Narrative:

About 3 hours into flight (FL290 -- mach .84) the red gear door open light illuminated simultaneously with GS-2 ant light. Placed the gear lever handle to the up position and then accomplished the 'red door open light on other than retraction or extension' procedure on page a of the fhb. Both lights remained on with no corresponding prim or altitude light at the flight engineer panel. The GS-2 ant light indication caused me concern as, in my mind, it suggested multiple indications of a single problem. I thought the nose gear door with the #2 lower GS ant may have unlocked but was being held in position by the slipstream. I had difficulty relegating the GS-2 ant light as a non-sequitur, even though the lack of flight engineer station indications suggested so. There was no buffeting or noise. About 45 mins after the light illuminated, flight engineer noticed both anti-skid landing gear tilt input lights flicker, as I noticed the gear door open and GS-2 ant lights momentarily extinguished. Flight engineer immediately referenced the fhb for ground safety relay failure. For the next 5 mins, the tilt lights flickered on then off many times. Then finally, the ground safe relay on light illuminated and we lost cabin pressure. The rate of change pegged at over 2000 FPM and the cabin pressure indicator was spinning so as to blur. First officer and I donned oxygen. First officer took manual control of the outflow valves and donned oxygen. Called and completed the rapid depressurization checklist. I rechked the gear door open and GS-2 ant lights on and confirmed our position relative to the etp. Flight engineer saved the cabin -- no warning horn. Faced with multiple gear door open light indications, a ground safety relay failure and no fuel pad, turning around seemed the most prudent course of action. We were 1 hour 20 mins before reaching our etp. For over 5 mins first officer tried to make contact with tokyo radio. I turned around and on 121.5 announced my intentions to descend from FL290 to FL245 and track between A590 and R580. By deciding to deviate from my clearance, declaring an emergency also seemed prudent. First officer did this upon first contact with tokyo. I took over contact with tokyo and instructed first officer to establish a phone patch with jfk. Dispatch directed us to proceed to narita. Rather than dump fuel, I decided to fly at a lower altitude. The proper fuel flow to time remaining ratio occurred at FL180. Tokyo cleared us to narita at that altitude. On landing at narita, as expected, thrust reversers and automatic speed brakes failed. But, with 12000 ft of runway after GS intercept, even a 285400 kgs landing was no problem. Air carrier a personnel parked us and provided initial support. About 45 mins after arrival, air carrier a technician took me to the air carrier B line maintenance office where repairs could be coordinated. Air carrier B technicians examined schematics and advised me that the front panel light indications were part of the ground safety relay failure. Recommendation: include gear door and GS ant lights on the landing list of ground safety relay items on page B of the fhb. Supplemental information from acn 401108: I pulled my oxygen mask down to my lap, instinctively. That action was shortly followed by a loss of cabin, whereupon I donned my mask and switched microphone selector to mask and had tested it using intercom and speaker. The CRM techniques trained and practiced during this event went to hell! The captain continued to fly and troubleshoot with the flight engineer who had the flight handbook in his lap. Captain began a descent from FL290 to FL180, a left turn off track to reverse course. We flew between A590 and R580 then joined. Flight engineer was able to control cabin manually. I tried calling sfo radio on 132.73 HF, I believe, and other alternate frequencys. Flcs from other flts on the same A590 and A580 rtes were the most ignorant, inconsiderate bastards I've ever shared the skies with -- especially air carrier X. They kept communicating over my xmissions. Finally, another air carrier told everyone else to shut up and listen to the problem we were experiencing. I had to point out 3 times to the confused captain we should fly to opulo. We landed at narita.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-200 CARGO ACFT LOSES CABIN PRESSURE AT FL290 WHILE FLYING THROUGH RJTG AIRSPACE.

