNING OF JUL/XA/98, WHILE CONDUCTING A ROUTINE PERIODIC INSPECTION ON THE BEAUMONT, TX, ASR SURVEILLANCE APCHS, THE ATC CTLR APPARENTLY THOUGHT WE WERE DOING A CHK SIMILAR TO A MIL 'OPS EVALUATION' WHERE FLT CHK CREWS MANEUVER CONTRARY TO ISSUED CLRNCS AND READ CLRNCS BACK INCORRECTLY. OUR MISSION WAS TO VERIFY THE LISTED CTLING OBSTACLES FOR EACH ASR APCH (RWYS 12, 30, 34, 16), ENSURE NO NEW OBSTACLES HAD BEEN ERECTED, AND TO EVALUATE THE ACCURACY OF THE APCH AND QUALITY OF AIR TFC SVCS IN ACCORDANCE WITH H8200.1, UNITED STATES STANDARD FLT INSPECTION MANUAL. THE INSPECTION WAS ROUTINE AS FAR AS FLT INSPECTION WAS CONCERNED. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT ITEMS NOTED BY US WERE: 1) TEMPORARY CRANES OPERATING APPROX 2 NM NW OF THE ARPT. 2) AN APPARENT DISCREPANCY BTWN EXTENDED CTRLINE OF RWY 12 AND THE 'ON COURSE' LINE OF THE ASR VIDEO MAP FOR RWY 12. 3) MSAW ALERTS ISSUED BY THE CTLR AS WE DSNDED FROM FINAL APCH FIX TO 100 FT BELOW MDA (FLT INSPECTION REQUIREMENT). 1) WAS IDENTED VISUALLY AND WE INFORMED THE CTLR WE WOULD PROVIDE OUR OWN SEPARATION FROM ALL OBSTACLES DURING THE INSPECTION. 2) A DIFFERENT CTLR TOOK OVER AND INFORMED US THEY HAD CHANGED TO A DIFFERENT VIDEO MAP FOR THAT RWY. 3) THE MSAW ALERTS WERE TIMELY AND FOR THE MOST PART CORRECT -- WE WOULD PURPOSELY SET UP A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT IN ORDER TO SEE IF THE RADAR PROGRAM WOULD TRIGGER PROPERLY. THERE HAS BEEN A PROB WITH THIS SORT OF THING AT OTHER FACILITIES IN THE PAST. ACCORDING TO INFO PASSED TO US BY OUR MGMNT, THE CTLR COMPLAINED TO HIS/HER SUPVR THAT WE WERE CONDUCTING A TEST AND EVALUATION OF HIS/HER ABILITIES BY BUSTING ALTS, FLYING HEADINGS CONTRARY TO THOSE ASSIGNED AND GIVING INCORRECT READBACKS. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. ALL MANEUVERS WERE PRE-COORDINATED PRIOR TO EXECUTION. THE FACILITY MGR APPARENTLY FORWARDED THE CTLR'S ACCUSATIONS TO THE SW REGION OFFICE, WHO FORWARDED IT TO WASHINGTON AND FROM THERE TO FLT STANDARDS. AS OF THIS WRITING AN ALERT BULLETIN HAS BEEN ISSUED BY AAT-20 STATING THAT 'NO PLTDEV OR INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS WERE COMMITTED BY EITHER THE CREW OF FLT CHK ACFT OR THE BEAUMONT, TX, AIR TFC PERSONNEL.' EVEN THOUGH THIS STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY AAT-20, I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY MY SUPVR THAT FLT STANDARDS IS 'WORKING' ON THIS AS A POSSIBLE PLTDEV.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.