Narrative:

On the first day of a 3 day trip we had an aircraft change at our home base (mco). This was a quick turn with approximately 35 mins to make the swap. The captain performed the preflight while I retrieved the dispatch release. Upon returning to the aircraft, the captain informed me of a possible hydraulic leak, #1 engine. While maintenance checked out this problem, I performed interior checklists starting from the top with aircraft acceptance check. Everything checked out ok except for takeoff aural warning check, which gave a trim out of takeoff range, with the trim in the green arc. I pointed this out to the captain when he arrived, and he ran the trim full forward and full aft. He briefed a possible trim problem on takeoff. Electric pitch appeared to operate normally. We boarded passenger and taxied for takeoff. The captain was the PF, and upon the takeoff roll, after bringing the power levers forward we received the takeoff aural warning that the trim was not set for takeoff. (It was.) we aborted the takeoff and returned to the gate. Maintenance quickly discovered the real cause of the discrepancy. The aircraft had come from the hangar where gear swings had been performed. The takeoff aural warning and hobbs circuit breakers had been pulled. Both maintenance, the crew that taxied the plane from the hangar, as well as our crew missed this. Contributing factors were the fact that popped circuit breakers are difficult to detect visually in this aircraft. A better method is to stand on jump seat and look down on panel, or use hands for a tactile check. Additionally, as the first officer on this flight I should have pointed out my displeasure with captain's decision to taxi for takeoff with an unexplained erroneous aural warning. Maintenance should have been called back out to troubleshoot this problem prior to pushback.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF EMB120 HAS AURAL WARNING REGARDING TRIM ON TKOF ROLL. THEY ABORT THE TKOF.

Narrative: ON THE FIRST DAY OF A 3 DAY TRIP WE HAD AN ACFT CHANGE AT OUR HOME BASE (MCO). THIS WAS A QUICK TURN WITH APPROX 35 MINS TO MAKE THE SWAP. THE CAPT PERFORMED THE PREFLT WHILE I RETRIEVED THE DISPATCH RELEASE. UPON RETURNING TO THE ACFT, THE CAPT INFORMED ME OF A POSSIBLE HYD LEAK, #1 ENG. WHILE MAINT CHKED OUT THIS PROB, I PERFORMED INTERIOR CHKLISTS STARTING FROM THE TOP WITH ACFT ACCEPTANCE CHK. EVERYTHING CHKED OUT OK EXCEPT FOR TKOF AURAL WARNING CHK, WHICH GAVE A TRIM OUT OF TKOF RANGE, WITH THE TRIM IN THE GREEN ARC. I POINTED THIS OUT TO THE CAPT WHEN HE ARRIVED, AND HE RAN THE TRIM FULL FORWARD AND FULL AFT. HE BRIEFED A POSSIBLE TRIM PROB ON TKOF. ELECTRIC PITCH APPEARED TO OPERATE NORMALLY. WE BOARDED PAX AND TAXIED FOR TKOF. THE CAPT WAS THE PF, AND UPON THE TKOF ROLL, AFTER BRINGING THE PWR LEVERS FORWARD WE RECEIVED THE TKOF AURAL WARNING THAT THE TRIM WAS NOT SET FOR TKOF. (IT WAS.) WE ABORTED THE TKOF AND RETURNED TO THE GATE. MAINT QUICKLY DISCOVERED THE REAL CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY. THE ACFT HAD COME FROM THE HANGAR WHERE GEAR SWINGS HAD BEEN PERFORMED. THE TKOF AURAL WARNING AND HOBBS CIRCUIT BREAKERS HAD BEEN PULLED. BOTH MAINT, THE CREW THAT TAXIED THE PLANE FROM THE HANGAR, AS WELL AS OUR CREW MISSED THIS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THE FACT THAT POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS ARE DIFFICULT TO DETECT VISUALLY IN THIS ACFT. A BETTER METHOD IS TO STAND ON JUMP SEAT AND LOOK DOWN ON PANEL, OR USE HANDS FOR A TACTILE CHK. ADDITIONALLY, AS THE FO ON THIS FLT I SHOULD HAVE POINTED OUT MY DISPLEASURE WITH CAPT'S DECISION TO TAXI FOR TKOF WITH AN UNEXPLAINED ERRONEOUS AURAL WARNING. MAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CALLED BACK OUT TO TROUBLESHOOT THIS PROB PRIOR TO PUSHBACK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.