Narrative: ABOUT 3 HRS INTO FLT (FL290 -- MACH .84) THE RED GEAR DOOR OPEN LIGHT ILLUMINATED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH GS-2 ANT LIGHT. PLACED THE GEAR LEVER HANDLE TO THE UP POS AND THEN ACCOMPLISHED THE 'RED DOOR OPEN LIGHT ON OTHER THAN RETRACTION OR EXTENSION' PROC ON PAGE A OF THE FHB. BOTH LIGHTS REMAINED ON WITH NO CORRESPONDING PRIM OR ALT LIGHT AT THE FE PANEL. THE GS-2 ANT LIGHT INDICATION CAUSED ME CONCERN AS, IN MY MIND, IT SUGGESTED MULTIPLE INDICATIONS OF A SINGLE PROB. I THOUGHT THE NOSE GEAR DOOR WITH THE #2 LOWER GS ANT MAY HAVE UNLOCKED BUT WAS BEING HELD IN POS BY THE SLIPSTREAM. I HAD DIFFICULTY RELEGATING THE GS-2 ANT LIGHT AS A NON-SEQUITUR, EVEN THOUGH THE LACK OF FE STATION INDICATIONS SUGGESTED SO. THERE WAS NO BUFFETING OR NOISE. ABOUT 45 MINS AFTER THE LIGHT ILLUMINATED, FE NOTICED BOTH ANTI-SKID LNDG GEAR TILT INPUT LIGHTS FLICKER, AS I NOTICED THE GEAR DOOR OPEN AND GS-2 ANT LIGHTS MOMENTARILY EXTINGUISHED. FE IMMEDIATELY REFED THE FHB FOR GND SAFETY RELAY FAILURE. FOR THE NEXT 5 MINS, THE TILT LIGHTS FLICKERED ON THEN OFF MANY TIMES. THEN FINALLY, THE GND SAFE RELAY ON LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND WE LOST CABIN PRESSURE. THE RATE OF CHANGE PEGGED AT OVER 2000 FPM AND THE CABIN PRESSURE INDICATOR WAS SPINNING SO AS TO BLUR. FO AND I DONNED OXYGEN. FO TOOK MANUAL CTL OF THE OUTFLOW VALVES AND DONNED OXYGEN. CALLED AND COMPLETED THE RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION CHKLIST. I RECHKED THE GEAR DOOR OPEN AND GS-2 ANT LIGHTS ON AND CONFIRMED OUR POS RELATIVE TO THE ETP. FE SAVED THE CABIN -- NO WARNING HORN. FACED WITH MULTIPLE GEAR DOOR OPEN LIGHT INDICATIONS, A GND SAFETY RELAY FAILURE AND NO FUEL PAD, TURNING AROUND SEEMED THE MOST PRUDENT COURSE OF ACTION. WE WERE 1 HR 20 MINS BEFORE REACHING OUR ETP. FOR OVER 5 MINS FO TRIED TO MAKE CONTACT WITH TOKYO RADIO. I TURNED AROUND AND ON 121.5 ANNOUNCED MY INTENTIONS TO DSND FROM FL290 TO FL245 AND TRACK BTWN A590 AND R580. BY DECIDING TO DEVIATE FROM MY CLRNC, DECLARING AN EMER ALSO SEEMED PRUDENT. FO DID THIS UPON FIRST CONTACT WITH TOKYO. I TOOK OVER CONTACT WITH TOKYO AND INSTRUCTED FO TO ESTABLISH A PHONE PATCH WITH JFK. DISPATCH DIRECTED US TO PROCEED TO NARITA. RATHER THAN DUMP FUEL, I DECIDED TO FLY AT A LOWER ALT. THE PROPER FUEL FLOW TO TIME REMAINING RATIO OCCURRED AT FL180. TOKYO CLRED US TO NARITA AT THAT ALT. ON LNDG AT NARITA, AS EXPECTED, THRUST REVERSERS AND AUTO SPD BRAKES FAILED. BUT, WITH 12000 FT OF RWY AFTER GS INTERCEPT, EVEN A 285400 KGS LNDG WAS NO PROB. ACR A PERSONNEL PARKED US AND PROVIDED INITIAL SUPPORT. ABOUT 45 MINS AFTER ARR, ACR A TECHNICIAN TOOK ME TO THE ACR B LINE MAINT OFFICE WHERE REPAIRS COULD BE COORDINATED. ACR B TECHNICIANS EXAMINED SCHEMATICS AND ADVISED ME THAT THE FRONT PANEL LIGHT INDICATIONS WERE PART OF THE GND SAFETY RELAY FAILURE. RECOMMENDATION: INCLUDE GEAR DOOR AND GS ANT LIGHTS ON THE LNDG LIST OF GND SAFETY RELAY ITEMS ON PAGE B OF THE FHB. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 401108: I PULLED MY OXYGEN MASK DOWN TO MY LAP, INSTINCTIVELY. THAT ACTION WAS SHORTLY FOLLOWED BY A LOSS OF CABIN, WHEREUPON I DONNED MY MASK AND SWITCHED MIKE SELECTOR TO MASK AND HAD TESTED IT USING INTERCOM AND SPEAKER. THE CRM TECHNIQUES TRAINED AND PRACTICED DURING THIS EVENT WENT TO HELL! THE CAPT CONTINUED TO FLY AND TROUBLESHOOT WITH THE FE WHO HAD THE FLT HANDBOOK IN HIS LAP. CAPT BEGAN A DSCNT FROM FL290 TO FL180, A L TURN OFF TRACK TO REVERSE COURSE. WE FLEW BTWN A590 AND R580 THEN JOINED. FE WAS ABLE TO CTL CABIN MANUALLY. I TRIED CALLING SFO RADIO ON 132.73 HF, I BELIEVE, AND OTHER ALTERNATE FREQS. FLCS FROM OTHER FLTS ON THE SAME A590 AND A580 RTES WERE THE MOST IGNORANT, INCONSIDERATE BASTARDS I'VE EVER SHARED THE SKIES WITH -- ESPECIALLY ACR X. THEY KEPT COMMUNICATING OVER MY XMISSIONS. FINALLY, ANOTHER ACR TOLD EVERYONE ELSE TO SHUT UP AND LISTEN TO THE PROB WE WERE EXPERIENCING. I HAD TO POINT OUT 3 TIMES TO THE CONFUSED CAPT WE SHOULD FLY TO OPULO. WE LANDED AT NARITA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.